ORGANIZATIONS TO BRIDGE THE PACIFIC:
THE JAPAN SOCIETY, THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT, AND
JAPANESE-AMERICAN CULTURAL INTERNATIONALISM, 1912-1931

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the Master of Arts in History, Saint Mary’s University

July 2018
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Date: July 27, 2018
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ABSTRACT

Organizations to Bridge the Pacific:

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In Japanese-American relations, much historical research has been undertaken on factors perceived to have caused the Pacific War. These include studies on the collapse of Japanese interwar democracy, treatments of American immigration restriction and racism, and wider geopolitical rivalries within Asia and the Pacific. However, while valuable, such studies can paint a deceptive picture of events by casting the war in highly deterministic terms as the “inevitable” outcome of longstanding national grievances. This thesis offers an alternative narrative of Japanese-American relations centred around the study of two nongovernmental internationalist organizations—the Japan Society of New York and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—which sought to improve understanding between both nations. In doing so, it offers an intellectual history of the (often discounted) internationalist movement as it applied to Japan, explores the mentalities of its constituent members, and examines the nature of the disapproval leveled against both organizations by critics.

July 27, 2018
Writing a MA Thesis in one year, especially while completing other course work, is not the easiest of projects and I would like to thank all those who helped me during my Masters program. As Graduate Coordinator Dr. Nicole Neatby kept me and the other grad students on track with our research and provided initial feedback on our projects while still in the formative stages. While my project eventually shifted away from my original topic involving Franco-Japanese relations, I would still like to thank Dr. Kirrily Freeman for generously offering me a reading course on French political and colonial history. For family members, I would like to thank my Dad for once again sitting through another of my long-winded projects and for once more acting as my knowledgeable layman in critiquing its contents. Most importantly, I’d like to thank Dr. Bill Sewell who despite his own commitments nevertheless still found time to offer me two valuable reading courses on Japanese history as well as act as my advisor. The value of his expertise can be readily seen in the citations throughout my thesis. I would also like to thank the two further members of my defence committee, Dr. Marc Doucet and Dr. Brook Taylor, for lending their time to help hold my feet to the fire.

Thank you everyone.
AUTHOR’S NOTE

Japanese and Chinese names are referred to in standard Asian order (family name first), apart from those writers who explicitly reversed it. This is true of authors such as K.K. Kawakami, who wrote in English for an American audience.

Japanese terms, including personal and place names, appear with standard diacritical marks apart from well-known place names such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, or other words commonly known in English such as Bushido or Shinto.

Chinese names and terms have been transliterated in Pinyin, except for names where the contemporaneous translation is more familiar, such as Sun Yat-sen or Chiang Kai-Shek.

When referring to places in Manchuria the cities of Port Arthur and Mukden, well-known to contemporaneous foreigners, are preferred over their modern counterparts of Lüshun and Shenyang. Additionally, the Japanese name for the Kwangtung Army (Kantōgun) has also been used as standard.

Transliterated words in direct quotations have been silently corrected to match these standards.

Abbreviations Used in Footnotes:

YCE – Yearbook of the Carnegie Endowment (1911-1943)
BJSNY – Bulletin of the Japan Society of New York (1915-1921)
YJSNY – Yearbook of the Japan Society of New York (1910-1918)
ARSAA – Annual Report of the Silk Association of America (1920)
AoP – Advocate of Peace
AJIL – American Journal of International Law
INTRODUCTION: FROM MEIJI TO TAISHO, 1905-1912

“Nearly thirty years ago, when applying for admission to the University in Tokyo as a student, I selected English Literature for my minor course, in addition to my major study of Economics. The Dean of the Department of Literature questioned me as to my motive for combining these two apparently unrelated branches of learning. ‘I wish, sir, to be a bridge across the Pacific,’ I replied. On being pressed for further explanation, I threw aside the metaphor and told him of my desire to be a means of transmitting the ideas of the West to the East, and of the East to the West.”
– Nitobe Inazō, June 20, 1912

On August 3, 1911 the Cunard liner *Lusitania* docked in New York bearing with it one of Japan’s most famous military personalities: the victor of the Battle of Tsushima, Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō. Disembarking to the cheers of his fellow passengers, the Admiral would be shown every courtesy by his American hosts. Touring the east coast, Tōgō met with the mayor of New York, attended a cadet review at West Point, and dined with both President William Taft at the White House as well as with his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, at his private home in Oyster Bay. However, the culminating moment of the trip was undoubtedly the official luncheon held at the renowned Astor Hotel by the New York Peace Society and its subsidiary organization the Japan Society of New York. “At a dinner at the White House,” the internationally-minded *American Journal of International Law* (AJIL) later reported, “President Taft had broached the subject of arbitration and sought an expression of approval from Admiral Tōgō. The latter avoided the subject for the moment, but a few days later in New York, as guest of honor of the two societies, and before six hundred guests, the Admiral spoke in no uncertain terms in favor of the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States.” Beginning his speech, Tōgō opened with what the AJIL dubbed “a pleasing personal allusion and etymological exercise”:

My name, Heihachiro Tōgō, possesses particular significance at this time. Heihachiro signifies “peaceful son” and Tōgō means “Eastern country,” the peaceful man of the East.

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I consider, therefore, that the name by which I was christened entitles me to address you on terms of intimacy.\(^3\)

When these words were repeated in English, *The Washington Post* reported, “an outburst of applause arose spontaneously from the hundreds of guests present.” For the victor of one of the most decisive battles in recent history, this claim may appear somewhat contradictory. But as it came from just such a military man as himself, Tōgō’s appeal to turn swords into ploughshares likely appeared even more genuine to his already receptive American hosts. In response, the Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, James Brown Scott, read a telegram from the Endowment’s founder and noted business magnate Andrew Carnegie who from Scotland sent “Cordial greetings to Tōgō, great warrior and great peace-maker!” The Japan Society, however, was not to be upstaged at its own event as one of the Society’s honorary presidents, General Stewart L. Woodford, was on hand to personally present the Admiral with a specially bound copy of Commodore Perry's original report from his 1853-1854 expedition to Japan.\(^4\) This would not be the last meeting to take place at the Astor Hotel between Americans and Japanese dignitaries.

From the Japanese perspective, Tōgō’s tour of the United States was emblematic of contemporary Japanese foreign relations. On the one hand, this was a chance to take a victory lap in what was already seen as the high-water mark of the Meiji era. As Sandra Wilson has argued, the late Meiji period saw the development of a discourse of Japanese national greatness where “military success was the single most important part of the standard argument that Japan had become or was becoming a great nation.”\(^5\) Taking pride of place among these successes was


victory in the Russo-Japanese War and at the Battle of Tsushima in particular. As the victor of that encounter, Admiral Tōgō had become one of the most internationally renowned heroes of the war. On the other hand, since even before the war, Japanese-American diplomatic relations had been steadily worsening. Main friction points had included the American annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines in 1898, Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, accusations by the Japanese press that President Roosevelt had cheated Japan of her rightful spoils of war at the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, the American policy of “Dollar Diplomacy” in Manchuria, the establishment of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” limiting Japanese immigration to the U.S. in 1907, accusations of Japanese imperial misrule, as well as numerous other political friction points. Japanese-American estrangement, in Akira Iriye’s words, “was one of the outstanding developments of the turn of the century” and was directly tied to the expanding imperial ambitions of both nations in the Pacific. Resenting this American competition, many Japanese nationalists were increasingly arguing the inevitability of an American-Japanese conflict. In July 1911, a mere month before Admiral Tōgō landed in New York, the conservative elder statesman Yamagata Aritomo had confidently predicted that “although the likelihood of an outbreak of war between the United States and Japan is, at this point almost unimaginable,” this was bound to swiftly change in the coming years. “We do not know what type of transformation will occur,” Yamagata admitted, but recent U.S. policy had made clear that “the unavoidability of a mutual clash” had made war inevitable “sooner or later.” Many Americans were no less fatalistic. In 1910, for example, the scion of American naval power, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, had already labeled Japan a “problem state” that would have to be contained by American naval

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power to insure economic access to Asian markets. As one historian has bluntly concluded, “the 1900 to 1912 years provided a string of horrors for U.S. hopes in Asia.”\textsuperscript{8} However, it would be a mistake to view Japanese-American relations as one long series of disputes, provocations, and jingoism. It is here that studying contemporary Japanese and American internationalist organizations can provide a useful counterpoint to these seemingly grim bilateral relations.

Both the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment were typical American examples of the proliferation of internationalist organizations which took place in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. As Akira Iriye has explored, there were three manifestations of this internationalism. Firstly, there was economic internationalism which sought to create a common set of policies for economic integration of the world’s economies—the sort of things associated with the contemporary term “globalization.” Secondly, there was legal internationalism which sought the codification of international laws to govern the conduct of nations—the most famous example of which was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris (the formation of the American Journal of International Law the same year as the Japan Society was another). Finally, there was also the development of cultural internationalism, “the idea that internationalism may best be fostered through cross-national cultural communication, understanding and cooperation.”\textsuperscript{9} As Iriye notes, this cultural internationalism was originally created with improving inter-European relations in mind, a fact not unsurprising considering the Eurocentric and racial attitudes of the time. However, with Japan’s rise into the ranks of the Great Powers there was a growing question of how to incorporate “non-Western” powers into the internationalist fold. In time numerous Japanese would indeed go on to join many contemporary internationalist organizations. Yet, as Iriye notes, “it is hard to escape the conclusion that before World War I

few in Europe or North America developed a conception of global internationalism, embracing different races and peoples. The Japan Society and (indirectly) the Carnegie Endowment are notable exceptions to this general trend.

The foundation of the Japan Society took place in 1907 in circumstances not too dissimilar from events in 1911. That year General Tamesada Kuroki and Vice-Admiral Gorō Ijuin—who, like Tōgō, were both veterans of the Russo-Japanese War—arrived in New York aboard the cruisers Tsukuba and Chitose as Japan’s official representatives to the American Jamestown Exposition to be held that spring. A welcome banquet on May 17 was held for the Japanese visitors upon their arrival. Presided over by Admiral George Dewey, who had led an American squadron to victory in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War, the event also included many members of New York high Society, including the noted international customs lawyer Lindsay Russell. Although nothing official was decided, the proposal for an organization “to promote and strengthen friendship between the Yankees of the East and West” was made during the evening and was well received by those in attendance. An organization of this nature was not unprecedented, after all. There was already a British Japan Society of London which had been founded in 1892 and a French Société franco-japonaise de Paris established in 1900. At a reciprocal banquet hosted on May 19 by General Kuroki, Russell announced the planned creation of a “Japan Society of New York, having for its object the cultivation of friendly relations between this country and yours.” Working with the journalist Hamilton Holt and other New York businessmen with ties to Japan, the Society was founded with Russell as its president and its mandate set as, “the promotion of friendly relations between the United States and Japan and diffusion among the American people of a more accurate knowledge of the people

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10 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 38-43.
12 Auslin, Japan Society, 12.
of Japan, their aims, ideals, arts, sciences, industries and economic conditions.”

It was a textbook example of a pre-1914 cultural internationalist organization. This was followed in 1917 by the formation of a Japanese branch of the Society as the New York Nihon kyōkai sanjokai (later renamed the Nichibei kyōkai) with the noted industrialist Shibusawa Eiichi as President.

Andrew Carnegie, meanwhile, had been involved in the movement for international peace well before the establishment of the Endowment that would bear his name. In 1905, for example, Carnegie had given a speech at the University of Saint Andrews in which he had proposed a “League of Peace” to help mediate international grievances. After all, he argued, the spoils of war “generally prove Dead Sea fruit.” Taking the recently concluded Russo-Japanese War as an example, Carnegie observed that despite being the victor, “had Japan, a very poor country, known that the result would be a debt of two hundred million sterling weighing her down” for only modest gains, they may have chosen to mediate and not have jumped into battle with such enthusiasm. It was in this spirit on December 14, 1910 that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was officially founded. With $10 million worth of 5% U.S. Steel bonds as assets, and its mandate outlined in a letter sent by Carnegie to the trustees he selected to run it, the Endowment was intended by its founder to be a more proactive peace organization than its allegedly incapable rivals and would work with the American government to achieve immediate results. In his letter, Carnegie stated that the Endowment’s primary function was to “hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization.”

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13 For a statement of the rules of the Society which were set down in November 1907, see Yearbook Japan Society of New York (hereafter YJSNY), 1910-1911, 7-10.
14 At the time this was somewhat cumbersomely translated as “the Associate Society of the Japan Society of New York”. See Yearbook Carnegie Endowment (hereafter YCE), 1912, 71-72.
17 This letter is quoted in every Carnegie Endowment Yearbook, and can also be found in S.N.D. North, A Manual
goal Carnegie laid out seven objectives identifying a range of internationalist objectives. This included the cultural internationalist objective to “cultivate friendly feelings between the inhabitants of different countries, and to increase the knowledge and understanding of each other by the several nations.”18 In early 1911, the Board of Trustees, led by Endowment President and former secretary of State Elihu Root divided the organization into three groups in order to cover its objectives, encompassing the Division of Economics and History (economic internationalism), the Division of International Law (legal internationalism), and the Division of Intercourse and Education (cultural internationalism).19 The activities undertaken by the Endowment were extensive, and ranged from publishing scholarly monographs to studying current political debates to sponsoring cultural exchanges sending individuals from one nation to another. While Japanese-American relations were not the Endowment’s sole concern it is nevertheless telling, as Akira Iriye observed, that the first such exchange planned by the Division of Intercourse and Education in 1911 was focused on Japan and brought over the noted internationalist Nitobe Inazō to lecture at six American universities during the 1911-1912 school year. After his exchange, Nitobe would publish a book of his lectures entitled *The Japanese Nation: The Land, the People, and Its Life*, in which he interpreted his task in the cultural international mould as, “the interchange of right views and sentiments between the two peoples,” and claiming his desire to act as a cultural bridge to help span the Pacific.20 It was about the time that Nitobe was completing this assignment that the Emperor Meiji passed away in July 1912.

With the death of Mutsuhito most observers realized that this was not just the death of the symbolic Japanese head of state, but also the explicit end of an era. The words writer Natsume

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18 North, *Public Benefactions*, 165.
19 North, *Public Benefactions*, 166.
Sōseki gave to the protagonist Sensei in his famous novel *Kokoro* no doubt expressed the feelings of at least some Japanese: “On the night of the Imperial Funeral I sat in my study and listened to the booming of the cannon. To me it sounded like the passing of an age.”\(^{21}\) In particular, the suicide of another prominent Russo-Japanese war hero, General Nogi Maresuke, to “follow” his master into death (*junshi*) provoked heated debate among the Japanese press and public about how should they remember the Meiji era.\(^{22}\) For some Japanese the death of the emperor provided, “a palpable sense that the glory of Japan itself had ended with the close of the Meiji era.”\(^{23}\) To conservative Japanese leaders, such as Yamagata and his supporters, this necessitated a renewal of Japanese patriotism to continue the momentum begun under Meiji. However, for other Japanese statesmen the end of Meiji provided much needed room for manoeuvre in Japanese policy, both at home and abroad, allowing the nation to strike out in new directions. When in December 1912, only a few months after the emperor’s death, two Japanese political cabinets run by typical Meiji era oligarchs collapsed over increasing defence spending—ushering in the first multiparty administration in Japanese political history—democratically minded Japanese like Diet members Yoshino Sazukō and Ozaki Yukio saw further opportunities to be seized. The Taisho Political Crisis, as the journalist Maruyama Kandō observed, showed how, “the democratic tendencies (*minshūte kikeikō*) of the late Meiji era have emerged even more colourfully in Taisho” and that “the underlying thought fits with the intellectual trends of the world.”\(^{24}\) In this new Japan of Taisho, it could well be asked whether sending out military representatives like Admiral Tōgō to spread Japanese goodwill was now

\(^{23}\) Wilson, “National Greatness,” 49.
also behind the times for a democratizing Japan. Furthermore, did these developments also signal the rise to prominence of men like Nitobe and other Japanese internationalists? These debates over the direction of Japanese policy would only increase in the coming years.

Nor was this navel gazing on what was being called “the spirit of Meiji” (*Meiji no seishin*) limited to the Japanese; Americans too were cognizant of the significance of the emperor’s passing, especially for the still nascent internationalist cause. On September 13, 1912 the Japan Society held a memorial ceremony for the late emperor in what the attending writer Hamilton Wright Mabie dubbed, “the first commemoration by the Far West of a ruler of the Far East,” although the topic of General Nogi’s suicide was passed over in conspicuous silence.\(^{25}\) As the *AJIL* later summarized this American search for meaning in the Meiji era:

> With the Emperor's death ended the Meiji era in the history of Japan … No nation that exists has compressed so much history within a period so brief, or effected an evolution which bears such a momentous relation to the future history of the world. Whether the Occidental and the Oriental civilizations are to antagonize, and there is to ensue a titanic struggle for the supremacy of one over the other; or whether these two civilizations are to coalesce and intermingle and co-operate, for the development and the ultimate triumph of the idea of international unity, remains to be seen; but if “that far-off, divine event” shall ever come about, the career and the character of Mutsuhito will stand at the very front of the great things of earth that have made it possible.\(^{26}\)

This, then, was the general state of Japanese-American cultural internationalism as it stood at the dawn of the Taisho era in 1912.

By any measurement, the coming decades of the 1910s and the 1920s were to be important years in both American and Japanese history, and in the history of relations between these two nations. Yet despite this, historians have been slow to recognize the role played by nongovernmental internationalist organizations like the Carnegie Endowment or Japan Society in helping to form Japanese-American relations (for better or worse). In his 1960 biography of


Japan Society co-founder Hamilton Holt, historian Warren F. Kuehl laid out one of the pressing reasons for this historical ambivalence—the issue of internationalist idealism leading to naivety:

In all his activities, as has been indicated, Hamilton Holt was essentially an idealist. Whether as journalist, social reformer, educator, or internationalist, he believed that men could, by hard work, determination, and faith, remake the world in which they live. The biographer of such a man obviously faces certain problems of interpretation. An idealist pursues visionary goals and can never fully succeed in the crusades he undertakes. Is his life then to be judged a failure? He is often unrealistic and impractical in his consideration of or approach to problems. Should the biographer then criticize him for the very qualities which make his life worth recording?

As Kuehl ultimately concludes, “only time will provide an answer” to these questions.27

This issue over the impracticality of interwar internationalism and how historians are to judge it has preoccupied much of the study of contemporary internationalist organizations. For many early post-Second World War observers this internationalism was generally dismissed as naive and wholly impractical. In studying the legacy of the 1928 Pact of Paris—often held to be the pinnacle of such interwar legal internationalism—Oona Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro have catalogued the pact’s reception by many modern detractors. From Cold Warrior George Kennan (“childish, just childish”), to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (“as irresistible as it was meaningless”), to more modern historians such as Ian Kershaw (“singularly vacuous”), diplomat Kenneth Adelman (“a laughingstock”), and member of the Council of Foreign Relations James M. Lindsay (“the international equivalent of an air kiss”), the Pact and the internationalism that produced it has generally been met with a dismissive mixture of pity and disbelief despite the fact its ideals arguably underpin much of the international order today.28 An attempt by the missionary and internationalist Sydney Gulick to send American dolls to Japan in 1927 in a cultural internationalist gesture to coincide with the Hinamatsuri was recently derided by Sadao

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Asada along similar lines as “naive, if well-intentioned” and anyway merely symbolic of the debate attempting to pigeonhole Japan as either an egregious menace to world peace or a quaint, progressive, and liberalizing nation during this era. The result has been the assumption that these internationalists were hopeless idealists (i.e. people aspiring toward achieving an overly idealized and utopian world) standing in dichotomous opposition to more realistic nationalists (i.e. people who believed that such aspirations were inherently futile, and one needed to simply accept the world “as is”). Given that the First World War failed to solve most pressing pre-war political questions, and that an even more terrible sequel was to occur less than twenty years later, there perhaps remains a “common-sense” argument to cast events between 1918 and 1939 as existing in a cynical, world-weary zeitgeist leading inevitably to war and to picture those internationalists who argued otherwise as being inherently ignorant about the true state of world affairs, and thus unworthy of serious study.

There are further explanations which can account for the lack of prior historical interest in studying the work of internationalist organizations. As Akira Iriye has suggested, one likely factor was the predominance of the nation state as the bedrock of much of the historical research regarding international relations. “Because the interests and relative power of nations provide key conceptual frameworks, it is not surprising that most monographs in international history are studies of crises, tensions, struggles, and wars among nations.” If you want to learn about international politics, the argument goes, look to the views of statesmen, politicians, diplomats and soldiers (war being the continuation of politics by other means); it is here you will find

29 Sadao Asada, Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 47.

30 For a look at the characteristics of idealism and a refutation to the claim that it is an inherently irrational or naive belief system, see Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

31 A recent example of this fatalistic view can be seen in Philipp Blom, Fracture: Life and Culture in the West, 1918–1938 (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 12-15.

answers, not with irrelevant or naive internationalists. There is also the argument, in historian Glenda Sluga’s view, that “internationalism has long been regarded as a story of ideologues and radicals—whether nineteenth-century pacifists driven by utopian dreams of a parliament of man or working-class revolutionaries urging the workers of the world to unite.”\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, during the Cold War, the idea of “internationalism” was more likely to invoke reference to the radical Communist International rather than the work of moderate American liberal internationalists. This imposed a powerful ideological filter on the field prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. But probably the most crucial factor in the ambivalence towards the study of internationalist organizations lies with the checkered legacy of the man who first brought liberal internationalism to prominence during the interwar era: Woodrow Wilson. While I would argue that the liberal internationalism invoked by Wilson was not inherently naive, there is much evidence to conclude that Wilson himself was. One of the most oft-discussed parts of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, for example, was his repeated call for national self-determination. Yet, despite these fine words, Wilson never once clarified what exactly he meant by them. Sometimes the words were implied simply to mean democratic self-government. Other times it was implied to mean full autonomy for formerly subject peoples. But, as Secretary of State Robert Lansing scratched his head, self-determination for whom? “What unit does he have in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community?”\textsuperscript{34} This was classic Wilson, saying something grand without really saying anything at all. To paraphrase David Lloyd George, Wilson came to the Paris Peace Conference like a missionary to rescue the ignorant European heathen with his little sermons full of trite platitudes. \textsuperscript{35} As the conference progressed, Wilson would often become agitated when

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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Clemenceau, Lloyd George, or Orlando picked holes in his vague and often ill-defined plans, claiming that the Europeans were still mired in cynical self-interest while he was boldly trailblazing a new way forward. The arrogance, hubris, and naivety of such views were not lost on many contemporaries, nor on many future historians.

However, since the 1990s, a growing consensus has risen to challenge these assumptions. As the political scientist Lucian Ashworth has argued, there has been no more influential idea in the field of international relations (IR) than the notion there was a “great debate” in the interwar era between idealists and realists, with the realists emerging victorious. But this alleged dichotomy is a false one, for what emerges as this great debate within the Anglo-American world is not a realist-idealist one, but rather three other overlapping foreign policy controversies:

In the 1920s and early 1930s we find a debate over whether capitalism causes war; and following that there is the conflict between the appeasers and the advocates of collective security in Britain, and a parallel debate in the US between intervention and abstention in international affairs. Interwoven through these was the question of whether peaceful change was possible, and what form it should take. Throughout this, the academic study of IR remained strongly liberal. The picture within Britain is of a liberal internationalism threatened, not by realism but by the left, while American liberal internationalism appears threatened by isolationists rather than realists.

“The great damage caused by this myth,” Ashworth concludes, “has been to oversimplify the nature of IR in the interwar period, and to close off avenues of research that were too closely identified with the thinkers that were labelled idealists.”36 Furthermore, as one historiographic survey recently argued, works like those of Glenda Sluga have also “deconstructed the binary between realistic nationalism and overly idealistic internationalism and studied the development of international(ist) ideas and institutions within a national framework.”37 These views have also been applied to the Japanese side of the equation where there has also been a rejection of an

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assumed binary conflict between ascendant nationalists and weakened internationalists leading inexorably to the collapse of Taisho democracy. Until the 1990s, as Japanese historian Goto-Shibata Harumi argues, the standard narrative held that Japanese interwar politics were divided between ultranationalists—like Ōkawa Shūmei, Kita Ikki, and Ishiwara Kanji—standing in opposition to internationalists such as Nitobe Inazō. As he continues, “a standard explanation of Japan’s revolt against the West in the 1930s, put simply, would state that the internationalists somehow failed to resist the vocal extreme nationalists. Since the mid-1990s, however, some scholars have come to consider such explanations too simplistic.” The result of this revisionist research by Ashworth, Slug, Goto-Shibata, and others has been to undermine the idea that there was widespread and inherent conflict between “idealistic, naive, internationalists” and “realistic, pragmatic, nationalists” in both the Anglo-American world and in Japan. Rather, there were a series of overlapping debates on the nature and value of liberal internationalism within a framework that did not fundamentally ignore the pragmatic realities of international relations and never assumed any breakdown in the role of nationalism or its replacement by a unified spirit of world governance through organizations such as the League of Nations. Instead, such people thought of nationalism and internationalism as acting in concert and reinforcing one another.

Building on this historiographical momentum, this thesis examines Japanese-American relations through the eyes of the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment to explore the role and extent to which cultural internationalism helped form positive bilateral ties between these nations. During this period, both the Endowment and the Society undertook numerous activities

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which attempted to improve Japanese-American relations and avert the possibility of war between them by bringing a range of people and ideas from one nation into view of the other.\(^{40}\) These activities all involved the participation of numerous individuals who, for all their similarities of viewpoint, held a great plurality of motivations to express themselves in the production, dissemination, and reception of their organization’s works, some of which appeared contradictory. Furthermore, this attempt at cultural internationalism did not go unchallenged by American critics who questioned whether these organizations were acting merely as apologists for Japanese propaganda rather than as frank observers, and who were perhaps insufficiently patriotic or loyal to their own country. In studying this topic, I hope to better situate the role and position of American and Japanese internationalists within the cultural context of early twentieth century American society; evaluate and explore their arguments, ideals, self-perceptions, and how they changed over time; show the interconnectivity of these two internationalist organizations; as well as study their American critics within the context of Japan’s tentative road towards democracy between the start of the Taisho era in 1912 and the beginning of the Manchurian Crisis in 1931. In doing so I hope to highlight the layered receptions to such internationalism by both the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment, their constituent Japanese and Americans members, as well the views of those Americans outside the movement, deconstructing the assumed dichotomy between idealists and realists in the process. As will be shown, these internationalists were motivated by a complex mixture of idealistic hopes about the future of Japanese-American cooperation, as well as by realistic assumptions about the ignorance of American politics and Society, the nature of imperialism in East Asian, and the state of

\(^{40}\) Although cultural internationalism also includes artistic and literary dimensions, this study focuses solely on the more fundamental educational aspects of this relationship with regards to increasing American understanding of Japanese politics and Society. For studies of these alternative forms of cultural internationalism, see Christopher Benfey, *The Great Wave: Guided Age Misfits, Japanese Eccentrics, and the Opening of Old Japan* (New York: Random House, 2003) as well as Auslin’s *Pacific Cosmopolitans*. 
Japanese-American relations more widely. Far from being irrelevancies, the influence of internationalist values on American society were widespread and were even implicitly validated by the sincerely-held concerns of critics fearful of these organizations’ potential power to sway American opinion in favour of improved Japanese-American relations.
I

THE MENTALITIES OF MEMBERSHIP:
PERSONAL AGENCY AND COLLECTIVE BELIEFS

“Good-will among men results from all teaching which can be called world-wide, all teaching of
the nature of different peoples, of their laws and customs, and of their religions.”
– Charles W. Eliot, 1915

“All the world’s great historic religious faiths are of Asiatic origin [...] Where then is there any
ground for Europe’s pride and arrogance when comparing herself with Asia?”
– Jabez T. Sunderland, 1918

“We are all selfish and self interest, it seems to me, will insist that the friendship between Japan
and the United States be continued and permanently maintained.”
– Elbert Henry Gary, 1921

Introduction

On April 26, 1923, readers opened their copies of the New York Times to find a curious editorial
printed on page 18. Penned by the now retired president of the Japan Society of New York,
Lindsay Russell, the editorial spoke about America’s foreign policy and the role which individual
Americans could play in directing it and influencing foreign opinions of the United States.
However, the position Russell took on this issue varied widely from his stance taken as Japan
Society President only a few years before. Instead of applauding these attempts by
internationally minded Americans, Russell instead argued for their stringent punishment:

With senators, distinguished travelers and foreign groups interfering with the President’s
control of foreign affairs and usurping the functions of the Secretary of State, his position
is indeed a difficult one. It would be well if that section of the Federal Penal Code could
be enforced which makes it an offense, punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 and
imprisonment for not more than three years, for any citizen of the United States without
authority of the Government to carry out verbal or written intercourse with foreign
governments or officers or agents thereof with intent to influence the measures or conduct
of any policy in relation to any dispute or controversy…”

This apparent contradiction in viewpoints, if not outright hypocrisy, was not lost on *Times* readers. A week later, a responding editorial—simply signed “Diplomat”—was published, voicing disappointment in Mr. Russell’s apparent retreat from internationalism:

> What has happened to Mr. Russell that he should publish such a lament against public interference in America’s foreign relations such as appeared in The Times this morning? Mr. Russell was among the first of our so-called ‘internationally minded’ citizens who believed that all should take an active part in the Government’s foreign policy, and here we see him arguing just the opposite thing … It would be interesting to know how many times, if any, Mr. Russell has had occasion as an officer of the Pilgrims, Japan Society and Italy America Society to correspond with Foreign Ambassadors and agents.”

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The contradictions in Russell’s attitude towards the internationalist cause highlights a point largely ignored in the broader narrative of Japanese-American cultural internationalism—the difficulty in harmonizing diverse individual voices and opinions under the umbrella of an organization like the Carnegie Endowment or Japan Society and the possibility that those voices could be contradictory in promoting internationalism, or could change over time from agreement with its aims to disapproval. Indeed, Russell’s apparent heel turn in 1923 was not unprecedented. As Society President in 1919, for example, Russell had made his views on the League of Nations clear: “For my part I am skeptical about the proposed League of Nations, for while it is effective in time of war, yet in time of peace the force which binds them in war—self-interest and self preservation—is centrifugal.”

46 Nor was Russell the only Japan Society member to exhibit buyers’ remorse. Emerson McMillin, an Honorary Vice-President of the Society, admitted in 1920 during the ongoing debate on Japanese immigration that while, “I have great respect for the Japanese people who come to this country,” he was, “very much provoked for the last year or two at their manner of expressing themselves, particularly if the quotations from papers can be relied on.” After all, he concluded, “The sending of the White Squadron to Japan by Roosevelt

settled the California school question [in 1908] almost to the minute, and the same sort of action by the present administration would stop the interference that we are receiving from Japan today.”47 This was a dubious claim, but it was a view held by many Americans. Indeed, as the American writer Sydney Greenbie intriguingly observed in 1921, contemporary “animosity toward Japan” was deeper than mere trade disputes or immigration debates, “it lies at the bottom of much of the seeming equivocation of Japan's best foreign friends.” As he saw it:

I was talking recently to one of the leading members of the Japan Society in New York, and said of myself that I deplored being regarded as anti-Japanese in some quarters, because I was not. “But,” spoke up this Japanophile, “the majority of the members of the Japan Society are anti-Japanese, or pro-Chinese, if you will.” They are trying their best to defend Japan, it would seem, and to cement bad relations with good, but the result is that the ground of many sympathizers of Japan is constantly shifting, though perhaps unconsciously. It is due, I presume, to the disappointment of people in that, having regarded Japan as worthy of their sympathy and adoration, they are now finding that all is not as well as it might be.48

However, despite these difficulties within the Japanese-American internationalist cause, there has been little study of either the Japan Society or the Carnegie Endowment, and historians have been slow to analyze the significance of these contradictions evident among its leadership.

First articulated in the aftermath of the Cold War in the late-1980s and 1990s, Akira Iriye’s pioneering work on cultural internationalism took a macroscopic view of the topic. As a historian of Japanese-American relations, Iriye often used these bilateral ties as examples of wider trends, but he was still focused on looking at the general course of cultural internationalism over time.49 In breaking new ground, this was not surprising, yet historians who

49 While Iriye had touched on this topic during the 1960s and 1970s, one of the first systematic studies of these ideals was in an article published in the American Historical Review in 1989 before being explored in more depth in books published in 1997 and 2002. See Akira Iriye, “The Internationalization of History,” The American Historical Review 94, no. 1 (Feb. 1989): 1-10; Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkley: University of California Press, 2002).
have come afterwards have largely remained focused on studying this history from the narrative, big-picture perspective. More recent works, such as those by Jon Thares Davidann and Michael R. Auslin, have continued on this overall course by remaining largely narrative in content and not focusing on either the Society or the Endowment as examples of cultural internationalist organizations.50 As one reviewer of Auslin’s *Pacific Cosmopolitans* notes, Auslin’s work is a narrative-driven one, “primarily targeted toward general audiences.”51 While there is nothing inherently wrong with such a study, a narrative style does have its limitations. For example, as a reviewer of Davidann’s book argues, in exchange for breadth the work sacrifices depth so that, “he might have done more to follow the evolution of the ideas of some of the leading publicists and intellectuals [he discusses].”52 While other Japanese-oriented internationalist organizations, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) or Japan’s branch of the League of Nations, have begun to be studied in depth by Jon Davidann, Tomoko Akami, Sandra Wilson, and Thomas W. Burkman, work on the Carnegie Endowment and Japan Society remains more general than particular and is constrained by the limitations noted above.53 For example, while a brief overview of the Japan Society has been written by Michael Auslin, it does not engage too closely with its sources, remaining narrative like his work in *Pacific Cosmopolitans*.54 Work on the Carnegie Endowment, on the other hand, is more substantial. Articles by Tomás Irish and Steven


Witt, for example, have examined some of the activities taken by the Endowment in Europe to improve post-First World War relations among the former belligerents, as well as attempts to inculcate in Americans an “international mind” through the creation of public libraries dedicated to encouraging international understanding (International Mind Alcoves the Endowment dubbed them).55 However, beyond a few offhand references in works like Iriye’s on Nitobe’s 1911-1912 exchange, there has been no systematic study of the Endowment’s role in seeking to improve Japanese-American relations.

The result of this work has also been, by omission, a historical narrative that implies a more unified and intellectually coherent internationalist movement than in fact existed. Far from the spirit of internationalist solidarity often implied by Iriye and others, members of organizations like the Japan Society or the Carnegie Endowment were motivated by varying and sometimes conflicting viewpoints. As Sadao Asada has explored, there were essentially three groups of Americans who argued against the necessity of war with Japan during this era: businessmen who saw Japan as a “great industrial nation,” liberal intellectuals who saw the dawning of a liberal and self-governing Japan under Taisho democracy, and missionaries who had visited the country and held out hopes for future conversions as well having as a general abhorrence to war.56 While Asada’s conclusion that these groups of internationally-minded people were “distorted and one-sided,” is a broad generalization and at times overly-determines the role of occupation in the formation of personal beliefs, it does provide a framework to consider how these different groups collaborated or clashed within the confines of cultural internationalist organizations like the Japan Society or Carnegie Endowment. As this section will

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56 Asada, Culture Shock, 40-46.
show, these organizations could be riven by infighting over accusations of hypocrisy or alleged
naivety while other individuals could hold contradictory or discordant views despite their
internationalist beliefs. While both the Society and the Endowment saw the value of cultural
internationalism, many of their members were personally motivated by economic, religious, or
intellectual expressions of internationalism. This section will briefly examine the personal
mentalities of three lesser-known members of the Japan Society and Carnegie Endowment—
Harvard University President Charles W. Eliot, the missionary and ardent anti-imperialist Jabez
T. Sunderland, and the noted steel magnate Henry Elbert Gary—in order to highlight these three
different strands of internationalist thought, as well as explore the personal motivations,
contradictions, and rationalizations offered by these three very different men in order to explore
why each of them joined organizations devoted to pursuing cultural internationalism between
Japan and the United States.

*Intellectual Internationalism: Charles W. Eliot*

Born in 1834, the educator Charles William Eliot gained his fame when he was elected president
of a small, provincial American University named Harvard in 1869 and rapidly developed it into
a household name as America’s preeminent institution of higher education. A prim man with a
patrician appearance, Eliot was also reform minded and in his 40-year stint as Harvard President
he would work hard to embed Harvard within American Society without making the university
appear undemocratic or out of touch with Society.\(^{57}\) When he stepped down as official head of
Harvard to accept the honorary title of President Emeritus in 1909, Eliot stayed on in Cambridge
and was elected to the school’s Board of Overseers. Yet, retirement still left Eliot with plenty of

\(^{57}\) For a look at Eliot’s tenure as Harvard president see Hugh Hawkins, *Between Harvard and America: The
Educational Leadership of Charles W. Eliot* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). See also Appendix A,
Image 1.
time for other causes, including the nascent internationalist cause. This included the International Health Board, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where Eliot was elected one of the Endowment’s original trustees by Andrew Carnegie himself.\(^5^8\)

Eliot would write himself into the story of Japanese-American cultural internationalism when he visited China and Japan in 1912. The report he produced, *Some Roads Towards Peace*, would be the first publication of the Endowment’s Division of Intercourse when printed in 1914.\(^5^9\)

As an educator, Eliot fundamentally believed that education was the key link to limiting the spread of war and undermining its acceptance. In April 1896, even before retiring from Harvard, Eliot had given a speech at the American Conference on International Arbitration to champion the cause of peaceful arbitration of disputes as opposed to taking military action. Quoting the words of another presenter that patriotic education in America had taught students “the battles of the nation” but not “the arbitrations of our nation,” Eliot was emphatic:

> Let us teach the children what is the rational, sober, righteous mode of settling international difficulties. Let us teach them that war does not often settle disputes, while arbitration always does; that what is reasonable and righteous between man and man should be made reasonable and righteous between nation and nation.\(^6^0\)

It was schools like his own Harvard, Eliot thought, which marked the way forward to a more knowledgeable, less ignorant form of government driven by liberal intellectual values. “Universities and colleges illustrate, I believe—at least in our country—the coming form of government all over the world,” he wrote during the First World War, for they “teach freedom, they teach self-government; and there is another thing they teach—good-will.”\(^6^1\) A cosmopolitan sense of goodwill, Eliot argued, would make the future leaders of America realize they had more

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in common with their neighbours, and thus less to fight about. This educating drive also extended to Americans who were not of schooling age. As one biographer observed, Eliot was something of a gadfly in his later years and felt compelled to speak his mind to engage and educate his fellow citizens when and wherever possible:

If a controversy to which he ascribed importance was waging he enjoyed throwing into its scales whatever weight his opinion might carry, for he believed that he could do nothing better, during the remainder of his life, than to help awaken the public to a realization of things that ought to be done, and to give such things they ought to be done, and to give such things a push towards accomplishment whenever he could.62

This somewhat elitist desire to bring light to and inspire the masses—this same biographer would draw parallels between Eliot, Theodore Roosevelt and even Mussolini—was a powerful impetus for Eliot in joining the Carnegie Endowment, and he would not be found wanting. His 90-page Some Roads Towards Peace would receive two print runs of first 5,000 then 25,000 copies due to what the Endowment described as “a continuous and wide-spread demand.”63

Eliot had originally departed for Asia in 1911, planning to visit India, the Philippines, the East Indies, and China before concluding his trip in Japan and Hawaii. However, Eliot was suddenly struck with appendicitis upon his arrival in Ceylon and was incapacitated for three months. By the time he had recovered, it was decided that he would visit only China and Japan before coming home via Hawaii, which he did in August 1912.64 Eliot’s views of Japan were generally positive. He commended the courtesy he received from Terauchi Masatake, the Japanese Governor General of Korea, noted the heritage to be found at Nara and Nikko, praised the level of Japanese religious observance he observed, and was generally positive of the Japanese education system which he admired as generally liberalizing and having “not come late in comparison with those of Western nations, and they have been remarkable as regards their

62 James, President of Harvard, 2: 190.
63 YCE, 1913-1914, 71.
64 James, President of Harvard, 2: 216-217.
scope and their prompt success.”65 On the subject of a Japanese-American war, Eliot was emphatic; there was no need for conflict. “The Japanese are not a warlike people, although within a few years they have waged two defensive wars, one with China and the other with Russia,” Eliot claimed. “Their fundamental motive in fighting, however, is not a natural love of it, such as is exhibited, or used to be exhibited, by some Occidental peoples, but a simple, profound loyalty to their country…”66 This belief was unsurprising. Liberal intellectuals, Sadao Asada notes, often “assumed that a liberal Japan was a peace-loving Japan, a notion reinforced by their susceptibility to its artistic charms.”67 Confronting the views of American military men that Japan wished to “dominate the Pacific,” Eliot argued that Japan had no desire or strength to attack anyone given its economic debts from the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. “All Japanese statesmen and political philosophers recognize the fact,” Eliot asserted. “War between the two countries is not to be thought of; and to suppose that Japan would commit an act of aggression against the United States which would necessarily cause war is wholly unreasonable, fantastic, and foolish—the product of a morbid and timorous imagination.”68

Eliot, however, took little notice of the race issue in Japanese-American relations. As a eugenicist, Eliot was opposed to any racial mixing and argued that “the experience of the East teaches that the intermarriage of races which are distinctly unlike is undesirable,” because of the alleged inferiority of the resulting children of such unions. “The notion that strong races have been produced, or are to be produced, by a blend, or amalgam, of many different races, gets no support from Oriental experience.”69 Eliot appeared not to oppose Japanese immigration to America on principle, but he believed it should be done in such a way to keep racial mixing to an

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65 Eliot, Some Roads, 47-48; 49-50; 53-55.
66 Eliot, Some Roads, 58.
67 Asada, Culture Shock, 42.
69 Eliot, Some Roads, 8-9.
absolute minimum:

To mitigate the grievances created by the immigration question, or to prevent the occurrence of such grievances, would be a good way to secure the maintenance of friendly relations between any two nations, one of which desires to export a portion of its people, or to have its people free to migrate at will. If the value of purity of race shall be firmly established among eugenic principles, it will have strong influence for good concerning the ever-increasing race migrations.\(^{70}\)

Eliot was not racist in the sense he could not abide people of different ethnicities coming to the United States or being treated unjustly, but his eugenic principles made him wish to promote “good breeding” and argued that immigrants to America needed to be assimilated into Society and become “Americanized” as quickly as possible. As historian Hugh Hawkins noted, “Eliot pictured American civilization as already established,” approving Jim Crow anti-miscegenation laws and blaming American labour strikes of the era on poorly integrated migrant workers.\(^{71}\)

When President Theodore Roosevelt invited the African-American advocate Booker T. Washington to dine at the White House, then Harvard President Eliot defended the move, asserting that, “it would never occur to me not to invite to my house an educated Chinaman or Japanese because their skin is yellow or brownish, or to avoid asking a negro to my table if he were intelligent, refined and an interesting person.” As Hawkins concludes, “such superficial tolerant statements revealed standards to which ‘they’ were expected to conform, raising a wall around both Eliot’s dinner table and Harvard University.”\(^{72}\)

Nor was Eliot’s approval of the internationalist peace cause without its own limitations. Eliot was a firm believer in the merits of imperialism and saw little wrong with either Japanese acquisitions in East Asia or European and American colonialism more generally. Eliot noted, for example, that Korea “has abundant agricultural resources, if by good [Japanese] government the

\(^{70}\) Eliot, Some Roads, 9.

\(^{71}\) Hawkins, Educational Leadership, 182-183.

\(^{72}\) Hawkins, Educational Leadership, 182.
Korean people can be developed into ambitious workmen and comfortable householders.”

Moreover, as he reported to the acting Carnegie Endowment Director of Intercourse and Education, Nicholas Murray Butler, from Ceylon, British governance in Southeast Asia was in general “intelligently directed to the promotion of the material well-being of the subject Oriental peoples,” although admittedly this was not evenly applied across all colonies. “The Pax Britannica had practically put an end to the racial and religious warfare which from time to time desolated the Asiatic countries over which British influence now extends,” Eliot thus concluded.

With this and his promotion of education in mind, Eliot recommended that:

> the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace could do a useful and appropriate piece of work by causing such a comparative statement to be prepared by a competent scholar, and publishing it to inform publicists and British colonial administrators, and to stimulate, through emulation and competition, progressive governmental well-doing in the countries named, and in other where like problems arise (e.g. the [American governed] Philippines).

Furthermore, while Eliot himself was an internationalist and desired to limit the spread of aggressive war, he himself was not above accusing fellow peace advocates of having naively idealistic ambitions. Conversing with the editors of the American Peace Society in their journal *The Advocate of Peace*, Eliot was asked to write his views of “what the peace societies might well do at this time” after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Eliot bluntly stated that he did not think there was anything they could achieve:

> I am sorry to say that I do not feel able to write an article on ‘what the peace societies might well do,’ for I have no clear vision of what they might do now for the advantage of the civilized world. I can see no way of preventing war in the future, except through an agreement made by a moderate number of strong nations to prevent war by force, and the peace societies have opposed, and I believe still oppose, all such use of force.

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73 Eliot, *Some Roads*, 48. This view was not unheard of among internationalists. Even Norman Angell, one of the most famous British internationalists for works like *The Great Illusion*, also supported “Western” imperialism because he believed that it furthered human interdependence by bringing “under-utilized” and “war-prone” parts of the world into an efficient global economic system. See Ashworth, “Realist–Idealist Great Debate,” 37.


Observing, in the modern parlance of Political Science, that it was only the state that held the legitimate monopoly of power within a country’s borders, Eliot argued that “international war will not be brought to an end without the use of a regulated, restrained, but effective force,” to which peace organizations were opposed. “So long as the peace societies and the peace promoters decline to recognize and act upon this obvious principle in government and law, they will only postpone the coming of international peace,” Eliot frankly concluded, further noting two phrases recently used by the Peace Society—that they had been working for nearly a century to avert war and now the greatest war in history was upon them—“is it not a fair inference that the methods or policies of the American Peace Society have not been sound?”

While Eliot was a proud internationalist, this was still inclusive with being an eugenicist, a realist in fighting for the abolition of war, and an open advocate for colonialism.

**Ecumenical Internationalism: Jabez T. Sunderland**

Born in England in 1842, Jabez Thomas Sunderland moved to the United States with his family in 1844. Going on to become a Civil War veteran, a Unitarian minister, and a missionary crusader, Sunderland is best known today as an ardent anti-imperialist who agitated for Indian independence from the British Empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since his first encounter with India in 1895 as a missionary late in his career, Sunderland had been enraptured by Indian culture and civilization, priming his support for Indian nationalists like Lala Lajpat Rai. This chance encounter had turned Sunderland, as one historian would argue, into “the most persistent American propagandist for India,” and would lead him to join, in 1907, 

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78 See also Appendix A, Image 2.
the New York-based Society for the Advancement of India.\textsuperscript{80} Less well known, however, is Sunderland’s role in Japanese-American cultural internationalism as he was also a member of the Japan Society of New York and in 1918 would publish a book with the Society’s blessing entitled \textit{Rising Japan} with the subtitle “is she a menace or a comrade to be welcomed in the fraternity of nations?” Viewing Japan with general optimism, Sunderland would attempt to explain the sources of Japanese-American friction and how they could be overcome.\textsuperscript{81}

“Missionaries,” as Sadao Asada contends, “went further than any other group in defending Japan.” As he continues, “missionaries who had a long history of working in Japan had come to identify their own hopes with young Japan’s national aspirations.”\textsuperscript{82} Undoubtedly the most famous missionary crusader for Japan during this era was Sydney Gulick, who pressed hard against the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act restricting Japanese immigration to the United States. Gulick, who as a biographer wrote, was motivated by a form of “Christian internationalism” that was “occasionally inconsistent, sometimes contradictory, and irrepressibly idealistic.” Yet, while working for an idealized and peaceful world “maintained by reasonable men and reinforced by the Christian spirit,” Gulick was also perceptive enough to realize that domestic issues were inextricably linked with how a nation conducted its foreign policy, explaining his strident opposition to the 1924 Immigration Act.\textsuperscript{83} For missionaries like Sunderland or Gulick, the role of public opinion and domestic policy making was instinctually identified as a key source of tensions in international relations, and as preachers with pulpits they had the opportunity to inform and build such opinions if they chose to do so. Sunderland himself would make full use of these privileges in advocating for Japan.

\textsuperscript{80} Raucher, “American Anti-Imperialists,” 86.


\textsuperscript{82} Asada, \textit{Culture Shock}, 44; 45.

\textsuperscript{83} Sandra Taylor, \textit{Advocate of Understanding: Sidney Gulick and the Search for Peace with Japan} (Kent: University Press, 1985), xiii.
Sunderland was fundamentally a cosmopolitan. As the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah notes, a basic cosmopolitan viewpoint begins “with the simple idea that in the human community, as in national communities, we need to develop habits of coexistence,” and thus should not fear to become engaged with people from different countries, ethnicities, and places.\footnote{Kwame Anthony Appiah, \textit{Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers} (New York: Norton, 2006), xix.}

In a sermon delivered in Toronto in 1905 entitled “Brotherhood between Races and Nations”, Sunderland made his view on this point clear:

I think there is no greater mistake than that of deprecating differences in races, in languages, in civilizations, in the dress and habits and characteristics of peoples, and wanting to reduce all to uniformity. Uniformity means monotony and poverty. Variety means interest, charm, intellectual and moral wealth. Friendship need not be confined to those of our own class, our own station in life, our own vocation, or even to our own race. Some of the warmest and truest friendships ever known have been between men of widely different races.\footnote{Jabez T. Sunderland, ““Brotherhood Between Races and Nations,” \textit{AoP} 68, no. 2 (Feb. 1906): 41.}

Excessive nationalism, in Sunderland’s view, was also a critical danger. “Why should we put into a flag a meaning which tends to stir up hostile feelings in our minds toward other nations,” he argued in the same Toronto sermon, “and to set us thinking not about friendly relations with them, but about guns and armies and fighting?”\footnote{Sunderland, “Brotherhood Between Races,” 41.}

Like Eliot and other liberal intellectuals, Sunderland believed that universal education was the key to improving both the prosperity of a nation and in producing an inclusive, internationalist worldview.\footnote{Indeed, in his later book \textit{India In Bondage}, Sunderland argued that the main reason that Japan and not India had become a respected Great Power was not only the former’s political independence, but also the promotion of universal education by Japan’s Meiji founders and not India’s colonial rulers. See Sunderland, \textit{India In Bondage} (New York: Lewis Copeland Co., 1929), Chapter 30, esp. 361-364.}

In the words of historian Alan Raucher, Sunderland was, “by longevity and temperament, a link between nineteenth-century reform sentiment and twentieth-century liberalism,” and thus felt himself compelled to educate and reform.\footnote{Raucher, “American Anti-Imperialists,” 86.} As the world became more interconnected and globalized, Sunderland argued, knowledge of and compassion for other people became a necessary duty of every citizen.
Sunderland’s involvement with Japan began between 1913 and 1914. In those years, Sunderland had been nominated as that year’s Billings Lecturer to Japan, China, and India—an exchange tour organized by the American Unitarian Association. In total, Sunderland gave 76 lectures and visited most of the prominent cities of the region. In Japan, he had met personally with statesman Ōkuma Shigenobu, the businessman Shibusawa Eiichi, and Sakatani Yoshiro, then the Mayor of Tokyo. Shibusawa had even invited Sunderland to speak before the Japan’s Association Concordia, an influential body representing noted men of the empire. Indeed, writing a few years later, Shibusawa would positively recall both Sunderland as well as Eliot’s visits to Japan, along with those of other Americans, concluding that “whenever these scholars have visited Japan, I have not failed to meet them and to get up receptions and farewell banquets in order to exchange views.” Upon his own return, Sunderland would become more involved in promoting Japanese-American friendship, and would eventually join the Japan Society, first appearing among its ranks in 1916. But it was only in 1918 with the publication of *Rising Japan* that Sunderland would finally turn his attention to promoting Japanese-American friendship in a more meaningful way.

Written in 1917, *Rising Japan* opens with the claim that “Western” civilization looked down upon Asia “as if her place in the world's civilization and the world's achievement were insignificant.” On the contrary, Sunderland argues, most of the world languages, science, culture and all its religions came from Asian societies and that “if Japan were in Europe, and if we were accustomed to think of her people as belonging to our own so-called ‘white’ race, we should not

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89 “Back from Trip Around the World,” *The Hartford Courant*, Jul. 19, 1914. This Concordia is not to be confused with the Concordia Association political organization established by the Japanese in Manchukuo in 1931.


hesitate a moment to assign her a high place among civilized nations." In the following three chapters, Sunderland lays out his comparison of Japanese civilization with that of Europe and finds Japan equal or even superior to the standards set by the West, whether this was in public order, its art and culture, the morals of its people, or in its technological progress. In the book’s remaining chapters, Sunderland focused on the various “menaces” that Japan allegedly presented to America, explaining their origins, and showing how they have typically been overblown by the American public. Once again, the danger of Japanese immigration to California was discussed and debunked, with new federal legislative for aliens admitted to the U.S. recommended to solve the issue. More serious in Sunderland’s mind was the belief that Japan was planning on a military invasion of both the Philippines and the American mainland. Sunderland singled out Homer Lea—whom he dismissed as “an adventurer who palmed himself off on the public as a military officer of large knowledge and high rank”—for instigating this perceived menace in his well-known book *The Valor of Ignorance*. As for any invasion of the Philippines, Sunderland argued that Japan would be setting itself up for an unwinnable war:

> Whether she were able to capture the Philippines or not, if she made the attempt, that would be war with us; and that would mean conflict with a nation possessed of such resources in men, munitions, and money that there could be only one possible outcome to it. In the end the war would go against her. She would have to give up the islands, even if for a time she had held them by the power of her guns. America would fight with an energy that nothing could withstand, and for years if necessary, and if necessary would sink half her enormous wealth in building fleets and equipping armies, rather than suffer a foot of soil above which her flag floated to be torn from her by force.

The result, Sunderland argued, would be Japanese economic collapse and “hate, which generations of time could not overcome.” The only conceivable way in which there would be a

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95 Sunderland, *Rising Japan*, 199.
Japanese-American war, Sunderland maintained, would be if American provoked it, and then they would be fighting in Japan’s home waters and invading the home islands themselves. “Is there an American living,” Sunderland concluded, “who is base enough and insane enough to dream of our ever attempting or desiring to invade Japan?”

Yet, Sunderland’s sympathy for Japan was not without its questionable aspects. For one, Sunderland’s views of the Twenty-One Demands bordered on the apologetic. Sunderland admitted that the Japanese had overreached in making its demands but observed that Japan had compromised on its most egregious demands to undermine Chinese sovereignty. Moreover, he argued that given Japan’s assertions in both the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Root-Takahira Agreement (signed with the U.S. in 1908) to uphold the integrity of China, he was doubtful that further attempts to coerce its neighbour would be made. Sunderland also acknowledged Japan had legitimate economic rights in the country. “China is her nearest foreign market, and a market of almost unlimited extent if only developed,” he claimed, adding that, “there seems to be no reason for believing that Japan desires to prevent investments of American capital in China.”

There were other criticisms of the book itself. While Lindsay Russell, in his foreword to the book, praised it as a “clear-sighted analysis” and a monograph that “deserves the respectful attention of broad and intelligent readers both in our country and abroad,” other reviewers criticized the book’s simplicity. The Stanford historian Payson J. Treat, for example, argued that the book “was very much worth while to show up the puerility of many of the charges against the Japanese,” but concluded that “in order to assure easy reading the author lays himself

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97 The Twenty-One demands were a diplomatic initiative undertaken by Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki for the government of Ōkuma Shigenobu in 1915 intended to make China cede rights to Japan while the rest of the Great Powers were involved in the First World War. See Dickinson, *National Reinvention*, 84-116.


open to the charge of superficiality” and “it would hardly alter the views of anyone who had fixed ideas on the subject.”\textsuperscript{100} Rising Japan, in other words, preached to the choir. Additionally, Sunderland’s sympathy for Asian cultures was not without its limits. While repudiating Britain’s conquest of India, as Alan Raucher notes, Sunderland still “emphasized the cultural superiority of the West and its missionary obligations to other peoples.”\textsuperscript{101} In his 1905 Toronto sermon, for example, while he had admitted the violence of European imperialists towards their colonial subjects—“to subjugate them, to exploit their lands, and in many cases to make slaves of them”—Sunderland’s solution was not ending colonialism, but rather its reformation:

The thought of the strong and civilized powers of Europe concerning the weaker and less civilized peoples of Africa and Asia should be, not ‘How may we subjugate them, and gain possession of their territories, and exploit them for our own enrichment?’ but ‘How may we help them, lift them up, set them on the road to higher civilization and self-development?’\textsuperscript{102}

More \textit{noblesse oblige} and less exploitation was his final conclusion. “The races that are low down in civilization should be thought of as the child races of the world, to be protected and helped as children.” While still a supporter of internationalist causes, Sunderland was both a defender of colonial paternalism and apparently nonplussed by Japan’s colonial ambitions.

\textit{Economic Internationalism: Elbert Henry Gary}

Among the business magnates of early twentieth century America, Elbert Henry Gary undeniably ranked alongside John D. Rockefeller or Andrew Carnegie for being one of the founders of the United States Steel Corporation. A shrewd businessman born in 1846, Gary’s corporation gave him in the 1910s and 1920s a remarkable sway over American public opinion, making him “a widely respected voice of American business,” as Gary’s modern biographer Benjamin Sevitch

\textsuperscript{100} Payson J. Treat, “Reviewed Work: Rising Japan,” \textit{American Political Science Review} 12, no. 3 (Aug. 1918): 546.
\textsuperscript{101} Raucher, “American Anti-Imperialists,” 89.
\textsuperscript{102} Sunderland, “Brotherhood Between Races,” 41.
has noted. In particular, “since his company from its inception held the dominant position in the industry, Gary’s words were carefully listened to by steel men.”¹⁰³ From this bully pulpit, Gary would discuss a wide series of opinions on a wide series of subjects, including on the prosperity of Japanese-American business ties. When Dan Takuma, the head of Mitsui, arrived in New York as part of the 1921 Japanese Business Men’s Mission to the United States, Gary was on hand to help roll out the red carpet.¹⁰⁴ Given these inclinations, Gary became a life member of the Japan Society of New York in 1914, just prior to visiting East Asia on a business trip in 1916.¹⁰⁵

American businessmen and financiers were one of the most vocal groups arguing against Japanese-American conflict during this period. While initially holding concerns of Japan’s growing financial power, by the 1910s and 1920s this had matured into respect for the profitability of Japanese-American trade. “Anxious for partnership with Japan,” in the words of Sadao Asada, “the bankers vigorously denounced war talk.” The Wall Street Journal became a leading organ for Japanese-American friendship, with columns claiming that war was “unthinkable to the point of lunacy.” Meanwhile, the New York banker (and later Japan Society president) Frank A. Vanderlip contended that, “No nation is more ready for frank and friendly intercourse and for fair and honorable efforts to adjust difficulties,” than Japan.¹⁰⁶

The belief behind such statements was that economic interdependence between nations reduces the likelihood of those nations going to war, an argument with a long history and to which economic internationalists like Gary subscribed.¹⁰⁷

Gary’s first encounter with Japan took place in 1916, when he visited East Asia as part of

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¹⁰⁴ Sevitch, “Spokesman for Steel,” 75.
¹⁰⁵ YJSNY, 1914, 6.
¹⁰⁶ Asada, Culture Shock, 40.
¹⁰⁷ For an examination of this argument, including its relevance to the outbreak of the Pacific War see Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton: University Press, 2015).
a vacation and personal fact-finding mission prior to meeting with his fellow businessmen at the bi-annual meeting of the American Iron and Steel Institute in Saint Louis that October. Attending a dinner in Tokyo, Gary assured his hosts that both Japan and America had no reason to fight and no disagreements big enough to warrant conflict. “This undoubtedly is the pervading and controlling sentiment of the citizens generally throughout the United States,” he confidently asserted.108 In his first interview given to the Chicago Daily Tribune upon his return to the United States later that month, Gary directly denied that there were pervasive anti-American attitudes in the country. “I noticed no such attitude; at least as far as the civilians are concerned, and I don’t know that there is any different feeling among what might be called the war party.”109 Speaking at his annual meeting, Gary was even more explicit in his belief in the war preventing power of Japanese-American economic interdependence:

the Japanese manufacturers, merchants and financiers are desirous of co-operating with those in the United States, to the fullest extent, in protecting and promoting the welfare of both and at the same time benefitting those in other countries with whom both of us may be conducting business. They understand and appreciate the spirit of co-operation which has actuated the men engaged in our lines of business and they would be pleased to consider with us all legitimate plans for the application of this principle.110

Gary also offered the assessment that Japanese intentions towards China in the recently concluded Twenty-One Demands were not intended to dismember the nation. “I think we may expect to see, before long, efforts on the part of the Japanese people to cultivate cordial business relations with those in China.”111 Many Japanese observers apparently took such statements by Gary during his trip to indicate a wider American approval of Japan’s policies in China.112 As Sevitch notes, Gary was often vague in his arguments, making use of dubious analogies and

111 Gary, Address, 17-18.
112 C. Walter Young, Japan’s Special Position in Manchuria (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 334.
straw man arguments. “Lacking examples, ignoring specifies, and avoiding identifications, he
still considered his assertions adequately supported.”113 For an American businessman, such
emphatic suggestions were hardly rare. “You must be convinced of the truth, or the importance,
or the meaning, of what you are about to say before you can give it forceful delivery,” the
famous public speaker Dale Carnegie recommended in one of his first books published in 1915.
“Conviction,” he contended, “convinces.” 114 Used to taking positions without all the
information, businessmen can often convince themselves of sweeping assumptions without
adequate proof, getting by on mere force of character. Gary was no different in this respect.

Gary’s internationalist leanings were also expressed in other ways. In January 1923, for
example, Gary called for an international conference along the lines of the recently concluded
Washington Naval Conference to promote solutions to the world economic problems, especially
the then serious conflict between France and Germany over the occupation of the Ruhr. If a
conference of the leading industrial nations, including Japan, could be constituted, “it would be
one of the greatest international peace movements which can be imagined at this time.” In fact,
Gary hazarded, “I believe such a conference in the near future is essential to the world’s welfare;
certainly it is most desirable in behalf of civilization itself.”115 Grandiose dreams perhaps, but
given that America would soon step in to curb the Ruhr Crisis and resulting German
hyperinflation by helping to negotiate the Dawes Plan, Gary’s ideas for economic stabilization
were not that far ahead of public policy or public opinion, and was also in keeping with the
multilateralism of the times. Moreover, as the muckraking journalist Ida M. Tarbell—who was
granted many interviews with Gary in preparation for writing his biography—scribbled in her

113 Sevitch, “Spokesman for Steel,” 90.
114 Dale Carnagy and Joseph Berg Esenwein, The Art of Public Speaking (Springfield, Mass: The Home
Correspondence School, 1915), 89.
notes, Gary had an “insistence at the start that there must be a world tribune to adjust matters,” and made his pacifistic viewpoints clear.\textsuperscript{116} As Gary told Tarbell, his belief that America should keep out of the war was one of his few genuine disputes with Theodore Roosevelt, with whom he had a comparatively good relations even despite the former President’s trust busting.\textsuperscript{117} In this pacifism, Sevitch dubbed him an “optimist,” and a naive one at that, given his unsupported beliefs in an early end to the Great War.\textsuperscript{118} Indeed, much like Eliot and Sunderland, Gary believed that knowledge itself was sufficient to insure peace. “If the masses of the people of the different nations engaged in the terrible conflicts that are now waging in Europe were fully informed of all the facts,” he argued in 1915, “is it to be supposed the wars would be much longer continued?”\textsuperscript{119} Logically, this made sense as the blood and money expended in the conflict would only expand to the point where it would be impossible to stop short of absolute victory. Yet, here Gary deeply underestimated the patriotism, vehemence, and desperation of the belligerents for victory. “In fact,” Sevitch noted, “there is no indication that his mistakes had any effect on him at all. For the next ten years he continued to make them.”\textsuperscript{120} In other claims Gary was on firmer ground; the League of Nations would fulfill his hopes for an international arbitration body, though its practical effectiveness would not live up to expectations.

Gary would remain on friendly relations with Japan until his death in 1927. In the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, for example, Gary chaired an emergency meeting of the Japan Society to rally the organization in collecting aid for victims of the disaster. “It is hoped,” Gary argued at the time, “that a substantial sum will be promptly raised and offered

\textsuperscript{116} The resulting interviews would be published as a biography in 1925. For the resulting discussion on international arbitration see \textit{The Life of Elbert H. Gary: The Story of Steel} (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1925), 249.
\textsuperscript{117} Interview: Ida M. Tarbell with Elbert Gary, 1925. https://dspace.allegheny.edu/handle/10456/37316.
\textsuperscript{118} Sevitch, “Spokesman for Steel,” 162-164.
\textsuperscript{120} Sevitch, “Spokesman for Steel,” 164.
to Japan as soon as we can get in direct communication with representatives in that Country. I hope the United States Steel Corporation will make a substantial contribution.”

True to his word, two days later U.S. Steel would donate $150,000 to the relief fund. Within a week of first hearing about the disaster, the Japan Society had also raised $10,747 for the cause. In 1917, when Viscount Ishii Kikujirō visited the United States for the signing of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, Gary also chaired the committee responsible for extending hospitality to the Japanese while in New York, and he would even open his house to the Japanese for their comfort while in the city. Gary would also get the opportunity to give a speech to the Japanese after the Mayor of New York. Gary praised both Japan and America for sincerely desiring peace and that they, “would endure much and they would suffer long before they would enter the arena of military conflict,” an odd claim given that Japan had been a belligerent in the Great War on the side of the Allies since August 1914. Gary’s speech was also long-winded (three and a half pages of text compared to the Mayor’s one and a half), and hardly a thing of rhetorical beauty. “In situations where the less said the better he often found worse ways of saying more,” Sevitch observed. Although his heart and his wallet may have been in the right place, it is also clear that Gary was sometimes fond of hyperbolic rhetoric on the economic inevitability of Japanese-American friendship. While Gary rarely strayed far from the mainstream currents of American opinion in such views, many of his ideas bordered on the irrepresibly idealistic.

121 “City’s Relief Quota Put a $1,000,000,” New York Times, Sep. 5, 1923.
124 Root, Japanese Mission, 64.
125 Sevitch, “Spokesman for Steel,” 129. While Gary admired many good rhetoricians, he also dubiously claimed of President Warren Harding: “His choice of words, his construction of sentences was far above the average.” H.L. Mencken, on the other hand, would famously quip that he felt Harding had “the worst English I have ever encountered” and dubbed his inaugural address so bad “that a sort of grandeur creeps into it.” See Ibid, 123.
“The [Carnegie] trustees recognize the great influence that public opinion now exerts upon the foreign policies of governments and are desirous of aiding in the formulation of correct opinions of each other by the various peoples of the world, following the classic theory that one is seldom the enemy of another whom he knows.”

– George A. Finch, July 26, 1929

“How May We Serve You?”

– Advertising tagline, Japan Society, 1916-1920

Introduction

In May 1945, with the war in Europe over, the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) asked a representative sample of 3,000 Americans a series of questions about America’s last remaining enemy—the Empire of Japan. One appeared quite simplistic, “can you tell me the name of the Emperor of Japan?” Surprisingly, however, only a slight majority (54%) could correctly identify Hirohito as the Showa Emperor. 5% mistook him for the erstwhile Japanese Premier Tōjō Hideki, while 40% did not know, could not pronounce his name, or mistook it for a place name like Fujiyama or Yokohama. Other questions asked by the AIPO on Japan were met with even greater misperceptions. The nature of the emperor was also confused with a 44% plurality, apparently with a vague understanding of Arahitogami, thinking that Hirohito was “the only Japanese god.” In another poll 29.3% of Americans flatly admitted they did not know the population of the Japanese home islands, even though in a similarly worded poll a 25% plurality knew the then approximate population of the United States (about 130 – 133 million).

127 The first known usage of this tagline was in an advertisement on November 19, 1916 in the New York Times.
128 Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton: University Press, 1951), 392. By contrast, the fact that Hitler was Führer of Germany was cited as common knowledge in other AIPO polls.
129 Cantril and Strunk, Public Opinion, 392; 585. It also appears that those who did respond merely guessed.
Nor was this the only thing about Japan Americans were apparently ignorant about since the start of the Pacific War. To many Americans in December 1941 the news that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor was met not with righteous outrage at Japanese aggression, but with genuine confusion. “Where was Pearl Harbor?” many Americans asked. Sid Phillips, a young American who would soon find himself storming ashore on Guadalcanal as part of the 1st Marine Division, was sitting at a counter in his local drugstore when he heard the news on the radio. “Everyone was puzzled, asking where Pearl Harbor was,” he recalled. “I was the only one in the drugstore who knew it was in Hawaii and told everyone this.” Having had an uncle who had served at one of the Island’s military bases, Phillips was one step ahead of many of his neighbours. Nor was Phillips the only American to hear such questions. Dan Lawler, another future member of the 1st Marines, recalled that he was attending a movie in his hometown in upstate New York when the manager of the theatre turned on the lights to inform the audience of the news. “The Japs have bombed Pearl Harbor,” he reported. “Where the hell’s Pearl Harbor?” someone shouted back. “Nobody knew,” Lawler observed. Nor was this ignorance limited to the man on the street as many American political figures privately admitted they too knew little about Japan. Henry L. Stimpson, Secretary of State during the Manchurian Crisis and Secretary of War by the outbreak of the Pacific War, also knew little about Japanese society, politics or ambitions and often let vague notions of racial “essences” colour his judgements. As Michael Chapman noted, upon hearing that Japanese-Americans were to be interned by the American authorities Stimpson admitted that, “their racial characteristics are such that we cannot

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understand or trust even the citizen Japanese."  

 Particularly egregious was when Ellis Zacharias—the U.S. Navy’s top intelligence expert on Japan during the Pacific War—admitted that to him the Japanese temperament remained a “strange, inscrutable, and peculiar phenomenon.” As John Dower concluded, “among many Westerners with long personal experience in Japan, it became a sort of badge of expertise to say that you knew from long and vain endeavor that it was futile to try and penetrate the Japanese mind.”  

 In retrospect this may seem amazingly implausible; how could Americans be so oblivious about their perspective enemy after decades of interaction? Yet, most Americans in the interwar era knew or cared little about Asia or the Pacific compared to contemporary European affairs even if racial stereotypes of “inscrutable Orientals” did not already dominate the discourse on Japan. For internationally minded Americans in the 1920s, this ignorance and prejudice required prompt action given Japan’s rising stature on the world stage. “It has been a common assumption in this country that the Oriental mind is mysterious and inscrutable,” Japan Society President Henry Taft lamented as early as 1920, which was convenient for Americans “in explaining international episodes which we have had neither the inclination nor the facilities for thoroughly investigating.”  

 To the internationalists of the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment, the solution to this problem was to increase Americans’ awareness, understanding, and compassion for the Japanese and their political problems on the overarching belief that knowledge itself could prevent war. One way this was to be achieved, in Michael Auslin’s words, was to “sponsor a regular round of activities that would reach a wide audience of ordinary Americans.”  

 The number and character of such activities were abundant; the Society presented exhibitions of

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Japanese artwork—including a major display of 236 Ukiyo-e prints in 1911 acquired on loan from New York art collectors\textsuperscript{135}—and gave yearly dinners to notable Japanese arrivals. The Endowment, meanwhile, helped facilitate exchanges with opinion makers in both countries. Both organizations also published and promoted numerous works on all things Japanese, from short pamphlets and weekly bulletins to specially printed monographs. In 1921, for example, the Endowment’s Division of International Law published a mammoth two volume study edited by John V. A. MacMurray—a former American diplomat to China and Japan—of all treaties concerning China signed between 1894 and 1919.\textsuperscript{136} A few months later, a series of pamphlets were published on Chinese topics in preparation for the forthcoming Washington Naval Conference using the information contained in MacMurray’s book. As the introduction for these pamphlets provided by then Endowment director James Brown Scott explained:

In the belief that the dissemination of information regarding the status of armaments, the collection of official documents throwing light upon the situation in the Pacific, and the furnishing of accurate accounts of the issues involved in some of the more important problems confronting the Conference, would render a service to the public and perhaps even to the delegates to the Conference, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has undertaken the preparation and publication of a series of pamphlets of which the present pamphlet is one.\textsuperscript{137}

Meanwhile, in the Japan Society yearbook for 1918—which typically listed that year’s membership and past activities—that year chose to include a 42-question questionnaire, the stated objective of which was “to show the influence of America and American personalities on Japan and to evoke further questions as a basis for historical data on the relations between the United States and Japan.”\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{135} See Frederick William Gookin, \textit{Japanese Color-Prints and Their Designers} (New York: Japan Society, 1913).
\textsuperscript{137} Carnegie Endowment, \textit{Manchuria: Treaties and Agreements} (Washington, DC: Byron S. Adam, 1921), vi. Other pamphlets in this series included treaties concerning Korea, the Shandong Peninsula, and the negotiations undertaken as part of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915.
As will be explored in this section, both the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment underwrote a wide range of activities which were intended to engage the American public at large with what they believed was factual information about Japan and East Asian affairs. In sending Americans abroad to visit Japan and report home with first hand experience of the nation and its people, the Carnegie Endowment would send the noted American essayist Hamilton Wright Mabie as its first American to visit Japan in 1912 and 1913 to follow up to Nitobe’s visit to America in 1911. While exchanges would be put on hold for the duration of the First World War, in 1929 the Carnegie Endowment would increase its engagement by sending a group of 11 newspapermen to view not only Japan, but also Korea, Manchuria, and China before returning home. For its part, the Japan Society would collaborate with prominent Japanese intellectuals in 1914 and 1915 to produce two books attempting to explain American views to Japan and Japanese views to Americans. This was followed up shortly thereafter with a concentrated advertising campaign in New York and Washington DC newspapers which attempted to sell the services of the Society to any American seeking to travel to Japan or wishing to know more about the country. This section will not only examine the content of such works—scrutinizing them for their implicit assumptions and biases—but will also attempt to look at how the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment saw these projects as fitting into their wider efforts to improve Japanese-American relations, and will also seek to examine its reception by its intended audience (the American public) by examining newspaper editorials, book reviews, and reports of opinion collected by these organizations themselves. Such an examination will help demonstrate some of the perceived successes of both organizations’ cultural internationalism, as well as its definite limitations.
In the early years of the twentieth century, Hamilton Wright Mabie was a prominent and widely respected American public intellectual. The author of 23 books on subjects as diverse as William Shakespeare to a compiler of stories intended for children—as well as the associate editor of a noted periodical, *The Outlook*—Mabie was also a noted voice in the Progressive movement which sought social reform in the view, as the historian William E. Leuchtenburg phrased it, that “there was no scourge that would not eventually yield to reason and goodness.” This belief was not unrelated to those of contemporary internationalists. Nearing the end of a long career, one of Mabie’s last acts before retirement would write him into the history of Japanese-American cultural internationalism when he visited Japan for six months in 1912 and 1913 on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of Intercourse and Education. Taking along his writing and oratorical talents, Mabie was tasked to present a series of lectures at Japanese universities with the theme “American Ideals, Character, and Life,” paralleling the lectures given by Nitobe on Japanese society the year before, to aid Japanese understanding of the United States. As one contemporary argued, this was “the crowning event” of Mabie’s already substantial career.

While it may have served as a capstone to his public life, this exchange also revealed the prejudices held by both Mabie and his Japanese hosts, as well as those of his American readers.

Just over a year after the luncheon for Admiral Tōgō in 1911, the Astor Hotel would once again play host to Japanese-American internationalism. On October 22, 1912 the Japan Society of New York brought together some 300 individuals to celebrate Mabie’s imminent

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departure, along with his wife and daughter who would accompany him. Eating their way through plates of hors d’oeuvres, noisettes of Lamb Rachel and other delicacies, the assemblage included Nicholas Murray Butler, the Acting Director of the Carnegie Endowment Division of Intercourse and Education, Japan Society President Lindsay Russell, as well as the Japanese Consul-General for New York Numano Yasutaro. In the speeches which followed, each speaker outlined the difficulties in Japanese-American relations and offered their interpretations on the role of cultural internationalism in helping to improve them. First to speak was Butler, who introduced Mabie with the cultural internationalist ideal that “if we can bring the nations of the earth, by whatever long course of education, to understand the insides of each other we shall have laid the foundation for a structure of peace.” Consul Numano, for his part, noted that while “the world was formerly under the impression that East is East, and West is West eternally,” this had been entirely disproven by Japan. He also admitted, quite candidly, that “the Russian war brought to Japan unqualified, exaggerated eulogy,” but now “the pendulum [has] swung to the other extreme” so that those Americans who once praised Japan were now fearful.

But Mabie’s speech was undoubtedly the most important, and interesting, of the evening. For one, Mabie argued against the increasing “Westernization” of Japan. “It would be,” Mabie lamented, “a misfortune for Japan to become Americanized.”

“We want to keep as far apart in our aspects as possible,” Mabie continued. “We don’t want identity. What we want is unity.”

What sort of “aspect” did Mabie imagine Japan to have?

I look upon Japan as a country of discipline which has been perfected by centuries of love and the beautiful. I am going to Japan, and Mrs. Mabie is going with me, because I have a great desire to sit at the feet of the ancient nation, to get a proper understanding of that subjugation of the individual will to the welfare of the state, and of that sense of

\[142\] This is the wording given by the *New York Tribune*. *The Sun* reported it somewhat differently as “the greatest misfortune to become Anglicized,” though the intent remains the same. The *New York Times* simply reported that Mabie said that he “look[ed] with horror upon the prospect of the East and West becoming identical.”
obedience which has made Japan a wonderfully great and centralized nation.\textsuperscript{143}

Here, Mabie was apparently attempting to express the cosmopolitan creed that “there are many values worth living and that you cannot live by all of them,” and thus one respects and hopes for a plurality of different views.\textsuperscript{144} Yet Mabie, intelligent as he was, appears to have initially held many of the typical American fallacies about Japan. Despite Numano’s argument that the Kipling-esque dictum “East is East, and West is West and never the twain shall meet” had long been proven obsolete, Mabie still appears to take the view that American-style modernity had somehow corrupted the inherent “essence” of Japanese society, which he defines as the typical Oriental collectivism in opposition to Occidental individualism, praising the paternalistic qualities of the centralized Japanese state.\textsuperscript{145} Such views appear to denote an Orientalist character in Mabie’s interpretation of Japan.

However, as Takashi Fujitani and Sandra Wilson have explored, the modern centralized Japanese state with the Emperor at its head was a unique product of the Meiji era, not a legacy of the past. As Wilson notes, there was a defiant regionalism in Japan before 1868, to the extent that those Japanese on opposite sides during the Bōshin and Southwest wars often viewed themselves “not only as enemies, but virtually as different ‘ethnic’ groups.” By the 1890s, however, regions of Japan were “increasingly defined by its relationship to the centre, rather than providing an independent source of identity in any sustained sense.”\textsuperscript{146} Meanwhile, Fujitani has noted how the celebration of imperial pageants during the Meiji era helped create a shared sense of time, and thus a centralized nationality amongst Japanese across the empire with the Emperor and

\textsuperscript{144} Appiah, \textit{Cosmopolitanism}, 144.
\textsuperscript{145} The was a long-lasting trope about Japanese, and other Asian societies. As Okakura Tenshin had once criticized it, “Eastern Society, with all its beauty of harmonized duties and intercalated occupations, is based on mutual dependencies, and at best can but end in conventionalism.” See Okakura Kakuzō, \textit{The Awakening of Japan}, 2nd ed. (New York: Japan Society, 1921), 57.
\textsuperscript{146} Wilson, “National Greatness,” 36; 43.
Tokyo as its focal point. Regardless of where you were, Fujitani notes, Japanese citizens “could believe themselves to be joined at exactly the same moment in history that was marked by the ceremonial event.” Nevertheless, as Mabie departed for Japan in 1912, these were his initial interpretations of Japanese government and Society.

With his family in tow, Mabie departed San Francisco on November 15 aboard the *Tokyo Kisen Kaisha* liner *Chiyo Maru*. Pausing for a brief one-day layover in Honolulu to get in some sightseeing—as well as meet with his friend, former classmate, and fellow Progressive Sanford B. Dole—the ship pressed on to Yokohama where even before his arrival Mabie was receiving welcoming telegrams from his Japanese hosts. When he did arrive, he was mobbed by reporters from the local press and given a whirlwind tour of the city before being placed on the train for Tokyo. “From that moment,” Mabie noted in a letter home, “we have never been allowed to forget that we were the guests of the nation.”

Mabie’s official welcome to Japan would take place a few days later when he and his family were invited to the house of Shibusawa Eiichi for a welcoming banquet. Joined by other Japanese financial luminaries such as Sakatani Yoshiro and Takahashi Korekiyo, Mabie somewhat paradoxically praised Japan’s “wonderful freedom which the spirit enjoyed from the weight of material things,” as the *Honolulu Advertiser* cited Mabie in the *Japan Times*. As for the host himself, Mabie was duly impressed calling him, “a leader not only in finance, but in all movements for the public welfare and for international peace.”

Given the already apparent statist and pro-business attitude of Mabie’s Progressivism, such

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148 “Progressives in Winning Fight,” *The Hawaiian Gazette*, Nov. 22, 1912. Dole himself was an imperialist who had helped depose the Hawaiian Monarchy in 1893, paving the way for American annexation. If we are to judge Mabie by the company he kept, then this is yet another indication of his imperialist sympathies.


praise was unsurprising—J.P. Morgan, who died just as Mabie was returning home, would also be praised by him as “a tremendous constructive force” in American society.\textsuperscript{152}

Over the next six months of continuing engagements, Mabie would come to lecture at over 80 institutions in Japan, as well as in Korea and Manchuria. These included the universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, Waseda, Keio, and Doshisha, the commercial colleges of Tokyo and Kyoto, along with many normal schools, high schools, and other clubs, societies, and general audiences besides.\textsuperscript{153} In between his meetings, Mabie acted the tourist, visiting classical sites such as Nara, Kamakura, Nikko, and Kyoto with Nitobe Inazō himself acting as interpreter many times. “Dr. Nitobe and I are off for a spree and we are like boys on a vacation,” Mabie cheekily reported to a friend as he crossed the Inland Sea.\textsuperscript{154} During this time, Mabie would produce two major sets of writings. The first, based on the scripts of his lectures intended for a Japanese audience, would eventually be published in 1913 as \textit{American Ideals, Character, and Life}. The second, based on articles which Mabie had been sending back to his fellow journalists at \textit{The Outlook} on Japanese society for the benefit of Americans, would be published in 1914 as \textit{Japan To-Day and To-Morrow}.\textsuperscript{155} It is through these, along with his official report to the Carnegie Endowment and the many personal letters he wrote during his trip, that we can analyze Mabie’s experiences in Japan, and assess his values and opinions about Japanese society.

One of the most interesting destinations of Mabie’s trip occurred in early-1913 when he crossed the Yellow Sea to visit Port Arthur and the newly captured Guandong Leased Territory,
where he explored the abandoned battlements from the siege which took place during the Russo-Japanese War. “Never had a great historic siege a more magnificent setting,” Mabie reported in his fifth article to *The Outlook*. As he likened the battlefield for his American readers, “to the Japanese Port Arthur stirs the blood as Gettysburg stirs the blood of the American; it was the scene of the most decisive battle in his history, of the most heroic achievement of his people.”¹⁵⁶ This comparison was also used by Mabie in a letter back home when he somewhat breathlessly claimed that, “since my visit to Gettysburg I have not had so thrilling a day as the day I spent at Port Arthur.”¹⁵⁷ Still living before the First World War, Mabie apparently remained capable of seeing death in war as a tragic, yet glorious enterprise and not, as Wilfred Owen would later claim, as the “old lie” of *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*. During his stay, Mabie also met with the Governor General of the Guandong Territory, Fukushima Yasumasa, whom he described as “a fine old boy,” and who personally came to meet with him upon his arrival at Dalian.¹⁵⁸ In his report to the Carnegie Endowment, Mabie defended the work of Japanese imperialism on the Asian mainland, arguing that, “experience in Formosa and familiarity with the work of Americans in the Philippines, reinforced by scientific training and habits of thought, are being utilized in Korea and Manchuria to develop the resources of the two countries and of the two peoples,” and that “the sincere endeavor to benefit as well as govern these countries will not escape the attention of the open minded observer.”¹⁵⁹ Mabie, therefore, apparently viewed the Japanese gains of the Russo-Japanese War with more approbation than hostility and from the Japanese perspective Mabie’s account could be seen as a validation of their war gains, and of Japan’s new position of ascendancy in Manchuria. If Mabie’s account was accepted, Japanese

¹⁵⁷ Morse, *Mabie*, 255.
¹⁵⁸ Morse, *Mabie*, 255.
interests on the Asian mainland were not incompatible with Japanese-American friendship.

Another hallmark of Mabie’s stay was his interview with Ōkuma Shigenobu. A former samurai and politician of generally liberal tendencies, Mabie would sit down for a lengthy interview with Ōkuma soon after his arrival in Japan. In his introductory biography, Mabie appeared quite enamoured by the man, describing him as both intelligent and charismatic—“the most interesting man in Japan,” as he later reported to a friend.160 Mabie also concluded that he was, “a born Progressive,” for “Ōkuma is a modern man in his openness of mind, his readiness to rest in the stability of the law of progress rather than in immobility of institutions.”161 For a man, as Joyce Lebra notes, who had optimistic and visionary views for Japan and was “exceptionally well informed on a great variety of issues,” Mabie had indeed found a kindred progressive spirit.162 In the interview itself, Ōkuma essentially offered his reading of Japanese history. He had pointed words for the Triple Intervention of 1895 (“Japan was powerless, but felt deeply injured”), and for the policy of extraterritoriality (“Japan discovered that it was not wholly independent and sovereign”), but also praise for the raising of democratic feeling among the Japanese people through the introduction of Western learning (“they began to get acquainted with the principles of civil life and constitutional government”).163 Indeed, Ōkuma concluded his interview with the remark that while many of Japan’s previous democratic advances like the Meiji Constitution, the growth of the press, or the creation of political parties were top-down government sponsored initiatives, nowadays, “thanks to its educative influence, people are coming to know and feel their own power” and that only through education could “the general

160 Morse, Mabie, 243.
161 Mabie, Japan To-Day, 242. See also “Count Okuma,” The Outlook, Jun. 14, 1913.
163 Mabie, Japan To-Day, 254, 256, 258. See also “A Japanese Statesman on Japan,” The Outlook, Jun. 14, 1913.
uplift of the nation fully express itself and secure for the country the most lasting results.”

Ōkuma’s democratic leanings should not be considered in a vacuum given that Mabie’s arrival in Japan in late 1912 also coincided with the beginning of the Taisho Political Crisis. The Meiji Emperor’s death, as Mabie observed, was still a prime topic of conversation. “The nation is still in mourning for the late Emperor, and many [of the usual] festivities are shorn of their gayer aspects,” Mabie observed as he toured Kamakura around the 1913 New Year. While Mabie himself only briefly mentioned the political crisis in his published works, we do know that he was present for many key events, including the dramatic events of February 5, 1913 which helped spark the fall of the cabinet of Katsura Tarō. Having previously agreed to issue a vote of no confidence against the cabinet, the Seiyūkai minority party attempted to question Katsura but were shouted down by members of his Dōshikai majority. With the gauntlet thrown down, Seiyūkai member Ozaki Yukio then stood up to deliver a blistering denunciation to the apparently nonplussed Katsura. According to Ozaki’s later description, he then had the melodramatic thought that “if I suddenly pointed my finger at Katsura he might try to avoid it and fall off his chair!” Carried away by the moment, he did just this, denouncing the Dōshikai and issuing his J’accuse against its leader. “Unfortunately,” Ozaki lamented, “Katsura did not fall off his seat.”

Still, the damage was done and as the scandals piled up Katsura resigned five days later. However, also according to Ozaki’s recollection:

Dr. Mābē [spelt phonetically], chief editor of The Outlook, also happened to be there. When I later met him in Kamakura he asked me why I had spoken so violently. He did not understand the language, but must have been startled by my attitude and tone of voice. When emotionally provoked one can act quite outrageously.

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164 Mabie, Japan To-Day, 268. See also “A Japanese Statesman on Japan,” The Outlook, Jun. 14, 1913.
165 Mabie, Japan To-Day, 117. See also “Holidays in Kamakura,” The Outlook, Mar. 29, 1913.
Indeed, it is possible Mabie had some sympathy for Ozaki, which was likely only increased when he left the Seiyūkai shortly thereafter, accusing the party of selling out to oligarchic rule in not pressing their advantage further. As Ōkuma had observed in his interview, “the circumstances that made Mr. Ozaki secede from the Seiyūkai were at bottom very much like the circumstances that caused Mr. Roosevelt to leave the Republican party.”168 For an admitted Roosevelt supporter and Bull Mooser, Ōkuma’s comparison appears almost perfectly tailored to win over Mabie’s natural affinity for such progressive men of principle.

Completing his assignment, Mabie departed Japan for the United States in May 1913. Despite the questionable nature of many of his initial remarks about Japan prior to his departure, Mabie was apparently humbled by his experiences. “My head is exactly the size it was when I left, but my heart is much bigger,” he reflected to a friend even before his departure.169 Onboard the Shinyō Maru, the ship that would return him to America, Mabie returned to these sentiments, observing that, “I know a great deal more than I did, and I hope I shall live to tell some of our ignorant fellow-countrymen what I have learned.”170 Like many internationalists, Mabie believed that most Japanese-American hostility involved ignorance and bad teaching rather than any belief in the inevitability of a clash of civilizations. Barriers between individuals from different countries “may exist for a little time in the minds of men of selfish interest and narrow racial feeling,” Mabie argued in one of his lectures to Japanese audiences, “but it has never risen in the minds of men of vision [in either the] East or West.”171 As for the prospect of a Japanese-American War, Mabie reported to his boss Lawrence F. Abbott at The Outlook that:

I have inquired in every direction, of all sorts of people, and I can get but one opinion that there has never been the slightest foundation for the idea that Japan has ever thought of

168 Mabie, Japan To-Day, 265; Hackett, Yamagata, 264.
169 Morse, Mabie, 254.
170 Morse, Mabie, 261.
171 Mabie, American Ideals, 3.
fighting us. I believe that scare has been manufactured out of nothing, and I am sure we can safely deride and condemn it. If they felt like fighting the conditions would make it suicidal. As a minister said not long ago Japan might as well commit hari-kari as fight the U.S. They seem, on the other hand, to have a real sense of gratitude towards us and to be grieved and confused by what they think has been a change of feeling towards them.\footnote{Morse, \textit{Mabie}, 242.}

With hindsight on the Pacific War, this may appear naive as there were indeed Japanese writers—such as Shirokita Yasushi or Oto Ryusen—who were penning pro-war literature of this type at about this time. However, as Mark Peattie has argued, their works still remained “highly fanciful” and “less intended to inform the Japanese public of the strategic and material requirements for victory than to provide it with satisfying visions of Japanese expansive power and military ardor.”\footnote{Mark R. Peattie, “Forecasting a Pacific War, 1912-1933: The Idea of a Conditional Japanese Victory,” in \textit{The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan between East and West}, ed. James W. White, Michio Umegaki, and Thomas R. H. Havens (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990), 118.} In general, most rational Japanese statesmen of this era were wary about fighting the United States, and those who argued otherwise remained, as yet, on the fringes of the Japanese political discourse, generally validating Mabie observations. In his final report to the Carnegie Endowment, Mabie would conclude that, “Japan offers a specially promising field for the work of the Endowment” and that, if willing, Japan was in “a position to render a great service to the peace of the world.”\footnote{Mabie, \textit{Educational Exchange}, 7.} As the Endowment glossed this summary:

Japan is committed to the maintenance of international peace by historic tradition, by its own national ambitions, by the need of concentrating its forces on the development of its domestic resources as well as by the pressure of a large national debt, and necessity for strengthening Japanese credit abroad.\footnote{YCE, \textit{1913-1914}, 70.}

In short, both Mabie and the Endowment agreed that America need not worry about Japanese aggression in the foreseeable future.

However, other American views of Mabie’s exchange were less positive. One of the bluntest was to be found in the popular journal of American Progressive thought, \textit{The Nation},
which criticized the poor transition of Mabie’s articles from *The Outlook* to book format in *Japan To-day and To-Morrow*, as well as Mabie’s generally dilettantish knowledge of Japanese history. “Outside of these chapters on Ōkuma,” the anonymous but clearly knowledgeable reviewer scoffed, “there is little of value in the book. Dr. Mabie has failed to absorb the best material, the pages bristle with inaccuracies and non-sequiturs and his style is so slipshod as to be a constant irritation.”\(^{176}\) *The North American Review*, while more generous, still accused Mabie of having set up a straw man view of American attitudes towards Japan as either “unscrupulous schemers or as picturesque figures out of the past” which he then seeks to dispel. “If we have aught to complain of,” this reviewer argues, “it is that the book is a bit too uniformly pleasant to permit of much sharp thinking, though here and there we meet with an illuminating passage.”\(^{177}\) David H. Buel, reviewing the work for the American Geographical Society, agreed with *The Nation* reviewer that the chapters of the book dealing with Ōkuma were the most interesting, but concluded that while the former Premier’s statements are “able, smooth and plausible” they also have “withal an air of special pleading.”\(^{178}\) Clearly, other Americans were not as sympathetic to Japan’s views as Mabie had been. The reception of Japanese reviewers, however, was more positive. Satō Aimaro, later Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., recalled Mabie’s, “winning personality which in itself was a master-key to any social circle,” along with his willingness to accept the Japanese on their own terms. “Naturally he won unfeigned admiration wherever he went and formed lasting friendships with Japan’s foremost thinkers.”\(^{179}\) Kitasawa Shinjiro, a Japanese student in America who had just completed his PhD at Johns

176 “The Island Kingdom,” *The Nation*, 100, no. 2586 (Jan. 21, 1915), 81-82.
179 Morse, *Mabie*, 262-263.
Hopkins University, produced a review in which he claimed that Mabie’s book was “distinguished by keenness of observation, broad sympathy, and that charm of style which characterize Dr. Mabie’s writings” and that “it is to be hoped that this charming volume will receive a hearty welcome in America and help to enlighten the general public on their knowledge of Japan and contribute to strengthen the historic friendship between the two nations.”

Criticisms of Mabie’s knowledge of Japan are certainly justified. He did not (as Ozaki had noted) speak the language, nor had he studied Japan from afar prior to his visit. His knowledge of Japan, therefore, was indeed as limited as his reviewers observed. Moreover, as seen, the views expressed by Mabie at the Japan Society dinner prior to his departure were based on many of the typical misconceptions Americans held about Japan. However, it does appear that over the course of his exchange he did develop a more nuanced picture of Japanese life. By his own admission, Mabie himself concluded that his initial conclusions were perhaps too simplistic. The most likely explanation for the difference in views between Japan and America was that the Japanese commentators were simply happy that someone in America was looking to legitimately understand their nation and its aims rather than offering generalizations or (even more infuriatingly) accounts which took a definitive pro-American stance on events. While Mabie’s account of Japan was hardly perfect—due to both his own ignorance of Japanese history as well as his personal biases, including his Progressivism and his elitism—he still attempted a sympathetic look at Japanese society. Furthermore, Mabie had intended his work for a general American audience, not an expert one, a fact unsurprising given the mandate of the Carnegie Endowment itself. This can account for some criticism among the American reviewers who derided the work for its simplicity as this was never intended to be a rigorous and scholarly

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work. Nonetheless, the Endowment itself was satisfied by Mabie’s work, calling it “admirable,” and expressed hope that his exchange would set the standard for future exchanges.  

_Carnegie Endowment II: East Asian Journalists, 1929_

For the Carnegie Endowment, the success of Nitobe, Eliot, and Mabie’s exchanges had shown the values of cultural internationalism and set the template for future exchanges. For the 1913-1914 school year the initiative returned to the Japanese as Dr. Satō Shōsuke, the Dean of the Agricultural College at Japan’s Northeastern University, arrived to speak at 16 American universities. However, just as the initiative was about to return to the United States, global events proceeded to humble the internationalist cause as the Great European Powers plunged into war in August 1914. By this point, it had already been decided by the Endowment that the newly elected President of Princeton University, John Grier Hibben, would visit Japan in 1914-1915, but this was not to be. Nevertheless, despite the blow of the Great War, the Carnegie Endowment remained optimistic about the post-war future of these exchanges:

> Three years’ experience has demonstrated clearly the value of these visits. The exchange is, of necessity, interrupted for a time. As soon as may appear advisable, the Acting Director will arrange for its resumption with the committee of eminent citizens of Japan who bear the expense of the representatives of Japan chosen to visit the United States, and who arrange the itinerary and entertainment of the representatives of the Endowment who visit Japan.

Despite this pledge, these uniquely Japanese exchanges were apparently never restarted. While as late as 1921 assurances were given that they would “resumed as soon as world conditions will permit,” it appears that they remained in limbo before being superseded by the Endowment’s

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181 YCE, 1913-1914, 70.
182 YCE, 1913-1914, 70-71.
183 Hibben had taken over the post in 1912 as it was vacated by then presidential hopeful Woodrow Wilson.
Carnegie Professorship program. While the Endowment would go on to send many American professors to teach at Japanese universities, it was not until 1929 that it would again send Americans abroad with the specific goal to increase public knowledge of Japan.

The plan finalized for 1929 was simple. Eleven reporters, representing a broad geographical range of American newspapers, would come together to collectively tour Japan, Korea, Manchuria and China-proper between April and August. During this time, they would meet with local political representatives of the nations they passed through, study the pressing geopolitical issues of East Asia from up close, as well as learn something of the local cultures and societies, before reporting back to their readers. The Endowment’s hope was that since “at least all sections of the country, if not all of its reading public, would have the benefit of the study and observation of these journalists through the columns of their respective papers,” the views expressed by these journalists would reach a wider range of Americans than those of any single traveller. While a single, elite figure like Mabie may have been sufficient in the years prior to the Great War, times had now changed. Moreover, given that the reporters were (hopefully) well known and respected by their readers, their reports from abroad would be treated with less scepticism than any statement issued by an organization like the Japan Society or the Carnegie Endowment itself which could appear biased. To forestall such criticism, Nicholas Murray Butler—now Endowment President in addition to his previous role as Director of Intercourse and Education—emphatically told the invited reporters, “members of the party will be under no obligation or commitment, expressed or implied, either to the Carnegie

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185 YCE, 1921, 65. In 1929, for example, this program had sent American teachers Dr. George M. Dutcher and Dr. Charles E. Martin to lecture at several Japanese universities while the Japanese Nakaseko Rokuro had spent a semester at the University of Hawaii. See YCE, 1930, 51-53.
186 YCE, 1930, 49-50.
Endowment or to any of their hosts, to accept or reflect any particular point of view.”\textsuperscript{187} This was important to state given that while the Endowment supplied $15,000 for the exchange, it would also be partially supported by several Japanese shipping and railroad companies.\textsuperscript{188} These included several zaibatsu-owned concerns, such as Mitsubishi’s \textit{Nippon Yūsen Kaisha} (NYK), as well as the South Manchuria Railway Company (Mantetsu). These organizations, as the Endowment’s yearbook explained, “acted as hosts to the party while traveling over their lines to and from and in Japan,” and while in Manchuria, “the South Manchuria Railway and the local Chinese authorities were joint hosts.”\textsuperscript{189}

True to their word, the journalists selected by the Endowment represented a geographically diverse range of newspapers. This included Francis W. Clarke for the \textit{Atlanta Constitution}, Paul Wright for the \textit{Chicago Daily News}, Judd Mortimer Lewis for the \textit{Houston Post-Dispatch}, Fred Hogue for the \textit{Los Angeles Times}, Harry B. Wakefield for the \textit{Minneapolis Journal}, Wilbur Forrest for the \textit{New York Herald-Tribune}, Herbert L. Matthews for the \textit{New York Times}, George S. Johns for the \textit{St. Louis Post-Dispatch} (who would act as the delegation’s spokesman), Francis E. Regal for the \textit{Springfield Republican}, Gideon A. Lyon for the \textit{Washington Evening Star}, and William Philip Simms representing the Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers. These journalists would also be joined by George A. Finch, the Assistant Secretary of the Endowment who would handle all diplomatic niceties.\textsuperscript{190} Given the difficulty of contextualizing so many individual perspectives, I have chosen to focus the following examination on only three journalists: those of Clarke, Hogue, and Simms, as well as those of Finch and the Endowment. I will, however, reference other journalists where I think it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{187} Scott, “The American Journalists,” 833.
\item \textsuperscript{188} YCE, 1930, 50.
\item \textsuperscript{189} YCE, 1930, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{190} YCE, 1930, 47.
\end{itemize}
contributes to the overall narrative.

Coming in from across the country the journalists met in San Francisco to receive their briefings. Together they were “an outstanding group of newspapermen,” as Francis Clarke concluded.191 Writing with a narrative flair for the dramatic, Clarke would focus less on his reception by local bigwigs in his columns, and much more on the everyday lives of the people who he encountered, enjoying himself all the while.192 This was not the case, however, for Fred Hogue. Hailing from a California writhing with anti-Japanese sentiment, Hogue often took a dim and darkly cynical view of events, observing that while Japan was, yet, “scientifically and mechanically weak,” that only meant that they “must be adroit in diplomacy until the day comes that they are powerful enough to be arrogant.” Hogue, clearly, was not going to be taken in by any Japanese propaganda, perceived or otherwise: “‘Yamato Damashii’—the soul of Japan—how carefully hidden from prying foreign eyes!”193 William Simms (along with George Johns) was one of the few “named” journalists on the expedition in that he already had a reputation, as Clarke would note, as “a veritable globe-trotter.”194 Because of this, and with his columns published in the numerous papers under the Scripps-Howard banner, Simms’ word was thus both a far-reaching and a credible one in American public opinion, a fact that would be important upon his return.

Boarding the NYK liner Taiyō Maru, the delegation departed San Francisco on April 23. “The hodge-podge of humanity on a trans-Pacific liner,” wrote Clarke wistfully. “New York may be the gateway to the melting pot of all nations, but surely the Pacific is the broad highway on

192 Clarke would, for example, pen an article during the exchange solely about the children he saw milling about Tokyo. See “The Children of Japan (XI),” The Atlanta Constitution, Jun. 16, 1929.
which the peoples of the earth, whatever their color or speech, go about their errands.” He was not far wrong; not for the last time would the party find themselves face-to-face with someone famous on their exchange. This time it was discovered that Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian Nobel Prize winner, was also aboard ship, raising early the race issue which was to hang over most forthcoming events. Tagore was “a man of tremendous physique,” a rather broadminded Clarke noted, who “when he turns those great soulful eyes upon you, thoughts of race or color depart and you think only that you are in the presence of a splendid mentality.” Interviewing Tagore, the journalists had to address the issue of Katherine Mayo’s recently published and infamous book Mother India (1927) which had attacked India as unready for self-rule. On Mayo’s critique of India’s castes Tagore was especially poignant, observing that Americans, “have your own caste system, quite as rigorous of as ours, in your treatment of the negro.” A less magnanimous Hogue, meanwhile, was also grumbling about castes, this time regarding the Japanese crew of the Taiyō Maru. Realizing that the Showa Emperor’s birthday was approaching on April 29, Hogue and George Johns (“chairman of our helpless, rudderless little delegation”) had tried to impose themselves on this Japanese celebration, asking if they could offer a toast or use the radio to send their greetings at sea, but were rebuffed. “We are losing caste 300 miles from the shores of Japan,” he groused, “and the worst is yet to come.” The fact that Hogue had shown his irritation with nationalistic Japanese “statistical sticklers” who were wont to observe that European and American colonial empires had occupied 46,000,000 of the 53,00,000 square miles of land available on earth in the name of imperialism, which left an (allegedly) overpopulated Japan with no emigration outlet, may have played some

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195 Francis W. Clarke, “Humanity on an Ocean Liner (IV),” The Atlanta Constitution, Jun. 9, 1929.
196 Ibid. See also Clarke, “A Talk with Tagore (VII),” The Atlanta Constitution, Jun. 12, 1929.
role in his difficulties.  

Pausing in Honolulu on April 30, there was time enough for the delegation to dine with the internationalists of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the islands’ local newspapers before departing for Yokohama where they arrived on May 10 and proceeding to stay in Tokyo until May 19. Their arrival was followed by rounds of publicity events, so that the delegation “tumbled into bed utterly spent after a day and night of intensive entertaining,” according to Clarke. For most of the reporters, their initial reactions mainly reflected on the reconstruction projects which were still being completed after the Kanto Earthquake of 1923. For Simms, who had passed most of the trip to Japan in silence, the perceived modernity of the cities was worth noting. “I was in Japan not long before the great catastrophe,” he reported. “At that time Tokyo, the capital, and Yokohama, Japan’s chief port, were progressing at a rapid rate but were, nevertheless, thoroughly Japanese of the old school.” Now, however, “Tokyo already resembles Chicago, Los Angeles or New York.” Otherwise, it was the rounds of meeting with the important men of Tokyo which were the prime reason to file a report. Clarke reported on the words of Saitō Makoto—future prime minister and soon to be re-elected Governor-General of Korea—who at a conference for the English newspapers of Japan observed that, “Japan realizes in full degree the extent to which her future, both economically and politically, depends upon the United States.”

Hogue, with customary suspicion, decided to follow the reception of the also disembarked Tagore in the Japanese press and had a very personal reaction to those articles,

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200 “Journalists Greeted on Way to Orient,” The Honolulu Advertiser, May 1, 1929; YCE, 1930, 47.
203 William Phillip Simms, “Two of Japan’s Cities Undergo Modernization (I),” Pittsburgh Press, Jun 28, 1929. Simms also reported on the fashions of the Japanese moga and mobo—which he cited by name—as a further sign of Japanese progressiveness. See also YCE, 1930, 49.
“narrating the discourtesy Tagore received on the Pacific Coast.” Hogue also narrated the poet’s trivial dislike of Hollywood as well as his (likely true) experience of being delayed by racist U.S. immigration officials who had him wait pointlessly before grilling him in depth about overstaying his visa.\textsuperscript{205} Clarke also recalled fondly meeting with Marquis Ōkuma—son of the late Ōkuma Shigenobu whom Mabie had meet some 17 years before—who had invited the delegation for dinner and Nō plays at Tokyo’s prestigious Peers’ Club.\textsuperscript{206}

One of the most interesting interviews held in Tokyo was by Mathews for the \textit{New York Times}, who spoke with then Mantetsu Vice-President Matsuoka Yōsuke. Lecturing about his long-held assertions that Manchuria represented Japan’s “life line” (seimeisen) to Asia, Matsuoka also guaranteed to Mathews that this did not mean Japan was excluding the United States from the region. “Manchuria is large enough for all of us,” Matsuoka breezily assured his guest, “and Japan welcomes the introduction of foreign capital.” It was only if the Soviets or the Chinese showed aggression in Manchuria, Matsuoka concluded, that Japan would be forced into war.\textsuperscript{207} While in retrospect we may be tempted to dismiss such claims as nothing more than the platitudes of a notoriously self-important individual, Matsuoka’s claims to Mathews were in keeping with his current beliefs on Japan’s role in Manchuria and China. Having recently returned from his own fact-finding mission to China with Yamamoto Jōtarō on behalf of the government of Tanaka Giichi in 1927, Matsuoka had shown a willingness to promote cooperation with the Guomindang provided that Japanese influence in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia was respected. Sending back a seven point report to Tanaka from Korea, Matsuoka had argued that, “a strict policy of non-intervention must be proclaimed with regard to China’s

\textsuperscript{205} Fred Hogue, “Tagore Amplifies on Snub (V),” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, Jun. 6, 1929.


domestic conflict,” and showed his most concern with the influence of the Soviet Union’s assistance to Chiang Kai-Shek, hoping Britain, France, the U.S. and Italy would join Japan in condemning these communist ties and in intervening in China to protect Manchuria and other foreign interests if the situation eventually warranted such action. Later, when Tanaka sent troops into China during the Jinan Incident to forestall the Northern Expedition, Matsuoka was furious, having a heated argument with the Prime Minister when he visited him at his home.

Matsuoka’s claims to Mathews were therefore truthful, in keeping with his current views on China, and also showed his willingness—even in 1929—to try and come to some sort of an arrangement with Japan’s foreign competitors in Manchuria.

With the tour of the capital complete, the Carnegie delegation then started upon a whirlwind tour of southern Honshu including stops at Nikko, Mt. Fuji, Numazu, Shizuoka, Nagoya, Toba, Nara, Osaka, Kyoto, Mt. Hiei, Kobe and Miyajima before arriving at Shimonoseki for the trip to Korea. One of the most commonly discussed events on this southern tour—beyond catching sight of the Showa Emperor as he travelled through Kobe—involved meeting another Japanese with a very personal story to tell. Passing near Toba, the delegation stopped to meet the famous businessman Mikimoto Kōkichi, the first man to successfully cultivate and mass produce pearls. Placing Mikimoto on the delegation’s itinerary was a shrewd recommendation by the Japanese authorities, as this was a man who would immediately appeal to American journalists with the nose for a good story. The story of Mikimoto, “a man who at 21 was a flour miller’s apprentice and who now at 71 is many times a millionaire, numbered among his friends some of the most notable men of the world,” as Clarke

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noted, appealed immediately to the American desire for a “rags-to-riches” story in the Horatio Alger mould.\textsuperscript{212} Indeed, Simms would praise Mikimoto using just these words, while also noting that in trying to cultivate pearls, Mikimoto had “[buried] himself on an uninhabited island of the Inland Sea [where] he experimented for years and finally, in 1894, produced his first semi-spherical pearl.”\textsuperscript{213} In another article Simms would even visit the “laboratory” where “surgeons” cultivated the pearls, and would positively compare Mikimoto to the American horticulturist Luther Burbank who was well known for breeding numerous new strains of plants over his long career.\textsuperscript{214} Not only was Mikimoto a hard worker, Simms essentially argued, but he was likewise innovative and scientifically minded, further desirable American attributes. Moreover, as he was also a man “reputed to have more millions at his command than Monte Cristo,” as Hogue observed, the visit also played into the paparazzi desire to know more about the lives of the rich and famous with their air of mystery and sophistication about them.\textsuperscript{215} This story, so uniquely Japanese, was also a human interest piece completely scrutable to an American audience, and thus played well with the Endowment’s objectives of increasing mutual understanding between Japan and the United States.

On the night of June 8, the delegation crossed the Tsushima Strait to the Korean port of Busan before taking the train first to Seoul and then on to Mukden.\textsuperscript{216} Clarke, for once showing a clear Japanese bias, was dutifully impressed by what he saw. “Prior to 1910 the nation of Korea had been for centuries been under threat or the actual dominion alternately of China and Russia with only short periods of home rule.” Now, Korea was making great strides under Japanese leadership. “Seoul, the capital, is entirely rebuilt on Occidental lines, with broad boulevards, fine

\textsuperscript{216} YCE, \textit{1930}, 48.
schools and a capitol building which would cost at least five million dollars to erect in the United States.”217 Japanese domination was hardly wanted by Koreans, most reporters acknowledged, but as Hogue described the challenge, “in crossing a desert infested with bandits, would you prefer to join an armed caravan, or travel alone?”218 In an era when geopolitical realpolitik was still a fact of life in international politics, despite the First World War or the recently signed Pact of Paris outlawing war, the morality and practicality of this issue was not clear cut, as many reporters observed. As Simms summed it up, “a leading Filipino once told me he would rather see the Philippines go to hell under its own flag than go to heaven under any other. He was foolish or wise, depending upon how you look at it, but at least he was human. And so is the Korean with his ambition for independence.”219 Making a clear distinction between a magnanimous imperialism which benefited to the colonized and exploitative imperialism which was not, most of the Carnegie journalists argued the Japanese imperialism in Asia was, as yet, a positive and stabilizing influence in the region that was worthy of their conditional approval.

Crossing the Korean-Manchurian border into Liaodong on June 13, the delegation received a letter of welcome from the Guomindang Minister for Foreign Affairs before proceeding on to Mukden, with further stops in Fushun, Gongzhuling, Changchun, Dunhua, Jilin, Harbin, Anshan, Dalian, and Port Arthur.220 Manchuria in 1929 was already on the brink of major geopolitical tensions. Zhang Zuolin, the Chinese warlord ostensibly in charge over the region, had been assassinated only a year before, provoking both a crisis within army headquarters at Port Arthur when the Kantōgun’s attempts to exploit the situation were rebuffed

220 YCE, 1930, 48.
by Tokyo, as well as a major political crisis at home for the government of Tanaka Giichi.\(^{221}\) By 1929 the Soviet Union had also returned to the region over a major geopolitical crisis with China for the first time since Russia’s departure with the Russian Revolution two decades earlier. In May, Manchurian officials under orders from Zhang Zuolin’s son and the region’s new warlord, Zhang Xueliang, had raided the Soviet Consul at Harbin, resulting in an escalating series of tensions that would culminate later that year.\(^{222}\) Indeed, with the drama heightening, Simms and Wilbur Forrest would eventually part ways from the rest of the delegation to rush north to Harbin and Manzhouli to cover events, but were to be disappointed by the lack of immediate action. Still, as Simms darkly predicted, “as surely as the sun will rise tomorrow morning, a finish fight will one day be fought over this tremendously rich country of Manchuria and its equally fertile neighbor, Mongolia.”\(^{223}\)

Undoubtedly, the delegation’s most memorable event came in Mukden when they were all invited to dine personally with Zhang Xueliang, who was still in the process of solidifying his position after his father’s assassination.\(^{224}\) Most approached the visit to the warlord’s villa with some trepidation. The walk past the lines of guards into the banquet room where Yang Yuting, one of the elder Zhang’s top advisors and an alleged Japanese spy, along with a colleague had been gunned down on the younger’s orders a year before “is calculated to be somewhat hard on the nerves of an American,” as Clarke put it.\(^{225}\)

“Damocles dined as comfortably as I,” Hogue winced, concluding that life in Mukden was on par with “the Rome of

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221 Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2001), 348-354. It would later be discovered that it had been rogue elements of the Kantōgun which had killed Zhang. It was also as this scuffle was unfolding that a young Japanese army officer named Ishiwa Kanji was first elevated into the ranks of the Kantōgun’s leadership in Port Arthur. See Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwa Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West* (Princeton: University Press, 1975), 93-94.


224 See Appendix A, Image 5.

the Borgias.” The widely accepted American perception that Manchuria was a lawless but developing backwater on par with the Wild West was clearly not undone by these experiences. Conflict was correctly seen in the foreseeable future.

Departing Mukden, the delegation headed south of the Great Wall on the evening of June 26 for a brief stay at Beijing. Leaving the decaying erstwhile Chinese capital on July 4, the delegation then travelled south to visit Tianjin, Jinan, Qingdao, Shanghai, and the Nationalist capital at Nanjing. It was in Beijing on July 1 that the delegation was able to sit down for an hour-long private audience with Chiang Kai-shek himself, who was already in the city attempting to patch up relations with the northern warlords Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. Two months before, Chiang had provoked Feng into rebellion having already bribed some 100,000 of his best men to defect to the Nationalist cause while, conspicuously, Yan had sat in nearby Shanxi and done nothing. Conversing with the delegation via translator, Chiang took the reporters through the trials and tribulations that he and the Guomindang had experienced since 1927 in trying to unify the country. Having completed the Northern Expedition in 1928, and having reached an agreement with Zhang Xueliang to fly the flag of the Nationalist cause (much to Japan’s chagrin), Chiang offered the optimistic assessment that, “I can say that we feel we have within the last few weeks completed our great task of unification and can now turn our thoughts towards the upbuilding of China.” Nevertheless, as Chiang knew, China was still beset by recalcitrant warlords and communists from within and by imperialists from without, and was no doubt hopeful that the reporters would take his admitted defeats in stride and join him in

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227 YCE, 1930, 48.
229 Taylor, Generalissimo, 84; Francis W. Clarke, “Interviewing President Chiang (XX),” The Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 2, 1929.
picturing the future. “I know that practically all of you are newcomers to China,” Chiang observed:

In your travels you will probably be faced with some inconvenience, because of the slowness in our industrial development, our lack of modern conveniences, and our destruction of communications. But I am sure that as friends of China you will make faithful reports to your newspapers and that you will make suitable contribution to the cause which we are now striving for, namely, the national reunification of this country.230

“General Chiang’s interview,” as Clarke noted, “was one of disarming frankness, of ready admission of the failure of his government to accomplish anything whatsoever of a constructive nature.” Nevertheless, Clarke admitted that the “suave and comparatively young” Chiang was able to deliver his admissions of failure and hopes for the future with “the greatest earnestness and seriousness.”231 Most reporters, it seemed, were yet impressed by Chiang and China. “I was so impressed,” Hogue dryly noted, “that I collapsed at lunch and am now in the Rockefeller Foundation Hospital.” Hogue (along with Wakefield and Wright) had caught an intestinal virus while in Manchuria and would be confined to bed, ending his journey with the Endowment.232

Their ranks dwindling, the remaining reporters pressed on, first to Nanjing where they visited the headquarters of the Guomindang, the new mausoleum for Sun Yat-sen, and the work being done on building the new capital of the Chinese Republic. Afterwards, it was on to Shanghai to again be confronted by the complexities of empire.233 Upon arrival, the delegation first attended a luncheon with local Chinese merchants before dining with members of the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) later that evening, where the topic of discussion for the day was extraterritoriality and the Nationalist government’s attempts to eliminate it. Speaking for the

231 Francis W. Clarke, “Interviewing President Chiang (XX),” The Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 2, 1929.
233 YCE, 1930, 49.
Chinese, the noted Shanghai merchant Wang Xiaolai hoped that “America was watching with interest and sympathy the efforts made by new China to establish a new order of international relationship so that freed from the shackles of unequal treaties and unilateral restrictions she may advance steadily in commerce and industries.” Harry E. Arnhold, the British chairman of the SMC, naturally took a different view. “The sudden cry against extraterritoriality is to divert the attention of the people from the results of the misgovernment of the Guomindang party,” he said, arguing that it was only “sheltered behind the security of the foreign settlements of Shanghai” that the ungrateful Nationalist had been able to finance their government.234

The tone of Arnhold’s speech was, in many ways, indicative of the flow of events in Shanghai during the 1920s. Beginning with the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925, the legitimacy of the International Settlement and the predominately British “Shanghailanders” who ran it had been badly tarnished. By the end of the decade, many in Whitehall and the international business community considered that the increasing modernization of the Nationalists might render the Settlement a costly obsolescence. Others were beginning to see the wisdom, and the morality, of returning extraterritoriality to China, especially while Chiang was in the mood to compromise.235 This was an important consideration given the success of the Nationalists in attempting to unify China during the Northern Expedition. As Chiang’s forces had approached the city in 1927, stories of Chinese atrocities had spread panic among the expatriate community, who compared their situation to that of the foreign legations at Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion. With the alliance between the Nationalist and the Communists still intact, there was also the fear that the arriving Chinese troops might visit a “Red Terror” on the city, a fact which was not implausible given the amount of communist violence already stoked within the city’s boundaries. In

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consequence, the British had led a 10,000-strong force of international troops prepared to defend the city against the Nationalists if the need arose.\textsuperscript{236} In the end, such fears were unwarranted as Chiang moved to purge the communists from his party after the capture of the city and establish his own independent government in Nanjing.

For the Chinese and foreign merchants of the city, however, this was not the end of their troubles. While Chiang was yet wary of attacking the foreign powers in Shanghai while he still confronted internal enemies, the Chinese merchants of the city had no such protection. Initially seeking to work with the Chinese financers like Wang to acquire loans, Chiang soon grew impatient and eventually applied force. In the guise of pursuing communists, Chiang strong-armed many affluent Chinese of the city into buying government bonds, a fact widely reported and denounced by foreign journalists.\textsuperscript{237} Given these facts, Clarke was apparently more convinced of the SMC’s viewpoint. As he argued, the Chinese position against extraterritoriality sounded good, until he was told that Chinese merchants like Wang had most of their assets in the International Settlement as insurance in case they fell afoul of the Nationalists’ anti-communist bond collectors.\textsuperscript{238} Moreover, “China’s tangled skein of politics is still far from being unknotted, notwithstanding the undoubtedly meritorious nature of some of the professed ideals of the present government and its apparently sincere young leaders.” Despite the good words, Clarke noted, the amount of graft, corruption, and incompetence within the Nationalist bureaucracy was an undoubted fact.\textsuperscript{239} The SMC may have been an imperialist institution run for the benefit of foreign businessmen, but at least in Clarke’s mind it was run by men with experience who


\textsuperscript{238} Francis W. Clarke, “Extraterritoriality in China (XXIII), \textit{The Atlanta Constitution}, Aug. 11, 1929.

\textsuperscript{239} Francis W. Clarke, “China’s Tangled Skein (XXIV), \textit{The Atlanta Constitution}, Aug. 13, 1929.
respected the rule of law, traits which Chiang’s Nationalists seemed to lack.

On July 23 the delegation arrived back in Japan. On July 23 the delegation arrived back in Japan.240 “Tired of body, weary of spirit, seeing red at the mere mention of a function, the remnant of the Carnegie Endowment’s party of American journalists alighted from the train in Tokyo at the end of what was undoubtedly in many respects the most remarkable tour ever taken by a group of newspapermen,” was how Clarke described delegation’s prevailing mindset.241 Still, compared with the corruption and rivalry which was taking place on the mainland, Japan was seen as a place of tranquility to recuperate for the voyage home. On July 26, George Finch would be invited on Tokyo radio to offer the delegation’s parting farewell to the Japanese people and provide his own opinion of Japan’s role in the internationalist world. “Speaking for myself … this visit to Japan has been intensely interesting, profoundly educational, and most delightful in every way,” he applauded. “Is it any wonder, then, that the first impression, the last impression, and perhaps the most permanent impression of the foreign visitor is the cheerfulness, the contentment and the friendliness of the Japanese people?”242 Finch ended by comparing what he saw as the overlap in the Carnegie Endowment’s objectives and those of Showa Japan:

In reading the Enthronement Rescript of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, I find these words: ‘It is our resolve to cultivate friendly relations with all nations, thus to contribute to the maintenance of world peace and the advancement of the welfare of humanity.’ I learn further that the name ‘Showa’ was selected for the new reign because it means luminous peace. As the representative of an organization one of whose objects is ‘To cultivate friendly feelings between the inhabitants of different countries, and to increase the knowledge and understanding of each other by the several nations,’ I cannot better conclude these remarks than by expressing my very best wishes for the success of the reign of Showa.243

This was the view eventually signed off on by Nicholas Murray Butler, who concluded that, “the

240 YCE, 1930, 48.  
interest in the Orient and its problems stimulated in the United States by this visit and the friendly American interest in China and Japan manifested by the visit, have contributed toward better understanding between the peoples of the respective countries and of the problems growing out of their mutual intercourse.”244 History would, of course, go on to make a mockery of both these views. In historian Frederick Dickinson’s words, “Standing only two years before the Manchurian Incident, 1929 is more likely to invite association with impeding doom that with any excitement.”245 As he continued, historical orthodoxy continues to stress the structural flaws of Japanese interwar democracy and cast the era in profoundly ambivalent terms. Yet, even in 1929 neither the events of 1937 (nor 1941) were by any means inevitable. A month after Finch gave his address, the newly elected Premier Hamaguchi Osachi would take to the Tokyo airwaves himself to deliver a 30-minute oration listened to by an unprecedented 4 million listeners. Given criticism of former Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi as reactionary and out of step with the times for his army interventionism in China during the Northern Expedition (and the aforementioned role of the Kantōgun in the death of Zhang Zuolin), Hamaguchi appeared all the more lustrous by comparison. In Dickinson’s appraisal, Hamaguchi’s premiership represented the “pinnacle” of the New Japan of Taisho.246 Nor had Japanese society itself yet turned away from its internationalist aspirations. As the Japanese educator Ishikawa Fusa confidently predicted in a speech published that same year, “The world at large also will become, some day, internationalistic by the guidance of the new movement in education, and racial prejudices will be discarded to bring true peace into the world.”247 We need not, then, read the words of Finch and Butler as wholly lacking in self-awareness, for they yet reflected a certain prevailing spirit in

244 YCE, 1930, 50.
245 Dickinson, Triumph, 168.
246 Dickinson, Triumph, 167-171.
Japanese society at this time.

Did the exchange provoke the public interest that the Endowment had intended? While reactions are hard to judge, the exchange does appear to have provoked some interest, but it is undeniable that the journalists themselves felt they were well served by the exchange. Francis Clarke, for example, would return to Atlanta thoroughly impressed by his experiences. In his final three articles for the *Atlanta Constitution*, Clarke summarized East Asia in the following terms: Japan was modernizing rapidly, Manchuria was a land of both promise and tensions, and Nationalist China had noble ideals but was bogged down with corruption (Nationalist press censorship, understandably, had particularly grated on the journalists). As for Japanese-American friendship, “to the average American, a citizen of Japan is a ‘Jap’ or perhaps one of the ‘little yellow men from the Pacific.’ Let that same American stay thirty days in Japan and he will think of Japanese as men of great personal charm and attractiveness, of high ideals and partially illimitable capacity for accomplishment.”248 Upon his return to America, Clarke would also voluntarily give a series of lectures to local groups in order to explain his experiences in person. On September 19, for example, Clarke spoke at the Junior Chamber of Commerce in Atlanta, showed motion pictures of Japan, and again expressed the belief that “Japan, being located between Asia and the United States, is in the position to be of great assistance and it behooves us to retain their friendship and good will.”249 Talking with his fellow journalists at the *Constitution*, Clarke would also report the state of sports in Japan, inspiring journalist Ben Cothran to pen an article about Japanese sumo wrestling, the “purest of all sports.”250

Fred Hogue, on the other hand, remained unimpressed. Recovering from his illness in Beijing, Hogue would head north to join Simms and Forrest in watching the Chinese-Soviet

railroad dispute before returning home separately from the rest of the delegation. In his reports, Hogue would play on the strange and incomprehensible nature of the Japanese. The penchant for Japanese to laugh uncomfortably when confronted with the unexpected particularly galled Hogue. He recalled touring the shrines and waterfalls in the hills near Nikko when it was discovered that three members of the delegation were missing from the group. “In some alarm we informed our Japanese hosts and guides. They counted us over, found we were one short, looked and each other and all laughed heartily. Some of us were indignant.” As he concluded, “the brain of Japan has opened its cells to receive impressions of western material science; but the heart of Japan, oriental in every fiber, has not been touched by contact with western civilization.” It was here that reaction to Hogue’s writing was indeed stimulated. In an editorial in the Los Angeles Times, Garner Curran, editor of the Pan-Pacific Progress, sniped that “if the trained (?) newspaper correspondents now touring Japan as the guests of the Carnegie Foundation [sic] are not able to interpret the mysteries of the oriental complex any better than your own star reporter Mr. Fred Hogue, they should return home in haste,” going on to deconstruct the stereotypes expressed by Hogue’s in his articles.

But it was William Philip Simms, the most famous of the three reporters, whose views received the most scrutiny, and his claim that Japan was becoming more like the United States (and was therefore scrutable) was thus all the weightier. As he argued after visiting Mikimoto, self-made men were becoming as common in Japan as they were in America. “That, I believe, is the secret to Japan’s rapid progress. For just as is the case in America, Japanese young people

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251 Fred Hogue, “Japanese wear Smiling Masks (VII),” Los Angeles Times, Jun. 10, 1929. Amusingly, a nearly contemporary article in the IPR’s Pacific Affairs was on a similar topic, looking at the laughter by audiences in both “the West” and Asia to movies which crossed cultural barriers and so provoked an unintended response. See Romanzo Adams, “Laughing at the Wrong Place,” Pacific Affairs 2, no. 7 (Jul. 1929): 415-417.

252 Fred Hogue, “Japan’s Heart Holds to Past (XVI),” Los Angeles Times, Jun. 27, 1929.

make the sky the limit, however humble or poor they may be today.”

Moreover, Simms would put the information he learned to use later down the road. When in October 1929, as the IPR Conference in Kyoto was being convened, Simms was able to directly address the Japanese complaints at the conference regarding their hatred of the 1924 Exclusion Act. “This writer is in a position to state that if the ban on Japanese immigration has been forgotten in America it is emphatically not the case in Japan. During a six weeks tour of that country earlier in the year, I found this question uppermost whenever Japanese and Americans met.”

But it was the grilling that Simms received into Japanese attempts to influence the delegation after he had returned to his desk in Washington, DC that provoked the most interest in his travels. As they had approached China, the Chinese expat-press, such as Shanghai’s China Weekly Review, had accused the delegation of being a “Japanese-conducted party from the day of its departure” and had leveled accusations of impropriety against delegation member Gideon Lyon. Speaking with the United Press, Simms emphatically denied these allegations. As he noted, Finch had made it abundantly clear at every stop they made that they were free to write as they wished with “no obligation or responsibility to anyone except his own newspaper and his own conscience.” It was here that Simms soberly considered whether the delegation had been fed Japanese “propaganda”:

It was to be expected that our hosts would show us the most pleasant aspects of their homes and countries. We as Americans would not think of entertaining our guests in the slums which exist in our cities or emphasizing in our conversations with them those aspects of American life which we may not approve. The important point is that all members of the Carnegie party were experienced newspaper men who were well aware that we were being shown the best of the countries we visited, and that there was no attempt either in Japan or China to ‘pull the wool over our eyes’ in a silly attempt to make us believe otherwise.

This was a rather poignant indictment of American double standards which asked tough

questions about where showing the best your country has to offer ended, and where papering over repressive, amoral, or general unsavoury elements began. Simms would conclude by offering his opinion that he still thought these tours offered by the Carnegie Endowment were of great value in improving understanding between nations.\textsuperscript{257}

Despite the accusations leveled at Simms, the American journalists who visited East Asia in 1929 apparently got a remarkably accurate picture about events in the region. As the above text shows, while the interviews given by men like Matsuoka or Chiang Kai-Shek were, naturally, self-serving, there is no sign that they represented a disconnect with what we now know of their wider outlooks at this time. Matsuoka’s assurances to Mathews that Japan had important non-negotiable interests in Manchuria, that the Soviet Union and China were the biggest threats to this, and that Japan wished to cooperate with the “Western” imperial powers, were all in keeping with his other contemporary statements. Meanwhile, the declarations made by Chiang, as Clarke noted, were remarkably candid about the failures of the Nationalists to enact reforms but showed that they were still trying to improve. Even Hogue’s negative experiences with the Japanese crew of the \textit{Taiyō Maru} about Japan’s alleged overpopulation and anger at European and American imperialism, merely reflected contemporary Japanese opinions on both matters, and the fact that Hogue simply dismissed such beliefs out of hand does nothing to change this. Indeed, as Clarke saw in Shanghai from the censorship they imposed on the local press along with the extortion of local merchants, the Nationalists was far less law-abiding and liberal than the contemporary Japan government. In an era where Taisho democracy remained a reality, where Japanese entrepreneurs like Mikimoto were finding economic success, and where Japanese hopes of internationalist cooperation with the other Great Powers were still intact, it is

not hard to see why Simms and the other journalists viewed Japan in such a positive light. No, Japan was not perfect they admitted, but then again neither was the United States. Given this, it is not difficult to conclude that worries about only seeing the “good” parts of Japan were a double-standard. Had the journalists instead visited with British politicians in London, rather than with Japanese in Tokyo, it is doubtful the journalists would have protested visiting their host’s haunts in Kensington instead of the slums of the East End.

Comparing the experiences of both the journalists and Mabie’s exchanges, it appears both achieved the cultural internationalism aims set by the Carnegie Endowment. For Mabie, his exchange did indeed provoke the re-evaluation of some of his beliefs. While initially holding many of the same generalizations and racially tinged opinions as his contemporaries, Mabie’s views do seemed to have changed in the face of new facts, as his letters written at the time show. Meanwhile, journalists like Clarke and Simms in 1929 also appeared open to probing uncomfortably into some of the contradictions and difficulties of European imperialism, racism, and Japanese-American relations more generally, though there were clear limits to this. Japanese imperialism itself was not seen as problematic and no journalist exhibited fundamental doubt in their own American values. They were, however, willing to politely consider the views of those Japanese and Chinese they met. Hogue, however, showed no such tact or compunction. With his stark anti-Japanese opinions, there is no doubt that his prejudices were not changed by his encounters but were perhaps even reinforced and given sanction by appearing under the Carnegie Endowment’s banner. Cultural internationalism requires an open mind to achieve its objectives, and this was clearly not to be had with Hogue. In these ways, both exchanges highlight the successes of cultural internationalism as well as its stark limitations in trying to positively influence Japanese-American relations.
As the European powers plunged into war in August 1914, Japanese-American relations would be destabilized by proxy. Initially, at least, the war seemed of little concern to the small coterie of internationalist organizations which made such affairs their business. The only notable exception was that as Japan declared war on Germany and set in for the siege of Qingdao, Japan Society members and bankers Jacob H. Schiff and Oscar S. Straus, as well as a dozen other members, had resigned—the former for his pro-German, anti-Russian sympathies, and the later due to his desire to use his membership money to aid the victims of the war. However, Japan’s seizure of the German Pacific colonies would be further exacerbated by the diplomatic fallout over the Twenty-One Demands and would badly strain Japanese-American diplomatic relations. It was against this darkening background that the Society would publish the first books with the aim of educating the American public about the benefits of a Japanese-American friendship.

The initiative for this project had originated with the Japanese. In 1914 Masaoka Naoichi, an internationalist-minded Japanese journalist and author, had been observing the United States for just under a decade. A former reporter for the Yamato Shinbun, Masaoka had first been given the opportunity to travel to the United States in 1905 to cover Komura Jutarō’s negotiating team as they worked on the Treaty of Portsmouth and had later travelled to America in 1909 as the only Japanese journalist to cover the Honorary Commercial Commission of Japan, an attempt to expand business ties between both nations. “These two visits to America taught me the following lesson,” Masaoka explained, namely that “the Japanese views of America so far have been
erroneous in the main.” As a result, he had decided to devote himself to writing books explaining the country to a Japanese audience, which by 1914 included Beikoku kenbutsu (A Peep into American Life), Beikoku oyobi Beikokujin (America and the Americans), and Beikoku bōchō ron (American Expansion). However, Masaoka had also concluded that this ignorance was mutual. “I … have come to realize that Americans need to learn truths about Japan as the Japanese do about America. Moreover, what the average American knows about Japan is far less than what the average Japanese knows about America.” With the internationalist credo that “most international differences are the results of the lack of mutual understanding,” Masaoka had decided to approach noted Japanese statesmen and intellectuals for short essays on various topics, have the articles translated into English, and then publish them as a compilation for a purely American audience. The eventual result published in March 1914 was entitled Japan’s Message to America.

Coming in at over 260 pages and containing 35 short chapters—including one each by Masaoka and his co-editor—the book provided a remarkably thorough look at both the history of Japanese-American relations as well as highlighting the material and technological progress made by Japan since the Meiji Restoration. The opening article was provided by the soon to be elected Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu and was entitled “Our National Mission.” This mission, Ōkuma argued, was “to harmonize Eastern and Western civilizations in order to help bring about the unification of the world.” As he explained it, as Asia’s premier industrialized nation it was Japan’s duty to help other Asian states—particularly China—develop industrially, while in parallel it helped explain Asian culture to the “West”. “The true difference of mankind is

261 Masaoka, Japan’s Message, vi.
neither in the color of the skin nor in the frame of the body,” Ōkuma pressed, “but is, if any, in the degree of culture itself … A nation, like an individual, must always endeavor to make up its own defects by adopting the merits of another, and to display its strong points at the same time.”

China had failed to do this, he noted, and was now being preyed upon. These statements were in keeping with Ōkuma’s intellectual development. As early as 1898, he had developed a brand of Pan-Asianism sometimes dubbed the “Ōkuma Doctrine” where Japan would act as the protector of China’s integrity, allowing Japan to pay China a debt of gratitude for its past tutelage, while also working on the more self-serving goal of expanding Japanese trade within a stable market. This cynicism was made clear when, as Prime Minister in 1915, Ōkuma supported Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki during his negotiations with China over the Twenty-One Demands, while at the same time Japan sought to assuage American and European diplomats along the lines he had expressed in his article.

Another prominent writer was the internationally-minded industrialist Shibusawa Eiichi. Essentially offering an autobiography of his own life, Shibusawa examined his relationship with America from first hearing about the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853 while still a farmer’s son at age 14, though to his current business deals with the United States in the twentieth century. Of chief concern to Shibusawa was the race issue. When he had first visited the United States in 1902, Shibusawa recalled that “the first time I saw with my own eyes the land of America, my joys were so great that I felt as if I were in my own native town.” Yet, landing in San Francisco and seeing a sign in Golden Gate Park forbidding the entry of Japanese was particularly shocking, especially when he learned that it had come at the request of American women annoyed at the actions of Japanese immigrants. “I thought, if such a small thing could

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264 Lebra, Ōkuma Shigenobu, 122-123.
lead to a discriminatory treatment of our countrymen, what would the result be, if the mutual antipathy should grow, seeing that there already existed such antipathy between the Orientals and Occidentals?" Later, as West Coast antipathy increased, Shibusawa felt compelled to act. He met with concerned Americans, assuring them that “we will do our best to educate our countrymen out of these faults, so that they may not be disliked by Europeans or Americans.” But, he noted, if excluding Japanese immigrants was due simply to race or religion, then the fault would be America’s alone. “I can not believe, I told them, that the Americans would do anything of the kind, because that would be against the original principle upon which America was founded.” While he also noted the work done by Nitobe and Mabie on their Endowment exchanges as positive steps forward, Shibusawa still concluded that if racism persisted, “the masses of the [Japanese] people may become enraged if the strained relations continue long.”

In explaining aspects of Japan to America, most of the articles compiled by Masaoka were also representative, if not always pleasing to the American palate. The noted journalist and nationalist Tokutomi Sohō, for example, included an article on what was translated as “Centripetal Mikadoism”—i.e. Tokutomi’s vindication of Japan’s emperor-centred regime (later termed tennōsei) and its relationship to the Japanese “national polity” (kokutai). The Emperor, Tokutomi concluded, was the central pillar of Japanese society and unlike a technically replaceable European monarch could not be removed without the national polity suffering. “Theirs are the hat, while ours is the head,” he explained. “The hat may be changed as often as you please; the head once gone, the body itself would die.” Moreover, Tokutomi was quick to argue that the “brilliant success” of Meiji Restoration was not solely due to Japan’s fear of

265 Shibusawa, “Myself,” 24-25.
266 Shibusawa, “Myself,” 29.
267 Shibusawa, “Myself,” 36.
268 Tokutomi Iichiro, “Centripetal Mikadoism,” in Japan’s Message to America, ed. Masaoka Naoichi (Tokyo: n.p., 1914), 116. For a brief survey of these two terms see Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 249-251; 279-286 passim.
foreign powers. This was important he admits, but:

the chief factor in breaking down, as we did, the feudal sectionalism of old Japan, and bringing about the national unification, with an unprecedented facility, must be found in the ‘centripetal Mikadoism’ of our people. Had the then Japanese nation lacked the Mikado as its centre, the outcome of our political change of 1868 might have been almost the same as that of the recent revolution in China.269

In other words, China’s chaos and warlordism as warring factions lacked a central leader to which they could propose allegiance in the face of internal and external challengers. One anonymous but knowledgeable reviewer for The Nation, would correctly take criticism with Tokutomi’s claims, perceptively noting the “essential modernism of the Mikado cult—a growth of yesterday—which its Japanese exponents are wont to read back into the whole national history.”270 Regardless, unlike Ōkuma or Shibusawa, Tokutomi viewed Japanese-American relations with profound cynicism. He believed that America had proven itself continually duplicitous, racist, and hypocritical towards Japan. While he applauded American ideals of freedom and tolerance and would not be opposed to the rights of self-determination offered by Woodrow Wilson in his soon to be issued Fourteen Points, Tokutomi pessimistically believed these ideals would be corrupted and only be employed in Anglo-American self-interest. Postwar events would, in the minds of many Japanese, more than justify his accusations.271 Numerous other famous names were also among the collaborators. Ozaki Yukio, fresh off his triumphs in the Taisho Political Crisis, offered a short cri-de-coeur for the peacemakers of both Japan and America to make themselves heard. “Let us speak out our hearts; let the joyous voice of peace drown the wicked cry for war; and let it echo and re-echo in melodious harmony from both sides

of the Pacific Ocean.”

Also represented were Gotō Shinpei, who wrote on “the real character of the Japan race,” as well as Abe Isoo who wrote on the movement of Japanese socialism and predicted that in the Taisho era, “along with the world tendencies of thought, the socialistic movement will take a new form and make its appearance in Japan.”

Travelling eastward, the book was first picked up by American newspapers in Hawaii before being distributed in the continental United States. In the Honolulu Advertiser; a full page was devoted to publishing short extracts from nine of the essays. “They indicate nine different viewpoints,” the editor noted, “but only one position, that of friendship towards the United States and a hope that the differences of the day will disappear, and the old friendship of the years return.” When the book reached the desk of the Japan Society of New York, it was seen as the perfect work to encourage international understanding and Lindsay Russell eventually contacted Masaoka to allow for an American reprint of the book under the Society’s banner. This was agreed to, and the book—retilted as Japan to America—was republished by G.P. Putnam in two print runs in late-1914 and early 1915. “The utterances of statesmen and other leaders of thought in Japan which are presented in this volume as a message to the United States are regarded by the Japan Society as possessing present interest and continued importance for the American public,” Russell wrote in the book’s new introduction, “and we cordially commend this volume to all persons who desire to secure a trustworthy knowledge and correct understanding of the people of Japan and of their aims and ideals.”

In this, the Japan Society was aided by a $6,000 allotment donated from the Carnegie Endowment, which allowed for the distribution of the book in the United States. As Russell reported to the Endowment in 1915, those volumes that had been

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274 “Japan’s Message to America – A Symposium,” The Honolulu Advertiser, Jul. 12, 1914.
275 Masaoka Naoichi ed., Japan to America (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1914), iii.
donated to libraries across the nation were apparently seeing wide use, where some institutions had checked out the book as many as 15 times over the course of a few weeks. “Practically everywhere we found interest in the matter of Japan-American relations and the desire for reliable information—frequently great need for facts and fair unprejudiced information.”

The book gained a wide reputation and the Japan Society’s bulletin twice published reviews from university educators and members of congress who had read the work and expressed their approval.

Reviews of the book were generally positive, though again not without their criticisms. Reviewing the work alongside Mabie’s just published Japan To-day and To-morrow, the New York Times identified that the work could best be summarized as “typical of the views of the educated classes of Japan.” These were elite views, the paper recognized, not necessarily popular opinions. The paper also noted that the common view expressed was that Japan wished to be friendly, “but feels hurt that there is prejudice against her civilization and her ideals because her people have yellow skin,” and this was exacerbated by the treatment of the nation’s immigrants in California and elsewhere. “In other words, the future course of Japanese-American relations seems to rest upon what is or is not done in California.”

P. S. Peirce, reviewing the book for the American Journal of Sociology also noted that while the book was “prevailingly conciliatory, optimistic, pacific,” it was not “without a note here and there of misgiving, of frank criticism, not to say of challenge. Especially do the discussions of Japanese immigration present diversity of tone.”

This focus on the racial question is important to note because of the focus by recent diplomatic historians on more realpolitik explanations of Japanese-American tensions during this

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276 YCE, 1916, 57-58.
279 P. S. Peirce, “Reviewed Work: Japan to America,” American Journal of Sociology 20, no. 6 (May 1915), 844.
era. As Frederick Dickinson has argued, “U.S. belligerence and victory in the Great War, arguably, was more pivotal than all the rancor surrounding Japanese immigration and race combined in terms of the ultimate effect on Japan,” going on to argue that the desire to pass the Racial Non-Discrimination clause at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was only a “secondary” goal for Japanese diplomats, behind keeping Shandong and the German Pacific colonies.280

While there is truth to this, racial animosity was undoubtedly still an amorphous yet important factor driving Japan and the United States apart. Konoe Fumimaro, for example, who had attended the negotiations at Versailles, would go on to pen an article to “Reject the Anglo-American Centred Peace,” and attacked the racism he had seen in London and New York. Offering a Pan-Asianist and Social Darwinian perspective of international relations, Eri Hotta notes, Konoe was also the man whose resulting foreign policy in the 1930s was “to push Japan onto an even more destructive as well as self-destructive showdown with Konoe’s eternal object of envy and hatred: Britain and the United States.”281 While determining the exact degree to which American racism coloured the views of Konoe—and other Japanese of this era—is impossible to measure, it was undeniably important. As Mark Peattie observed, the generation of low ranking Japanese soldiers who would come to staff the Japanese army during the 1920s, such as Ishiwara Kanji, were “little burdened by their elder’s caution to the West,” and were “more sensitized to the growing Pan-Asian idea of resistance to the West than their Meiji predecessors [i.e. those writing in Japan’s Message to America] had been.”282 Read in this light, the racial warnings offered by “the educated classes of Japan,” can been seen as an attempt to

280 Dickinson, National Reinvention, 175; 206. Elsewhere, Dickinson quotes as allegedly representative the words of a Japanese journalist that by 1927 Japanese “bitterness” over the 1924 Immigration Act was, in fact, receding. See Dickinson, Triumph, 34.


282 Peattie, Japan’s Confrontation, 18.
alert American policy makers that future Japanese leaders of the up-and-coming generation might not be as understanding as they were. With the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act, such racism was finally codified as America turned inward and Japan was primed for the Kantōgun’s later Pan-Asian justifications of acquiring Manchurian living space.283

But this was not the end of the Japan Society’s attempt to build on Masaoka’s book. In 1915 Lindsay Russell would decide that to make the exchange truly reciprocal they should send a book back to the Japanese in response. The resulting America to Japan, was released on May 19, 1915 and was edited by Russell with 52 articles submitted by noted American intellectuals, businessmen, and statesmen. Former President Theodore Roosevelt penned an article; so did William Jennings Bryan and former Secretary of State Francis Butler Loomis, the later emphatically arguing that “the peril of the situation on the Pacific Coast lies not in the fact that there are some thousands of well disposed Japanese trying to live there lawfully and in peace,” but because of “selfishly interested persons of other races to incite racial and economic prejudice against the Japanese.”284 The Carnegie Endowment was also unofficially represented by both Nicholas Murray Butler as well as Elihu Root, with Butler speaking on the role of immigrants in American society and Root submitting an article on treaty obligations related to Japanese immigration. Another familiar face was seen in the submission by Hamilton Wright Mabie. Since his return to America, Mabie had continued to use his knowledge to speak about Japanese-American friendship.285 “It takes time to become neighbors,” he wrote in his article, “knowledge, respect, and friendship are not born in a day.” Still, Mabie continued to offer a

285 Morse, Mabie, 267-268.
questionable reading of history. It is true, he admitted, that European imperialism had “put Japan on the defensive,” but this had nothing to do with the United States. “Commodore Perry and Mr. Townsend Harris were not only the messengers of a government which desired peaceful relations with Japan but the spirit and bearing of both happily interpreted the attitude of the nation they represented.”

Again supported by funding from the Carnegie Endowment, 4,500 copies of the book were eventually distributed, including a complimentary copy to every Japan Society member who wanted one. Eugene C. Worden, then Secretary for the Japan Society, even travelled across 16 states to present both books to local libraries, Chambers of Commerce, newspapers, publishers, and educational institutions in order to insure its wide public dissemination. Together the two books constituted, “an interchange of thought and information between leading minds of both countries, unique in international intercourse,” as Russell argued in his introduction. “They indicate the points upon which the East and West can meet.” This was not just Russell’s boasting hyperbole. Even George Haven Putnam—the son of George Palmer Putnam and owner of the eponymous publishing house which had just printed Japan to America and America to Japan—argued in his memoirs, “these two volumes, modest in compass as they are, constitute, I think, something distinctive in the history of international relations.” As he concluded, “I do not know another case where publishing machinery has been utilized so directly for the purpose of furthering the exchange of sound information and of sympathetic views.”

Reviewers, however, again had caveats. The New York Times detected the book’s

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286 Hamilton Wright Mabie, “Strangers Become Neighbors,” in America to Japan, ed. Lindsay Russell (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915), 281; 277-278. In many respects Perry was no less imperialist than his British or French rivals, and he had tried hard to convince Congress to establish control over both Okinawa and the Bonin Islands. See Peter Booth Wiley, Yankees In the Land of the Gods (New York Penguin, 1990), 204-220.
288 YCE, 1917, 60-61.
290 George H. Putnam, Memories of a Publisher, 1865-1915 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915), 165.
consensus that war was “unthinkable,” and that there could be “no doubt that there is widespread cordiality and respect for Japan in this country.” Nevertheless, the paper again recognized the focus on racial antipathy as the principal issue at stake “rather than any danger contained in the alleged imperialistic ambitions of Japan … or rather than any danger that Japan has designs on the Philippines or that she is likely to try and win Pacific trade against us through arms.”

The paper also noted the approval by former secretary Loomis to the idea provided by the American missionary Sydney Gulick to fix immigration ratios to America in proportion to the number of currently naturalized immigrants from that nation in the country. In the end, the 1924 Immigration Act would offer a version of this proposal which used a past demographic profile of the U.S. to exclude Japanese immigrants entirely, much to the shock and humiliation of Japanese diplomats and the internationalist community.

Other reviewers noted that for a book directed at Japan, many of the chapters appeared to address American audiences. Perhaps, as one noted, “the feeling is prevalent that Japan already understands America well and that the danger does not lie in that direction.”

The Nation, as typical, offered a nuanced and critical assessment of the work, noting both what the work explored as well as what it did not. The ongoing Great War, they noted, made little showing and that it would be difficult to gather from the text that “Japan was and is at war, and on the side of the Allies. In fact, some of the contributors might fairly be held to imply the contrary.” Nor, the journal noted, “can we address Japan, as do several of the contributors, as if this country were altogether free from the imputation of adding to its possessions by successful wars,” noting the territorial and imperial acquisitions of the Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars, as well as the American sponsored coup in Panama that had allowed for the construction of its canal. The result, the journal argued, was that America had

292 LaFeber, The Clash, 144-146; Auslin, Pacific Cosmopolitans, 127-128.
slipped in Japanese esteem to be replaced by Britain as its primary friend through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. “There is no hint in the symposium this shifting of sympathies.”\textsuperscript{294} Compared to the Japanese original, the \textit{Los Angeles Times} concluded, “‘America to Japan’ is far from being, as a whole, the straightforward, upstanding manly, face-to-face reply that some of us have expect who have awaited the answer to Japan’s message.”\textsuperscript{295}

\textit{Japan Society of New York II: Publicity Campaign, 1916-1920}

In 2007 Michael Auslin republished for the Japan Society a history of the organization for its centennial celebrations. Originally written by Edwin O. Reischauer in 1982 for the Society’s 75th anniversary, Auslin redacted 40\% of Reischauer’s original text while expanding it to cover events during the intervening 25 years.\textsuperscript{296} As the authors write, the Japan Society developed a very serious problem during the First World War. Namely, “the impression grew that the Society was permitting some of its educational work to shade off into political advocacy and even propaganda.” By the end of the war, they note, “criticism had developed about the Society’s role as a biased and therefore not believable advocate of the Japanese point of view in foreign policy.” Because of the realization, “throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Society carefully eschewed all political advocacy and stuck to its chosen social, intellectual, educational, cultural, and business fields.” Even when the 1924 Immigration Act was signed, they argue, the Society did not take sides and the only action taken “was to send a recent pamphlet on the immigration question to the members of the Society.”\textsuperscript{297} In other words, the Society had realized its mistakes had make a correction in course.

\textsuperscript{294} “America and Japan,” \textit{The Nation} 101, no. 2616 (Aug. 19, 1915), 234-235.
\textsuperscript{296} Auslin, \textit{Japan Society}, 6.
\textsuperscript{297} Auslin, \textit{Japan Society}, 22-24.
However, I argue that this narrative is far too simplistic an explanation of the Society’s actions during this era. Auslin and Reischauer’s narrative of the Society’s members moving from “bad” advocacy to “good” informing is far too progress-minded and simplistic to fully account for the actions taken during this era. For one, reading the Society’s monthly bulletin or the works of its constituent members, the Society’s understanding of Japan’s actions during the Twenty-One Demands, for example, were not believed to be advocacy by the members themselves. As they saw it, they were merely defending Japan from the same clichés and slander about “inscrutable Orientals” that they had always done. “The uneasiness and suspicion in the United States in connection with Japan’s negotiations at Beijing are based on misunderstanding and misinformation scattered broadcast by interested mischief makers,” as the Society’s bulletin quoted the words of Ōkuma Shiginobu under the heading “Integrity” on the front page of its April 1915 issue. Later that year, the bulletin reported the alleged words of Yuan Shi-kai who denied that Japan had been flagrantly coercing China, and opined that it was “worth the attention of all who wish to know the truth.” Clearly, the Society did not believe they were Japanese puppets, but were simply defending them against libelous criticism. Nor were such views incomprehensible. As Frederick Dickinson has noted, the Twenty-One Demands were not, after all, “a dramatic departure from established diplomatic practice in China nor the product of the ‘extremist’ elements in Japan. Rather, they belong squarely in the tradition of great power competition in China and are the handiwork of Japan’s consummate practitioner of nineteenth century imperialism in the British mode, Katō Takaaki.” As an Anglophile, a believer in civilian rule and the rule of law, Katō’s actions were, as Dickinson notes, “imperialism in the service of

democracy,” making confusion of Japan’s motives unsurprising.\footnote{Dickinson, \textit{National Reinvention}, 86.}

Indeed, the quotation from the Society’s annual report that Auslin and Reischauer use to allege that the Society had become impartial in not fighting the 1924 Immigration law merely states that, “after considerable discussion it was the sense of the directors that, as the Society had \textit{always in the past avoided taking part in political matters, it would be best for the Society in the long run to continue that policy [emphasis mine].}”\footnote{Auslin, \textit{Japan Society}, 24.} Clearly, the Society’s leaders did not believe anything had changed on this front. In fact, Japan Society members would continue to argue viewpoints that, from a modern viewpoint, were undeniably sympathetic to Japan during the 1920s. In 1921, for example, soon to be elected Society president Henry W. Taft—brother of the former American president—would offer a sympathetic reading of Japan’s ambitions prior to the Washington Naval Conference. Beyond arguing against the implausibility of an American-Japanese war and stating what America should do to help negotiate the question over the fate of Shandong between Japan and China, Taft also asked whether Americans ought not to “approach Japan’s problems sympathetically from her standpoint and not in a spirit which prejudges her case?” He also defended Japan’s desire to find an outlet for its allegedly surplus population. That Japan wished to accomplish this “by dismembering China is by no means clear,” Taft concluded, “but that she seeks to obtain an economic foothold in Manchuria, Mongolia, Shandong and perhaps Siberia, as a means of procuring raw materials, and that she will encourage her people to emigrate to those countries, is not only probable but seemingly justifiable.”\footnote{Henry W. Taft, \textit{Japan and the Far East Conference} (New York: MacMillan, 1921), 47; 74. This view of Japanese expansion was also endorsed by Society President Frank Vanderlip in 1920 who called it Japan’s “diplomacy of necessity” in the Japanese English language newspaper \textit{Japan Advertiser} which was also quoted in the Society’s bulletin. See BJSNY, “Japan’s Diplomacy of Necessity,” Oct. 1920.} Despite William Kuehl’s criticism that men like Japan Society co-founder Hamilton Holt “Blatantly condoned
[Japan’s] actions” and “rationalize[d] their territorial aggrandizement,” it is more accurate to say that Holt, like other members of the Japan Society, considered himself a fair-minded observer that was not going to criticize Japan for owning a colonial empire while America sat in the Philippines.303 “Let us pass judgment on the Japanese only by the same standards as we would have them judge us,” as the Japan Society bulletin put it in 1921.304 This is an important distinction to make given that it is essential to study the self-perceptions of the Japan Society not only to judge its views about Japan’s geopolitical motivations, but also to see how it presented its internationalist values to American audiences. As there has been no systematic study of the Society’s motivations other than that of Auslin and Reischauer’s this must be addressed because it implies a break in Society thinking between the end of the Great War and the retirement of Lindsay Russell as president in 1919. As shown this was not the case; the views of Society members did not change perceptibly. It was spanning this era from 1916 to 1920 that the Japan Society would mount a publicity campaign in many American newspapers to try and convince Americans to make use of the Society’s service and explain to its goals and aspirations.

Advertising the Japan Society’s services was not new in 1916. Since at least 1913 the Society had been publishing ads in both its bulletin and in New York newspapers promoting the Society’s services for Americans planning on travelling to Japan, advertising two and three month planned trips. “The Japan Society’s bulletins, recommendations of books and introductions to the Tourist Bureau in Japan are available to travellers as a part of the Society’s education activities in promoting friendly relations,” one ad pronounced.305 The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 had only provided further incentives to this campaign. “Europe and the Mediterranean are closed. Why not go to Japan?” an ad from 1915 bluntly stated, inviting the

303 Kuehl, Hamilton Holt, 102; See also Asada, Culture Shock, 42, footnote 48.
reader to write the Society for more information. However, the number and size of these ads were limited, and were solely focused on promoting the Society’s role as a travel agency and issuing letters of introduction. Beginning in 1916, however, the Society would begin to place adverts which sought to raise its awareness as an internationalist body with accompanying goals and would do so over a far wider series of publications, including local New York periodicals like the Outlook and the Independent, daily newspapers like the New York Times and the New York Tribune, as well as expanding to Washington DC based papers such as the Post or the Evening Star, obviously intended to increase name recognition within the halls of power. The campaign also had a new motto: “How may we serve you?”

Initially, many of the first adverts published in November 1916 focused on the Society’s role as, essentially, a fact checking organization or gatekeeper which promoted “truthful” accounts of Japan. “Learn the truth of this Empire that is 26,000 square miles larger than the United Kingdom,” one ad in the New York Times pronounced. “Come to us for authentic information relative to the social, industrial and economic conditions that prevail on the other side of the world.” Under the title “An Exact Knowledge of Japan,” a further ad in the Times addressed whether Japan was a “land of the Gods” or one of menace towards the United States:

Some call it the land of wisteria. Some think it a place of hysteria. It is neither the one nor the other. It is far greater than either. Let us give you a proper conception of the aims and ideals of this newly “westernized” island empire whose social, industrial and economic progress has amazed the world. The Japan Society is an organization of Americans. Its purpose is to disseminate a better knowledge, encourage more friendly relations, and foster more pleasant and profitable trade connections between two neighborly nations…

The motivations of these ads were, again, to highlight the typical internationalist belief that the

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dissemination of proper information was critical to the avoidance of international conflict and set up the Japan Society as the ultimate conveyor of such information.

This campaign also saw the beginning of the Japan Society’s explicit invocation of cultural internationalism as the basis of their mindset. Under the headline “Internationalism,” an ad in both the Evening Star and the Times proclaimed that “the provincial mind of yesterday is developing into the international mind of to-day. Japan is a case in point.”309 As historian Glenda Sluga has argued, internationalism has often been assumed to be in direct opposition to nationalism. Yet, as a reviewer of Sluga notes, her work, “highlighted that twentieth-century liberal internationalism’s promoters and lynchpins rarely saw it as an idealistic opportunity to overcome national identities,” instead they, “considered international initiatives and projects as pragmatic and upheld by nationalism, nation-states and national institutions.”310 This was the interpretation accepted by most Japanese-American internationalists. As Nitobe himself reasoned in 1930, internationalism was merely the extension of patriotism. “If you love your country,” he argued, “you must love other countries without which your own country cannot exist and loses its raison d’être.”311 This was precisely the view taken by the Japan Society. “Next to NATIONALISM, the first duty of every American is INTERNATIONALISM—the obligation to see fair play and equity towards other nations,” an ad in both the Times and the Tribune contended in 1916.312 “As American Citizens there is imposed upon each of us a double duty,” one placed in the Washington Post added:

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310 Ana Antic, et. al., “Beyond Liberal Internationalism,” 363. Indeed, this had been the view of most American internationalist thinkers since the nineteenth century. The jurist Francis Lieber, for example, argued in 1868 that the development of internationalism was contingent on the development of ethnically homogenous nation-states which then acted in concert with one another. As international cooperation increased, Lieber held, “there will be no obliteration of nationalities. If such were the case, civilization would be seriously injured.” See Francis Lieber, The Miscellaneous Writings of Francis Lieber (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1881), 2: 241.
(1) A sense of Nationalism which prompts adherence to our government and its institutions and the maintenance of our prestige and position among the various peoples of the earth. (2) a sense of Internationalism which recognizes our relations with other nations and tempers our dealings with a spirit of justice and fair play. Acting in this dual capacity, the Japan Society, an American organization of 1000 members, attempts properly to interpret the aims and ideals of this great Eastern Empire, and to promote a better understanding of Far Eastern affairs among the American public. 313

In this respect, there was no dichotomy between nationalism and internationalism in the Society’s view, nor any attempt to supplant one with the other. Rather, both complemented the other and being an engaged American citizen simply meant that one also had international obligations to fulfill.

One run of advertisements published in 1919 attempted to educate its audience in the advert itself. Containing short biographies of Japanese cities and places, such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagasaki or the Inland Sea, these ads explained what sights you might see should you travel there for business or pleasure. Tokyo, for example, was feted as “the gayest city in the Empire,” with its 32 theatres, 23 public parks, its cherry trees, and the grand Imperial Hotel, “to be operated on the most modern American plan, the very last word in comfort and convenience.” 314 Others, such as Nagasaki or Yokohama, played up Japan’s historic relations with the outside world. Yokohama was applauded for both its modern commercial enterprises (“25 native banks and claims 40% of the Empire’s foreign commerce”) as well as being near where “in 1854 Commodore Matthew C. Perry … delivered to the Shogun’s Representative the historic friendly letter from the President of the United States.” 315 Nagasaki, meanwhile, was “one of the earliest ports in Japan visited by foreigners,” with total imports in 1915 worth nearly 12.5 million yen. The city’s climate was also ideal, with the city’s residential district presenting, “a scene of calm restfulness in a strong contrast with the bustle and activity of the business

section below.”316 The Inland Sea, meanwhile, was an “ever-changing panorama of scenic beauty,” with its “shores of granite rock” splashed with “gaily colored flowers,” and including the famous floating torii at Miyajima.317 Collectively, these ads expressed a duality to Japan, on the one hand a land of modern conveniences, business entrepreneurship, and growing trade, while also still retaining its pre-modern charms, with its serene pastoral landscapes and famous landmarks like Itsukushima Shrine’s torii or Mount Fuji’s famous cone. This focus on duality was hardly unique; many American accounts of this period contain “Orientalist” elements that contrasted the “old” Japan with the “new” post-Meiji state, usually bemoaning the loss of the former to the later.318 Yet, comparatively, the version contained in the Japan Society advertisements did not attempt to state one as being “better” than the other; Japan had Shinto shines and modern banks and both coexisted in the Japan of 1919, and if one was a tourist looking for the first or a man of business looking for the second you knew where to go to find your pleasure. As all these adverts inevitably concluded, “if interested in Japan, whether for trade, investment, travel or study, communicate with the Japan Society. Here you will find the information and advice you have been seeking.”319

Other advertisements suggested works that inspiring American internationalists might read to improve their knowledge of Japan. As the Society’s bulletin noted, “we are frequently asked to recommend books on Japan giving an impartial and unbiased view,” a difficult task given that “a new book on Japan by some foreign writer is born almost every week,” and were usually “so anti-Japanese as to defeat its purpose or so strongly pro-Japanese and so filled with

318 Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy, 13-20.
over-praise as to be unconvincing.” One book they could “persistently” recommend was Nitobe’s The Japanese Nation, the book he had written upon conclusion of his Carnegie Endowment exchange in 1912, which was promoted by ads in both 1917 and in 1920.

Other works suggested included Japan in World Politics (1917), then the latest book by the prolific Japanese-American writer Kiyoshi Karl (K.K.) Kawakami, as well as Have We a Far Eastern Policy? (1920) a travel book and study of international affairs by Charles H. Sherrill. Both of these books were likely chosen by the Society due to the global perspectives of their authors, their attempts to engage with their topics in an impartial way, and their willingness to approach situations from opposing points of view. “The most important step toward the formulation of a foreign policy is a due consideration of the point of view entertained by the people with whom that policy will have to do,” Sherrill wrote in his book’s conclusion. “If one is not prepared to investigate the great problems that are arising and will arise about the Pacific with an open mind upon matters social as well as national, he had best give up the study in advance, admit he is a small man, and remain quietly at home close to his village pump.”

Kawakami, meanwhile, observed that in striving to be neither pro-Japanese nor pro-American he would likely be hated by both. “The role which I have essayed to play is far from enviable,” he lamented. “Yet I am convinced of the wisdom of it.” The truth, he admitted, was that “I have no intention exclusively to serve either Japan or America; it is my desire to serve both, and all mankind by removing some of the misunderstandings now casting a dark shadow upon the relationship of the two

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323 Charles H. Sherrill, Have We a Far Eastern Policy? (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920), 297-298.
nations.” The alleged goals of both authors, therefore, fit well with those of the Society to act as an unaligned referee, noting the failures of both sides and commenting on areas for improvement in the spirit of international understanding. Despite their undoubted flaws, both books did this for their many prospective readers.

These advertisements also highlighted some of the issues that were causing difficulties in Japanese-American relations, what could be done to change them, and what the Society did and did not stand for. “Inflammatory journalism and rabid personal attacks are most often inspired by ignorance and misconception or mean and petty motives. Yet they were as a constant menace to the perpetuation of the good relations so much desired,” one ad argued both the Washington Post and the Evening Star in 1917, and thus most likely focused directly at American congressmen. “The Japan Society wishes only to promote a better understanding between America and Japan … This Society does not advocate unrestricted admission of Japanese immigration, —it does not seek to meddle in the local problems of any territory. It stands merely for the dissemination of a bigger, better, broader knowledge [emphasis original]” This was the Society’s attempt to head off the complaints of producing propaganda mentioned by Auslin and Reischauer. Again, as I suggested, this was never the Society’s intent, but rather came with the territory. As the Society was seeking to explain the concerns held by the Japanese press and government to an American audience, and improve those relations if possible, this meant the discussion of controversial subjects like immigration restriction or Japanese and American imperialism. This would have almost inevitably opened the Society to criticism that it was playing favourites or disseminating propaganda even if Society members had not made apologetic claims in favour of Japan. As elaborated in the following section, their critics’ hatred for internationalist organizations like the

Japan Society or Carnegie Endowment was furthered, in many cases, by their mere existence, irrespective of what actions they actually took.

The Japan Society of New York thus had a mixed legacy. In practical terms its attempt to build an organization to promote Japanese-American cultural internationalism was an undoubted success. While in May 1907 the Society had boasted just 250 members, this had risen to 500 by the end of 1908 and over 1,000 by 1913. By the late 1920s, the Society could claim a membership of over 1,300 Japanese and American. The Society’s annual dinners were now prominent New York events, drawing in over 1,000 socialites in 1926, 1927, and 1928, among them the Japanese Ambassador to America. On December 11, 1929, for example, both the new Japanese Ambassador, Debuchi Katsuji, and the retired American Ambassador to Japan, Charles MacVeagh, attended that year’s celebrations. Debuchi himself had high praise in 1929 for America. American trade with Japan was finally balancing and Japan was preparing to lift its gold embargo. “The volume of commerce carried over the Pacific is bound to increase,” Debuchi reported happily. “This will in turn encourage the growth of general interdependence and common interest among countries.” Debuchi also praised American participation at the IPR conference held that year in Kyoto, cheerfully observed the arrival in America of the Japanese diplomatic team on its way to the London Naval Conference, and promised that Japan, “will under all circumstances assume a liberal and friendly attitude towards China and will be prepared to extend to her the ready hand of cooperation.” The gains of the interwar internationalist movement appeared secure. Yet, in one of the last advertisements of the Japan Society’s 1916-1920 publicity campaign, the Society had identified the pitfalls that the Society would need to watch out for if its successes were to be maintained. The advertisement was entitled “Insularity”:

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The gravest danger to national progress is the fallacious idea of self-sufficiency. Ease of communication, free interchange of ideas and ideals, facile trade channels and unrestricted travel build that better understanding and friendship upon which national prosperity is founded. … The Japan Society is interested in better communication facilities between the United States and Japan, in promoting greater familiarity with the history, customs and resources of the two countries, and in breaking down the baseless prejudices that have been fostered by the unthinking. If you are interested in Japan for travel or trade communicate with us. We have resources of information that will save you time, trouble and expense. How may we serve you? 328

This was, in a nutshell, a succinct summary of the beliefs and attitudes of the Japan Society and the internationalism that founded it. Through increased trade, communication, and cultural understanding would Japanese-American relations be fostered, and the possibility of war made all the less likely as a result. Yet, as the October crash of Wall Street which had preceded Debuchi’s speech continued to drag down the world’s economies into the 1930s, and the nations of the world began to erect tariff walls, promote nationalist rhetoric, and talk of achieving economic and political autarky; the lights began to dim for the Society as it proved powerless to stop the slow deterioration of Japanese-American relations in the years to follow as the internationalist cause lost much of its original luster.

III

FOREIGN INFLUENCES:
JAPANESE COOPERATION AND AMERICAN BACKLASH

“The anti-Japanese sentiments of the anti-Japanese Americans not only will not be mitigated by the tender or flattering words of our pro-Americans, but they will, instead, be rather intensified and enhanced.”

– Tokutomi Sohō, 1921

“The aims and purposes of the Japan Society and its branches are decidedly partisan and totally pro-Japanese.”

– Montaville Flowers, 1917

Introduction

On March 13, 1919 a delegation of Japanese businessmen arrived in New York. Led by Senator Imai Gosuke, these nineteen noted silk producers represented the somewhat cumbersomely named Honorary Commission of the National Association of the Raw Silk Industry of Japan which had come to meet with their American counterparts in the Silk Association of America.

The Japanese in this commission represented the top men in the Japanese silk industry. As one of the owners of the largest silk reeling firm in Nagano Prefecture, Imai’s own Katakura-Gumi had recently been praised by the Japanese government with the claim that “the superior quality of the silk supplied by the company is known all the world over.” Japanese silk exports to the United States had only been increasing since the start of the twentieth century until, by the end of the First World War, more than seven-tenths of America’s silk imports came from Japan and silk was Japan’s single most important American export. Given that most raw silk imported to America

331 Annual Report of the Silk Association of America (Hereafter ARSAA), 1920, 17-18.
was refined on fast-moving power looms, American silk manufacturers were obliged to use raw silk that was even and uniform in quality and coarse in size. Eliminating the causes of silk imperfection during production was thus a matter of some economic importance to both nations, which was what Imai and the members of his commission had come to discover.  

After a celebratory dinner held at the Astor Hotel with 850 fellow American silk businessmen, the Japanese delegation took part in a series of conferences with their hosts at which the problems experienced by the Americans with Japanese silk were explained. “These discussions … cannot fail to bring about many improvements that will be of benefit to the trade at large and cannot help but stimulate the growing interest in Japan in the study of the problem of the classification of raw silk,” the official Silk Association of America blithely reported. On March 25, Imai himself sat down for an interview with New York Tribune. “It has been a wonder to me that more Japanese silk manufacturers and traders have not come to visit America and oftener,” Imai observed. “Our neglect on this point is little short of incredible, and certainly inexcusable, but from now on I do sincerely hope that we shall improve on this point.” Nevertheless, Imai was unimpressed that Americans appeared unwilling to pay the Japanese a visit in reverse. “It is the rarest thing in the world to see them studying the details of the production of silk in Japan,” he scoffed. “I hope you will make it clear to our American friends connected with the silk mills and in the silk trade generally that there is a sincere and hearty welcome waiting them on the other side of the Pacific whenever they find it in their pleasure to pay us a visit.” Imai also critiqued those Americans with misconceptions about Japanese silk, such as the idea that the silk from certain regions of Japan was innately inferior to others. Nevertheless, he still concluded that “I am an enthusiastic devotee to the doctrine of the

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334 ARSAA, 1920, 18.
America-Japanese combination in the silk business.”

Having completed their tour of the silk mills of the East Coast, on April 9 the Japanese delegation decided to hold another dinner at the Astor Hotel in honour of their hosts. Joined by the councillor to the Japanese Embassy (and later Ambassador), Debuchi Katsuji, the dinner was tendered by the Japanese commission to “their American friends” as the cover of the evening’s menu cheerfully announced. The cover also featured an elaborately commissioned image symbolizing Japanese-American friendship. In the centre sits the Stars and Stripes crossed with the Hi no maru. To the right of the flags stands the Statue of Liberty while on the left there rises the cone of Mount Fuji. Above the flags the American eagle rests below the rising sun while the text itself is encompassed by olive branches. The symbolism was clear: both sides had come together as equals to undertake mutually beneficial trade. Unfortunately, the meal did not play out as the symbolism implied. It was, to the Americans, apparently quite forgettable; the report of the Silk Association of America makes no mention of the event and the American press did not focus on the feelings of friendships which were supposed to have been engendered. Under the byline “Counsellor of Embassy Denies Designs on Lower California” the New York Times devoted only a short column to the event and focused the piece on the words of Counsellor Debuchi who fended off claims that Japan had sinister ambitions in Mexico and was mistreating its Korean subjects. “Modern Japan is not so ignorant as to offend her good customer and sincere friend for the sake of any enterprise which does not involve her vital interests,” Debuchi tactfully responded. The New York Tribune also made no mention of the event, merely reporting a few

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days later that, “Better Raw Silk Promised by Japanese Merchants.”\textsuperscript{338} It was on this less than positive note that the Japanese silk delegates turned for home.

The experience of the Imai and his fellow silk producers in America highlights many of the difficulties of non-consular face-to-face Japanese-American relations during this era. As experienced silk manufacturers, Imai and his colleagues appear to have been treated with unthinking condescension as to what made good silk by their American hosts, beyond merely stating the problems American producers were having with the Japanese product. Imai himself, in his interview, seemed at least mildly annoyed at what he saw as American ignorance and parochialism, unwilling to examine their own flaws or come to Japan to see what they might be able to learn from their silk producing experts. Moreover, when Imai and his colleagues tried to extend a hand of friendship, it was ignored in favour of criticizing Japanese wrongdoing both real (Japanese mistreatment of Koreans was widespread in the new colony) and imagined (no sane Japanese desired to extend Japan’s presence to California or Mexico). As this section will explore, this was the issue experienced by many Japanese visitors to the United States during this era, and those Japanese who were members of the Carnegie Endowment or Japan Society were no exceptions. For Endowment special correspondent Miyaoka Tsunejirō and Japan Society member Takamine Jokichi it was at times difficult to see where being merely an honest nationalist ended and being an outright apologist began. Indeed, it was due to their membership in these very organizations that they would be attacked with such force by their American or foreign detractors. Some, like Korean advocate Henry Chung, were motivated by patriotism and an honest desire for truth while other critics, like the American writer Montaville Flowers, attacked the Japan Society and Carnegie Endowment for the far baser reasons of racism and xenophobia. Yet, as noted above, both organizations struggled to find the line between merely

explaining Japanese views to Americans and actually advocating on Japan’s behalf. Maintaining a fair balance of opinion would remain a difficult challenge for both organizations.

Our Man in Tokyo: Miyaoka Tsunejirō and the Carnegie Endowment

Discussing Japanese-American internationalism during this era is almost impossible without mentioning the name of Miyaoka Tsunejirō. Born in 1865, Miyaoka had at one point been a Japanese counsellor diplomat to the United States but had been forced out in 1908, according to the gossip of the time, for allegedly “having too freely expressed views not complimentary to American administrative and diplomatic methods.”339 Taking up a law career in Tokyo, Miyaoka would turn his attention to legal internationalism, working as a lawyer at The Hague Permanent Court in its debates on the opium trade and becoming a member of the Rotary Organization before he was finally tapped by the Carnegie Endowment in 1911 to act as a special correspondent. As the Endowment noted, “there are in Europe and Asia certain gentlemen whose self-sacrificing and devoted work in the interest of the cause of peace and arbitration will make them of special value to the Division as correspondents,” and would therefore be paid “suitable honoraria” for their services. Miyaoka—“untiring in his activity with the press and public men”—was quickly chosen as the Endowment’s correspondent for Japan.340

Miyaoka jumped with alacrity to spreading the internationalist creed on Japan’s behalf. He was, for example, instrumental in facilitating both Eliot and Mabie’s exchanges to Japan. Indeed, Mabie would dedicate his resulting book, Japan To-day and To-morrow, to the “wise counsellors and loyal friends” which had helped him on his journey, including Miyaoka, Nitobe, and Ono Eijirō (a noted banker and member of the Nichibei kyōkai) and Miyaoka sent reports of

340 YCE, 1911, 59-60.
this work back to the Carnegie Endowment as part of his correspondence duties. Miyaoka had also been offered the chance by Masaoka Naoichi to contribute to Japan’s Message to America, but had been unable to do so due to other commitments. Still, the resulting contributors, he vetted, “were lacking neither in number nor in the sterling worth of their character.”

Miyaoka’s work continued in 1915 when he published a pamphlet for the Endowment extolling the growth of internationalism in Japan. Providing a whirlwind tour of the growth of the internationalist movement, Miyaoka drew attention to the growing international spirits in Japan and the United States, using the visits of Eliot, Mabie, Sunderland and others and examples of this rising trend. As he argued, recent events had proven the idea’s popularity in Japan, echoing the views Ōkuma Shigenobu had previously voiced to Mabie:

In the beginning [of the Meiji era] international relations were entirely in the hands of the Government officials, and people outside Government circles had nothing to do with them, either politically or socially. Today, while the political adjustment of international affairs is intrusted to the properly constituted diplomatic service, the press and the people are active social forces, molding the international relations of Japan. … The development of real internationalism in Japan at this critical period in the history of her international relations augurs well for the prosperity of the Empire and the peace of the Pacific.

As Glenda Sluga has noted, Nicholas Murray Butler—then director of the Endowment Division of Intercourse and Education—had codified the idea that it was possible to inculcate an “international mind” among a nation’s citizens that would help in the gradual decrease of warmongering and increase international solidarity, and Miyaoka’s pamphlet played directly into these ideals. As Miyaoka concluded, “The internationalism which is deeper than the fraternization of different political units of affiliated races is the real internationalism.”

As a lawyer, Miyaoka also brought his legal training to bear, hoping to legally validate

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341 Mabie, Japan To-Day, v; YCE, 1913-1914, 68.
343 Miyaoka, Growth of Internationalism, 6.
344 Sluga, Internationalism, 31-32. See also Butler, “The International Mind,” AoP 74, no. 6 (Jun. 1912): 143-146.
345 Miyaoka, Growth of Internationalism, 15.
the growing liberalism of the Japanese state during the Taisho Era. Between June and November 1918, Miyaoka was invited by the American Bar Association to visit both the United States and Canada to lecture on “The Safeguard of Civil Liberty in Japan” as well as “the Growth of Representative Government in Japan.” In both lectures, Miyaoka gave his legal reading of the 1889 Meiji Constitution and its modern precedents under Japan’s emerging Taisho democracy. While he admitted the flaws of the system, noting that, “the Constitution of Japan is silent as a sphinx when it comes to the question to whom the Ministers of State are held accountable,” and admitting that the constitution itself was “so terse, so simple and so direct, that it is evidently a work of a group of men who lacked neither clearness of vision nor precision in the art of expressing thoughts,” Miyaoka’s reading of the document was essentially optimistic. Listing off the guarantees of Japanese law, from the privacy of correspondence, the freedom of speech, the right of free association, Miyaoka held high hopes for future developments. “Is it not reasonable to suppose that the Japanese nation, in its wisdom and in its own time, will solve its constitutional problem in a manner best adapted to its genius and the requirements of the age?” As he concluded:

Japan has the same ideals to which you [the U.S.] are dedicated. We stand for the rights of humanity. If in this brief address I have made clear to you some of the fundamental principles on which our legislation is based, if I have shown that the Japanese people are not the kind of people to quietly submit to the invasion of their rights or the curtailment of personal liberty, I may congratulate myself on having contributed something towards the better understanding between our two countries.

The victories gained by Japan’s emerging democracy, in Miyaoka’s reading, were clearly assured. Given that the interwar era also saw the passage of such “liberal” ordinances as the 1925

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347 Miyaoka, Growth of Liberalism, 3-4.

348 Miyaoka, Growth of Liberalism, 13.
Peace Preservation Law, one can rightly take issue with Miyaoka’s whitewashed version of Japanese legal history.\textsuperscript{349}

Speaking outside of his lectures, Miyaoka also defended Japan’s actions during the First World War, noting that Japanese intervention in Siberia was part of a combined allied effort and not Japanese unilateralism. “Sometimes it is said Japan is out of her element in a war to ‘make the world safe for democracy,’” Miyaoka acknowledged to the \textit{New York Times} as Japan was a nation led by what was allegedly an absolute monarch. This Miyaoka denied, pressing that this was not a war for republicanism and that President Wilson himself had made the right to choose one’s own government part of his Fourteen Points. “This is a war for the vindication of human rights, and when Japan went into it she was inspired by the same ideals which inspired the American people.”\textsuperscript{350} This, clearly, was a selective reading of history, as Japanese self-interest in China, the Pacific (and later Siberia) were clearly motivators in Japan’s decision to join the war on the side of the Allies.\textsuperscript{351}

Nevertheless, as the end of the war approached (the Armistice would be signed just as Miyaoka was finishing his lectures) the fact that the world was heading in a more democratic direction was obvious to all but the most blind of Japanese observers. Even Yamagata Aritomo—“the fount of conservatism until his death in 1922”—was forced to admit the enduring popularity of constitutional government and democracy in the post-war intellectual landscape.\textsuperscript{352} Indeed, for the Carnegie Endowment, Miyaoka’s lectures had been a complete success. “Mr. Miyaoka’s complete command of the English language gave him an unusual opportunity to impart to those

\textsuperscript{351} Dickinson, \textit{National Reinvention}, 34-36.
\textsuperscript{352} Dickinson, \textit{Triumph}, 85-87.
Americans who were so fortunate as to hear him, a fund of exact information about Japan and the Japanese…”353 Even the Japan Society’s bulletin bought into this argument, citing Miyaoka’s visit as proof that, “the European War has done, and is still doing, more than anything else to develop the world viewpoint, not only of the Japanese but of the people of all countries.”354

During the 1920s, Miyaoka would continue to act as both the Endowment’s special correspondent, as well as Japan’s leading legal internationalist. In 1922, for example, Miyaoka would report Japan’s satisfaction with the results of the Washington Naval Conference, as well as the work being done on Japanese textbook revision. “Ideas tending to inspire a strong militaristic national spirit have been eliminated and in their place matters cultivating a friendly and peaceful spirit in accord with true international understanding and humanitarian sentiment have been introduced.”355 In 1923, the Endowment had waited anxiously to hear from Miyaoka after the Kanto Earthquake. “Fortunately no member of my family or near relatives were injured,” Miyaoka reported, describing the devastation to nearly the entirety of Tokyo. “The Yuraku building in which my offices are located is one of the few buildings which miraculously escaped the fire.” At the same time, Miyaoka also provided support for a representative of Tokyo Imperial University who was travelling abroad to replace the university’s library which had been 75% destroyed in the disaster.356 Later in 1924, when Miyaoka again visited the U.S., he was personally hosted by Elbert Gary, who rescheduled a U.S. Steel meeting to see him, an event Miyaoka remembered fondly.357 Also during this period, Miyaoka produced two pamphlets of comparative law, explaining the rights of foreigners living in Japan, as well as an examination of

353 YCE, 1919, 71.
355 YCE, 1923, 77.
356 YCE, 1924, 74-75.
Japanese treaty-making power under the Meiji Constitution. Most notably, Miyaoka stressed the role of the Emperor in foreign policy, explaining the complexity of determining what the Emperor could or could not do without the consent of the Diet. In Miyaoka’s view, the Emperor still held those powers which were not expressly restrained in the Constitution (since he had possessed such power from time immemorial) and compared this to how anything not expressly mentioned in the American Constitution was delegated to the States for legislation. Given the legal debate in Japan between the views of Hozumi Yatsuka and Uesugi Shinkichi and those of Minobe Tatsukichi over the role of the Emperor in Japanese Taisho democracy and the future abuse of tennōsei during the 1930s, this was, in retrospect, a worrying conclusion by Miyaoka.

Nevertheless, Miyaoka would remain a contributor to the Endowment into the 1930s, though his internationalist ideals would gradually diverge with those of his American counterparts.

The New York Chemist: Takamine Jokichi and the Japan Society

If Miyaoka was the most ubiquitous Japanese name among the internationalists, then Takamine Jokichi was undoubtedly the most famous. Born in 1854, Takamine had first visited the United States in 1884 when he had visited New Orleans for an industrial exhibition where he also met Caroline Hitch, the woman he would eventually marry in 1887. Emigrating to America a few years later, Takamine would soon become renowned for his medical expertise. Grounding themselves on the success of German medical institutions, Meiji Japan had grown famous for its

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cutting-edge medical science. The bacteriologist Kitasato Shibasaburo, for example—a protégé of Robert Koch—became one of Japan’s most famous scientists for his discovery of the plague bacillus during the Hong Kong plague epidemic of 1894, and his prominent role in the Manchurian plague of 1910-1911.\textsuperscript{362} Takamine, however, was no lightweight himself; he patented both an eponymously named enzyme (Takadiastase) and gained renown as the first person to isolate and purify Adrenaline in 1901. In June 1903, American patent 730,198 was assigned to Takamine—“a subject of the Emperor of Japan, residing in the city of New York”—for his “process of preparing extracts of the suprarenal glands.”\textsuperscript{363}

Beyond his scientific achievements, Takamine was also a fervent supporter of Japanese-American cooperation and a firm believer in cultural internationalism. “Dr. Takamine,” the Japanese-American journalist K.K. Kawakami argued, “believed that by constant intercourse between these men of varied interests, a mutual recognition and appreciation of the honesty and integrity of both nations would result.”\textsuperscript{364} As a result, Takamine would use his fame and wealth to promote the internationalist cause, becoming the President of the Japanese Association of New York in 1914 and also founded the Nippon Club of New York in 1905 to serve as a place for Japanese expatriate businessmen and Americans to meet. Takamine himself would praise the Nippon Club in 1912, with “its dainty Japanese drawing room, and a membership of 130.”\textsuperscript{365}

Takamine was also an early supporter of the Japan Society back in 1907 and became one of its honorary Vice-Presidents along with the aforementioned banker Jacob Schiff and General

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One of Takamine’s most major legacies was in bringing the first Japanese cherry trees to the United States in 1912 with the help of Ozaki Yukio, then Mayor of Tokyo, to plant along both the Tidal Basin in Washington DC and in Riverside Park in New York. Unveiling the plaque upon completing the New York planting in April 1912, Takamine rhapsodized that “our affection for this country is deep-rooted, and has increased with every step of our national development, as, let us hope, the roots of these trees will with each passing year take deeper root in your American soil.”

During his life in America, Takamine also considered it his duty to speak on Japan’s behalf in the face of American criticisms. Much like American defenders of Japan, the two main debates revolved around Japanese imperialism in China and Japanese immigration to the United States. On Japanese immigrants, Takamine was emphatic: “The charge that the Japanese are an undesirable element in the population of America is not sustained.” Far from being an uneducated and holding incompatible beliefs, “a decided characteristic of the Japanese in this country is their remarkable assimilation of American manners and custom.” Moreover, compared with European immigrants who heard nothing but “the jingle of the dollar is in their ears all the way across the Atlantic,” the Japanese were not looking for get-rich-quick schemes but rather for an education—“their dreams are not of money but of books and colleges.” As for China, Takamine was all for maintaining its territorial integrity and hoped for “a provision putting it permanently out of the program of the trading nations to intrigue for or seize upon Chinese territory.” As Takamine noted, “It is in the attitude of all the powers east and west toward China that the danger resides. Her weakness is an invitation to the predatory instincts” which

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366 YJSNY, 1910-1911, 5.
367 “Cherry Tree Tablet Accepted by City,” New York Times, Apr. 29, 1912.
368 Takamine, “Japanese in America,” 238-239.
needed to be curtailed. Yet, Takamine also subscribed to the view that Japan held “special interests” in Manchuria and Korea which were beyond doubt. “Why should Japan retire from Manchuria?” Takamine prompted a journalist who interviewed him while visiting Washington DC in early 1910:

She is not going to do so any more than she is going to retire from Korea, but this does not mean that Japan is closing the doors of Manchuria and of Korea to other nations. It has been said that the open door in Manchuria is a misrepresentation; that Japan is monopolizing the business of that country and Korea. This is not so. … It is necessary, of course, that Japan extend her trade as much as possible, but she is seeking this by legitimate business methods and not by conquest of war. The only war Japan will have will be a legitimate commercial war, and every country recognizes this as fair, because all other countries are engaged in a like struggle.

Despite complaints of Japanese economic discrimination by American and European officials in Manchuria during this era, there was little contemporary evidence found substantiating such claims, supporting Takamine’s assertions. Less justifiable, however, was his attempt to defend Japan’s imposition of the Twenty-One Demands. Responding to a negative editorial in the New York Times, Takamine would argue that it was, “only by ignorance of the text or a perversion of the terms of Japan’s proposition to China that conclusion can be arrived at which show Japan striking the territorial integrity of China or menacing the ‘open door,’” dubiously justifying Japan’s selfless actions in taking Shandong from Germany and “liberating” Korea to defend Japan from China in 1895.

Other attempts to defend Japan against criticism were more obviously defensible. In July 1916 an editorial appeared in The Forum entitled “What is Behind the Japanese Peril” allegedly penned by someone named Sigmund Henschen. With unconcealed sarcasm, the editorial

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371 For a dated but through examination of Japan’s rights in Manchuria see C. Walter Young, Japan’s Special Position in Manchuria (New York: AMS Press, 1971).
lambasted Japan as a clear menace to American interests. “The Japanese are a greatly maligned people. They are our friends,” Henschen mocked. After all, “such a rare thinker as ex-President Eliot of Harvard has said so. Japanese noblemen who have visited this country have assured us of it.”

Outlining the alleged vulnerability of the Philippines and the main American base on the island of Corregidor to Japanese attack, Henschen then took direct aim at Japanese warmongering, drawing comparisons with the militarism of Wilhelmine Germany:

But why should Japan go to war with us? They trade with us. They are tax-ridden; they can’t afford war. Let us understand the Japanese! Do you know what Bushido is? It is something worse than Bernhardism. Bushido is a code that has been handed down to the Japanese from the Middle Ages. Its slogan is “Dai Nippon!” It goes “Deutschland Ueber [sic] Alles” one better. It means the glorification of the Japanese; and God help anybody who stands in their way. It teaches that no sacrifice is too great for the Mikado. It is the code of the Empire. Its power is so great these modern days that, when his Emperor died, Nogi, hero of the Russian war, committed hari-kari, so that he might accompany his Emperor and safeguard him on his way to the Fields of Paradise. That happened but a few years ago, when one of the biggest men in Japan yielded to the doctrines of Bushido. It conclusively proved the enormous primitive feeling that is beneath the Japanese race.

In response to this bigoted polemic, The Forum gave Takamine the opportunity to speak on behalf of Japan against what even the nominally impartial editor admitted was “a very savage attack on Japanese motives and aims as a world power.” Noting Henschen’s “tone of raillery” and “spirit of mockery,” Takamine responded with discretion, clearly arguing that beyond German and Chinese propaganda—which would naturally seek to tarnish Japanese-American relations—there was no reason to believe that a Pacific War was immanent, especially given the

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376 Friedrich von Bernhardi was a German general with Social Darwinian beliefs about the struggle of nations to survive who advocated a policy of ruthless German expansion. His most infamous work was Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg (Germany and the Next War) published in 1911 which argued that war was not only necessary to the success of a nation, but was also “an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality.” See Germany and the Next War, trans. Allen H. Powles (New York: Chas A. Eron, 1914), 14.

bloody cautionary tale already playing itself out in Europe. The First World War, economic ties, and the difficulty or impracticality of Japan being able to attack the Philippines, the Panama Canal, or the American West Coast as Henschen had suggested were all raised by Takamine as strikes against war. “Every pound of tea, every pound of raw silk is a soldier of peace and goodwill,” Takamine concluded. While it is true that some contemporary Japanese statement and critics, such as Yamagata, were convinced of an eventual Japanese-American race war, this was not yet in the mainstream of Japanese opinion. We should, therefore, not doubt the sincerity of Takamine’s claims.

Takamine would remain a prominent voice in Japanese-American relations until his death in 1922. In April 1917, for example, as the United States plunged into the First World War, Takamine chaired a meeting of the Japanese Association of New York which pledged to do its utmost to aid the American war effort. Given that the war was, “for the vindication of justice and freedom and for the furtherance of the cause of humanity, and is entirely in harmony with the ideals Japan cherishes,” the Association had resolved to “offer the services within our power, in whatever manner the Government of the United States may deem acceptable, for the successful prosecution of this righteous war against our common foe.” In his obituary in 1922, the New York Herald praised Takamine as “a cosmopolitan with a worldwide outlook, an intelligent laborer in the cause of international peace, an ambassador of amity from one family of human beings to another.” Indeed, the paper mourned, on the eve of the Washington Naval Conference:

He strove to foster between Japanese and Americans that concord of feeling all enlightened men long to see permanently established. He contributed importantly from his wisdom and experience and good will to the removing of misunderstandings between individuals of the two Governments. Indeed, his ambition to promote good feeling

380 Dickinson, National Reinvention, 43-44; Hackett, Yamagata, 274-275.
381 BJSNY 40, “America a Melting Pot,” Apr. 30, 1917.
between America and Japan may have hastened his death, for at the time of the Washington conference, when caution counseled regard for his health, his unselfish ambition led him to great exertions as an aid to the negotiators.\textsuperscript{382}

To his admirers at least, Takamine Jokichi was a true internationalist and a friend to America.

\textit{A Japanese Cat’s-paw: The Rise of American Criticism}

“There is a ‘yellow peril’ which threatens the peace and prosperity of the American people,” \textit{The Outlook} ominously reported in 1914. But, it continued, it was not to be found in East Asia, but rather right at home in America. “It is the yellow journal.”\textsuperscript{383} Without a doubt, the “yellow” journalism of William Randolph Hearst was the prime bogeyman of Japanese-American internationalists during the First World War and interwar eras. In the papers of his vast media empire, Hearst repeatedly beat the drum of Japanese hostility to the United States and the prospects of a coming race war. Echoing the arguments of Sigmund Henschen, Hearst’s \textit{New York American} magazine carried the headlines in 1915 that “Japan’s Plans to Invade and Conquer the United States, Revealed by Its Own Bernhardi.” In the article, it was claimed that Japan was preparing to invade California and destroy the Panama Canal. The “plans” in question were a reference to Shirokita Yasushi’s recently published and fictional novel \textit{Nichibei kaisen yume monogatari} (A Dream Story of War with the United States) and were refuted by the Japanese consul-general in New York and the investigative reporting of \textit{Harper’s Weekly}.\textsuperscript{384} Other attempts by Hearst to alert Americans to the Japanese threat included financing the 1917 film \textit{Patria}, which depicted an invasion of America by pillaging Mexican and Japanese troops, and his vocal opposition to the Washington Naval Conference (“the white race throughout the


world, will pay dearly for this act of criminal folly in times to come”). Hearst’s problem with Japan was not, as biographer Ian Mugridge argues, that he saw Asian people, “as unrelievedly vicious and threatening: his attitude to them often appeared similar to his view of the European powers, whose peoples were oppressed and made threatening by obscurantist governments.” Rather, “the problem was that there were so many of them, that they had been so long oppressed and backward, isolated and disunited,” that they would come looking for revenge as soon as they achieved the power to rival the European empires or the United States. “This state of affairs he anticipated with horror.” Moreover, Hearst was not only fearful of an avenging Japan, but he was a self-styled political realist whose interwar papers proudly trumpeted the slogan “America First” and George Washington’s dictum to avoid entangling alliances. “Hearst was the very picture of a model isolationist,” biographer Ben Procter notes, and “strenuously denounced any administration, whether Republican or Democrat, that favored American participation in the League of Nations or the World Court.” For both his anti-Japanese activism and his anti-internationalist political philosophies, Hearst’s views were antithetical to organizations like the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment. Yet, Hearst was not the only anti-Japanese activist writing at this time, nor was he the most vociferous and personal critic of either organization. Indeed, many of the other criticisms so leveled contained far more truth than the often-baseless jingoism of Hearst’s papers. While, as an explicitly Japanese-oriented organization, the Japan Society took the brunt of such criticism, the Carnegie Endowment and those it sent on exchanges were also at times targeted as being too pro-Japanese for their own good.

385 LaFeber, The Clash, 120; Ian Mugridge, The View from Xanadu: William Randolph Hearst and United States Foreign Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 58. Upon seeing this film, President Wilson contacted the film distributor to try and limit its sales given its sensitive material. Given that Wilson had once hosted a private screening of W.D. Griffith’s The Birth of the Nation at the White House, this tactfulness highlights less Wilson’s anti-racism and more his political shrewdness.

386 Mugridge, The View from Xanadu, 47.

387 Procter, William Randolph Hearst, 221.
As established in the previous section, while arguments have been made by Michael Auslin and Edwin Reischauer that the Japan Society moved from being a pro-Japanese advocate to being a more dispassionate and impartial observer, I have argued that there was no perceptive change in the Society’s collective mentality during this era and—as will be seen in this section—critics of the organization did not disappear after this period either. The Society’s attempts to justify Japanese actions was not an effort to uncritically defend Japan but was rather motivated by a desire to judge Japanese actions by the same standards Americans held for their own country. Critiquing American hypocrisy towards Japan was their perceived objective; it was not acting as credulous apologists. Furthermore, far from the cliché of naive internationalists offering bromides on Japanese-American friendship, these two organizations considered themselves the purveyors of a more sophisticated brand of internationalism that discussed the “hard questions” of Japanese-American relations, a fact hammered home again and again by members of both organizations. An article in the Society’s bulletin which discussed worn-out topics of conversation between both nations to avoid in the future had touched on this:

Don’t, in addressing a Japanese audience or members of the Japan Society, say too much about Commodore Perry and his work. This is taught in the primary schools in Japan and is as familiar there and to the Americans who study Japan as is the date of the landing of Columbus in America. Don’t dwell too long on Japan’s marvelous progress since its adoption of Western civilization. It is all right for the average American audience, but Japan Society members and the Japanese the world over class this with observations about the weather. Don’t talk about the historical and eternal friendship between the two nations. This is tiresome, has been worked overtime, and besides each country will suspect the other if it protests too much…

Another article published a few months later entitled “Why They Smile” again approached this issue, this time with tongue more firmly in cheek:

It was at a dinner—almost anyone will do, either in New York or Tokyo or wherever “Hands Across the Sea” speeches are delivered. Many Americans were present; also many Japanese. The best part of the dinner was over, the worst part—the prepared

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extemporaneous speeches—was to come. Once more the Japanese heard in what a high regard we held them. We reminded them that it was but fifty years since they had opened their doors to civilization, or, as some seemed to think, since they emerged from barbarism! We dwelt on their inconceivable progress since their awakening. We told them how polite they were, how willing to learn, how progressive, and how proud we were to act the part of “big brother” to them.

“Is it any wonder,” the article concluded, “the Japanese are always smiling?” Even Nitobe, the most famous Japanese internationalist, joked about this point in a lecture he gave in 1932 shortly before his death. Discussing Japanese-American relations, Nitobe began with an anecdote about a friendly New England clergyman who once remarked that he had a boy who was so often told the story about the landing of the Mayflower, “that he wished them to be sunk under the sea.” Likewise, Nitobe quipped, “whenever two or three Americans and Japanese are gathered together, the shades of Commodore Perry, accompanied by the hackneyed phrase of traditional friendship, loom up—so that sometimes I wish them to share the same fate that the little boy desired to befall his Puritan Fathers.” Clearly, Japanese-Americans internationalist wished to move beyond merely exchanging platitudes to promote a more widely encompassing internationalism which, as Miyaoka had argued, “is deeper than the fraternization of different political units of affiliated races [and] is the real internationalism.” These facts should be kept in mind when accusations of frivolity are leveled against both organizations during this era. If some in Japan Society or Carnegie Endowment were indeed offering platitudes, it was not due to a lack of self-awareness on the behalf of many members.

One of the most vocal American critiques of the Japan Society and Carnegie Endowment can be found in the works of Montaville Flowers and his supporters. Born in 1868, Flowers was a racial eugenicist and ardent opponent of Japanese immigration to the United States who expressed his views in numerous pamphlets, articles, books and in person as a lecturer on the

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American Chautauqua circuit. “The melting pot idea is the great American illusion,” he warned in a 1917 Chautauqua lecture in Texas. “No mixed race has ever developed a high type of civilization.”

In an era where respected figures could publish books with titles such as *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916), *The Rising Tide of Color* (1920), and *The Conquest of a Continent or The Expansion of Races in America* (1933) and offer stark views that in the United States, “the higher birth rate of races of low intellectual capacity as compared with the higher intellectual stock, is causing race deterioration,” Flowers’s rhetoric on race was hardly unique.

Flowers’s widest-reaching work, however, was a book published in 1917 entitled *The Japanese Conquest of American Opinion*, whose introduction made his views on the subject clear. “The weapon with which … victories are won in America is Public Opinion. Japan is now trying to secure possession of that weapon.”

While Flowers also attacked the Carnegie Endowment as an organization “not engaged in investigation, but in propaganda,” it was the Japan Society which he singled out as ultimate expression of this victory, not only because of its sympathetic views towards Japanese immigration, but also for the presence of Japanese nationals within it.

“The presence of these Japanese makes impossible in this Society a free discussion of the Japanese-American problem and prohibits a hearing to those who oppose the aggressions and policies of Japan,” Flowers claimed. In his book, Flowers also took aim at many of the Society’s past activities. Publishing *Japan to America* and *America to Japan* only symbolized,

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394 Flowers, *Japanese Conquest*, 146. This quote was cited with approval from an editorial published in the *Chicago Tribune*. Flowers himself would argue that in publishing Eliot’s 1912 summary, the Endowment played down the eugenics angle of Eliot original work and that, “in the endeavour to counteract his influence on the subject they have even made it appear that Dr. Eliot favours the mixture of Mongolians and Whites.” See Ibid, 216-217.

“the ceaseless labour and wide scattering of propaganda by that Society.”

In conversing with Shibusawa’s *Nichibei kyōkai*, the Society created the illusion of friendship, but “when the common membership of these two organisations is kept in mind, we can understand the vogue of certain widely heralded ‘banquets,’ ‘receptions’ and ‘dinners’ given to Japanese and Americans travelling in both countries.” After all, “they seem to spring spontaneously out of general regard and public opinion; but they are merely play and counterplay of two parts of one club for one end.”

Flowers even criticized the rationale for the Society’s existence, for “there is no Japanese or Oriental problem in New York or the Atlantic Coast. Why should Americans in New York City interest themselves thus in Japan instead of India, China, Belgium, France or other nations?” The reason, Flowers argued, was based on deception and propaganda.

In all his works, Flowers depicted himself as both a patriotic American in opposition to insufficiently loyal internationalists and as the last man meeting the full weight of powerful, well-heeled Japanese and American propagandists with cold, hard facts and logic. As the introduction to one of Flowers’ other pamphlets melodramatically argued:

His [Flower’s] work has been done under great criticism and opposition, but it has been thorough and incessant. He has spent weeks at Washington securing facts from original sources. He has courteously, but fearlessly assailed the leaders of the pro-Japanese campaign in America, challenging to debate such men among them as Hamilton Holt, editor of *The Independent*, and the whole Japan Society of New York City; but they fear to meet him. He has submitted to the press articles far less accusing than *The Century* now uses, to have them refused over and over again, until at last public opinion has been aroused to accept them. The enclosed article, *Do Americans Know?* (three times rejected), reprinted from *THE PLATFORM*, is one of these. Read it and pass on it, and if you have any interest whatever in your state and nation, register your address for further information, and give to Montaville Flowers the moral support which this great cause and his patriotic service merit.

In this and other works, Flowers borders on conspiracy-mongering, displaying many of the

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399 Montaville Flowers, *Do Americans Know?* (Chicago: The Platform, 1915), cover slip.
tropes Richard Hofstadter defined as the “paranoid style” in American politics. This can be seen in his work’s, “elaborate concern with demonstration it invariably shows.” After all, Hofstadter noted, “the enemy … may be the cosmopolitan intellectual, but the paranoid will outdo him in the apparatus of scholarship, even of pedantry.”

Flowers defiant tone combined with his pamphlet’s assertions to “securing facts from original sources,” and the prolific number of citations in The Japanese Conquest itself testifies to this style of rhetoric. In Flowers’s perspective there was a conspiracy of Japanese writers (such as K.K. Kawakami and Ienaga Toyokichi) who published apologies for Japan’s actions which were then picked up by organizations like the Japan Society and Hamilton Wright Mabie for The Outlook, and on down to more local critics who were all part of an echo chamber intended to make the threat of Japan appear ridiculous—“a fine team play by all in the game, pitching and tossing references and quotations one to another, so as to give the appearance that all the ‘authorities’ are on their list.”

As Flowers concluded, “the aims and purposes of the Japan Society and its branches are decidedly partisan and totally pro-Japanese; it has closed its doors to an open discussion of the Japanese problem and has denied a hearing to those who interpret the Japanese problem from the standpoint of the out-and-out American.”

Provocative as Flowers’s book may have been it was apparently popular, and its legacy can be found in many American works critical of Japan which followed. One of the most influential was Peter’s B. Kyne’s 1921 novel The Pride of Palomar. Originally serialized in the magazine Cosmopolitan and later adapted into a 1922 motion picture, the book tells the story of

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400 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Knopf, 1965), 35; 32. In making this argument I do not assert that Flowers held a medically defined paranoid condition. Rather I am, as Hofstadter himself cautioned, “not speaking in a clinical sense, but borrowing a clinical term for other purposes.” As he notes, “It is the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon significant.” See Ibid, 3-4.

401 Flowers, Japanese Conquest, 126.

402 Flowers, Japanese Conquest, 114.
Don Miguel, an ex-American army soldier who after returning to home to his ranch Palomar after service in the Allied intervention of Siberia finds that he has been declared MIA and his ranch is to be sold to a malicious Japanese-American potato grower named Okada (a parody of the real-life George Shima, a Californian who made his fortune growing potatoes). Given this history, Don Miguel is not positively disposed to the Japanese immigrants he meets. “We ought to have Jim Crow cars for these cocksure sons of Nippon,” our protagonist fumes early in the novel. “We’ll come to it yet if something isn’t done about them. They breed so fast they’ll have us crowded into back seats in another decade.”403 Kyne makes his source for this bigotry clear at the end of his introduction, “Acknowledgment is made of the indebtedness of the author for much of the material used in this book to Mr. Montaville Flowers, author of ‘The Japanese Conquest of American Opinion.’”404 Taking his cue from Flowers, Kyne has his protagonist attack those Americans who abet the Japanese threat to America. When Don Miguel meets the father of Kay Parker—the novel’s love interest—who is sympathetic to Japanese immigrants, Kyne uses this meeting as a personal diatribe to attack the failings of the Japanese and their American supporters. Eventually, Don Miguel correctly guesses that Kay’s father is a member of the Japan Society. When Kay asks how he knows, Don Miguel offers his own view of the organizations and its membership:

Oh, all the real plutocrats in New York have been sold memberships in that instrument of propaganda by the wily sons of Nippon. The Japan Society is supposed to be a vehicle for establishing friendlier commercial and social relations between the United States and Japan. The Society gives wonderful banquets and yammers away about the Brotherhood of Man and sends out pro-Japanese propaganda. Really, it's a wonderful institution, Miss Parker. The millionaire white men of New York finance the Society, and the Japs run it. It was some shrewd Japanese member of the Japan Society who sent you to Okada on this land deal, was it not, Mr. Parker?

404 Kyne, *The Pride of Palomar*, viii
“You’re too good a guesser for comfort,” is the inevitable response. While the book and its movie adaption were panned by many critics for containing “Hearst propaganda,” other reviews for both works were more positive, approving the anti-Japanese polemic. By January 1922, the novel had risen to become the fifth most circulated work of fiction from American public libraries, rising to number two for those libraries in west coast states.

Kyne’s critique of the Japan Society may have come from the mouth of a fictional character, but it was a more succinct attack on the organization than that of Flowers’s original. The Society was disliked by Don Miguel—and thus presumably by Kyne as well—not just because it was producing “pro-Japanese propaganda,” but because it was directed by out-of-state “plutocrats” and “millionaires.” This was an attack not only on unpatriotic internationalists, but also a populist assault on alleged wealthy New York elites who did not know the conditions “on the ground” in California but felt the need to impose themselves on the situation anyway. Indeed, Flowers himself had titled the chapter of his book where he criticized the Japan Society, “the Appeal to Social Influence.” While the leadership of the Carnegie Endowment had chosen noted and esteemed Americans to send on its exchanges—and the Japan Society was staffed by similar individuals—in the belief that the American public would hopefully respect and trust their opinions about Japan, this tactic had backfired for men like Flowers or Kyne who saw them merely as arrogant and privileged elites. As Flowers had argued in his book, his targets were not only the Japan Society or Carnegie Endowment, but also “the regular contributions by Hamilton Wright Mabie, Hamilton Holt, and their confreres in their weekly magazines and their addresses,” a group of people whose condescending and naive views were “always one of

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superior knowledge, higher spirituality and larger gift of ‘the international mind.’”

The wider context of Flower’s arguments should not be forgotten. Between the 1910s and the 1920s American society became, arguably, more xenophobic and intolerant than at any point in its history before or since. It was an era where the First World War, the First Red Scare, and Prohibition gave Americans the excuse to attack, in turn, German-Americans for the brutality of “the Hun,” Eastern Europeans and people with left-leaning political views for being subversive communists and terrorists, and allegedly loose-morale immigrants—such as Italians or Irish—of the booze-guzzling cities. At the same time the “Yellow Peril” was attacking Japanese-Americans, Jim Crow laws were oppressing African Americans and Native Americans were confined to their reservations. Additionally, the revived Klu Klux Klan—upholder of Protestant America—had reached its peak at about the same time the 1924 Immigration Act went into effect, a bill championed by racially bigoted politicians, many with Klan sympathies. Increasing immigration and urbanization, meanwhile, especially to the Japan Society’s home town of New York, quickly became synonymous with anti-American values. “New York,” the Denver Post sniffed in 1930, “has become a cesspool into which immigrant trash has been dumped for so long that it can scarcely be called American any more.” When the 1924 Immigration Act—designed to protect the Anglo-Saxon racial stock of America—passed with overwhelming support, some Americans recognized the danger to their relations with Japan. “It is a sorry business and I’m greatly depressed,” then Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes wrote soon after. “It has undone the work of the Washington Conference and implanted the seeds of antagonism which are sure to bare fruit in the future.”

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408 Flowers, Japanese Conquest, viii; 126.
409 For an overview of contemporary American xenophobia see Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, Chapter 11.
410 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 226.
411 Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 207.
Americans, speaking with their Japanese counterparts, warned Americans of the dangers of such racism, but were ignored or accused of disloyalty by American politicians. When the issue was raised at the 1925 meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu, congressman John F. Miller of Washington lashed out at the assembled delegates with much the same rhetoric as had Flowers. “Selfish reasons alone explain the academic attempts to assail the actions of congress,” he warned the press darkly. “They can have no result except to give certain people the impression that certain races have actual instead of fancied grievances.” The real reason for immigration restriction in Miller’s view was mainly economic, the Chicago Tribune reported, “the racial factor only being a secondary consideration.”

The idea that America was being threatened from within and without at this time was widespread, and the views of Flowers and Kyne were typical in this respect.

But attacks on the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment were not limited solely to American critics. Many Chinese and Koreans, their nations’ suffering from Japanese imperialism, had little love for Americans who helped legitimize Japanese empire-building. One of the most forceful writers in this camp was the Korean writer Henry Chung for his two books, The Oriental Policy of the United States (1919) and The Case of Korea (1921), both dedicated towards agitating for Korea independence. Unlike Flowers, Chung did not argue that the Japan Society or its members were intentionally malicious. Rather, he tactfully argued that they had been hoodwinked by the Japanese. Despite their arguments to the contrary, Chung lamented, “the American Peace Society of Japan, the Japan Peace Society, and many other similar organizations are nothing more than the catspaw of the Japanese national program.”

As he concisely argued in his 1921 book, in addition to deliberate Japanese propagandists (again citing Kawakami and

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Ienaga), “there are a number of people who are sincerely won over by the finer sides of the Japanese character. And then there is the group whose services are enlisted by subtle means of delicate flattery and social ambition. The members of the Japan Society of New York are mostly from the latter two groups.”

Like Flowers, Chung took aim at the Society and the Endowment’s many publications. “Although scholars like Inazō Nitobe have travelled in the United States as professorial lecturers,” he noted, “in reality they have told their college audiences in America what the Japanese Government or newspaper could not publish without betraying its motive.” Citing the Japanese-based and British-owned newspaper the Japan Chronicle, Chung also raised a warning on the context of Japan’s Message to America. “Some of the declarations in that [book] are of the most chauvinistic nature,” the paper noted:

Mr. [Yosaburo] Takekoshi, a journalist and M. P., says that ‘Korea exists now for Japan, from the viewpoint of imperial policy,’ and demands the development of Manchuria also. Another prominent journalist [Tokutomi Sohō] in an article entitled, ‘Centripetal Mikadoism’ shows himself a flamboyant imperialist. … A peace Society in Japan which concentrates all its attention on menaces to peace abroad while ignoring those at its own doors may be adopting a very prudent policy, but it is not contributing much to the cause of international good will.

Particularly alarming to Chung was the veracity of the Society’s bulletin and other publications. “American libraries are flooded with the bulletins and pamphlets of the Japan Society, all distributed gratuitously.” Indeed, many Americans also held criticism for the Society’s bulletin. While Flowers eviscerated it as a rag which, “attacks men who write anything uncomplimentary to Japan or which might sound a discordant note in the education of public

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415 Chung, Oriental Policy, 152.
417 Chung, Oriental Policy, 152.
opinion in Japan’s behalf,” his was not the only voice. In 1915, the Hartford Courant had run an editorial which observed that the bulletin had recently published an article explaining that in order to prevent “the wanton issue of extra editions of newspapers, the Tokyo police have issued a warning that the City Fathers will take stringent steps against all publishing houses issuing extra editions with no real news of special interest.” Reading this as a veiled attempt at press censorship, the unnamed editorialist scoffed that, “people talk of the cleverness of the Japanese but once in a while they let go in a way to amaze the wide-awake folks of these United States.” Given the undoubted press censorship, both formal and informal, which existed in Japan even under the country’s nascent Taisho democracy, this was not an unwarranted argument to make, and one could criticize the Society of eliding the truth or being intellectually dishonest in not calling out such whitewashed reporting when it appeared in their publications. As Auslin and Reischauer concluded, not only was the bulletin full of articles defending Japan, but “the source of the money supporting the Bulletin, about $3,000 a year, was not clear,” leaving open the door to accusations of purchasing influence.

One final criticism raised by Chung of profound importance to the whole cultural internationalist movement was whether travellers to Japan were being fed intentional propaganda by the Japanese. Stocked up with information from the Japan Society’s travel bureau, Chung argued, “the minute a globe-trotter lands in Japan he has little chance to see or find out anything for himself, especially if he is a distinguished personage.” For example the Society, “gathered all the addresses delivered by Judge Gary in Japan, bound them in an attractive pamphlet, Japan

418 Flowers, Japanese Conquest, 112.
421 Auslin, Japan Society, 23.
422 Chung, Oriental Policy, 156-157.
as Viewed by Judge Elbert H. Gary, and scattered it gratis to all the leading libraries in the country as the sane and unbiased view of a distinguished American business man.”^423 As he concluded, “the average globe-trotter in Japan sees Japan through the eyes of the Japanese. He sees nothing except what the Japanese want him to see, and hears nothing except what the Japanese want him to hear.”^424 As seen with the 1929 Carnegie Endowment journalists, and William Phillip Simms in particular, the idea that travellers to Japan were only seeing what the Japanese government wished them to see was a prime accusation levelled against them, and one which the Endowment itself was emphatic to deny. While the Endowment and its hosts would arrange a series of stops for the journalists, they were under no obligation to write anything positive for either group and could leave the scheduled itinerary to go where they pleased. Those journalists who left in Manchuria to visit the Sino-Soviet border dispute were a prime example of this ability.^425 “Most of us followed the fixed schedule,” Simms contended, not out of coercion or through being taken in by Japanese or Chinese propaganda, but rather “because it was well arranged and enabled us to see the most in the shortest possible time.”^426 Nor were the journalists apparently under any illusions as to the limitations of their exchange. As Gideon Lyon frankly admitted in his final report, all his references to “Japan” could only extend to those Japanese “with which we have been in close contact during these past few weeks—official, business and social Japan. In brief, the Japan that speaks English and that we can understand directly and without interpretation.” While he could generalize about the views of other Japanese given what he had seen during his travels, Lyon admitted that, “of the minds of the masses of the

^424 Chung, Oriental Policy, 160-161.
^425 See Section II above.
people who have no such facility of [English] speech it is impossible to know.”

The question as to whether travellers in search of authenticity ever see the “real” places and people they intend to visit is a debate which continues to the present day, but in this case it does not suggest that American visitors to Japan were as credulous as Chung contended.428

In retrospect, however, Chung was essentially correct about the exploitive nature of Japan’s empire and American internationalists’ justifications of it. As a colonial power, Japan viewed itself not too dissimilarly from its European and American counterparts. As Bill Sewell argues, the development of the Japanese state was based on the pursuit of achieving “modernity” and increasingly saw itself as a progressive and civilizing force in the world. “Significantly,” Sewell argues, “that modernity included an imperialist impulse, in large part because the prevailing global modernity entailed the creation of empire.”429 Thus, Japanese imperialism was based on the idea that Japan was bringing progressive modernity to its new imperial possessions, not unlike the Anglo-American idea of “The White Man’s Burden” or France’s “mission civilisatrice.” Such tendencies can be seen in many of Japan’s colonial governors, such as Gotō Shinpei who was both an administrator in Taiwan and the first President of the Mantetsu between 1906 and 1908. An example of a Japanese “reform bureaucrat,” Gotō believed in winning over Japan’s new colonial subjects with what he called “biological principles” (seibutsugaku no genri), that is through bettering the welfare of the local population and providing them with economic stability and limited self-rule. However, as Sewell notes, Gotō was not above using the stick when the carrot had proven ineffective. “He had no qualms, for example, about using military force to terminate Taiwanese resistance. Indeed, it was likely because Gotō could work

428 For an inquiry into the truth and authenticity of travelers’ accounts see Pierre Bayard, How to Talk about Places You’ve Never Been, Trans. Michele Hutchison (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).
with the military that he received official positions.” These Japanese justifications were little different from those given by American observers to defend their control of the Philippines. “Wherever I went in the islands,” the touring American missionary Gilbert Reid argued in 1919, “I was impressed with the remarkable skill and good sense, efficiency and generosity of American rule in the Philippines, unsurpassed by any other colonizing nation.” Another of Japan’s Taiwanese colonial administers was Nitobe Inazō himself, who was quick to use his international credibility to justify Japan’s new imperial project. Among Japan’s achievements on the island, Nitobe argued, was the imposition of the rule of law, the promotion of public health, the encouragement of local industry, and the establishment of public education. “And therefore,” Nitobe concluded, “I beg of Americans who are interested in the development of Japan as a colonial power, not to be misled by reports which now and then appear in different periodicals and newspapers by critics of all nationalities and of all countries.”

In short, it appears most American visitors from the Japan Society and Carnegie Endowment viewed Japan with a kind of natural affinity due to its economic prosperity, rule of law, and its willingness to play the political game with its European and American rivals. Nor, as it has been argued, did most American internationalists during this era see anything wrong with imperialism and the paternalistic qualities which supported it. In a pamphlet produced by the Japan Society at about the same time as Chung’s books, tellingly entitled *China’s Foremost Need* (1919), Society President Lindsay Russell defended Japanese imperialism in China in no uncertain terms. “The creation by Japan of the great [soy] bean industry in Manchuria affords one of the most remarkable examples of what can be done to bring prosperity to a hitherto backward people,” he argued. Moreover, he maintained that “China is politically bankrupt in that

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she has failed in self-government,” and that what it needed was “stern and efficient measures such as England applied to Egypt, the United States applied to Cuba, and Japan applied to Korea.”

Indeed, Russell even went as far to argue that the United States, along with Britain and Japan, could join together to use their power to collectively police their respective continents. Given that this “policing” included Japan’s crackdown on Korean independence activists after the March First Incident in 1919, Chung was quite right to take umbrage with Japan’s alleged “civilizing mission.” “The atrocities committed by Japanese [in 1919] are nothing more than a part of the system that has operated since the protectorate was established in 1905,” as he bitterly noted in 1921. Clearly, when it came to criticize the Japan Society’s imperialist sympathies, Chung’s accusations were not without merit.

Furthermore, as both American and foreign critics concurred, one major problem with the Japan Society and Carnegie Endowment was, paradoxically, their Japanese members. After all, the presence of the Japanese in these organizations was part of what gave them their legitimacy. Had there been no Japanese participants one could have criticized both organizations for speaking on behalf of people they did not know—reducing them to mere Japanese fan clubs that would have appeared, in their own way, even more slavish and beholden to Japanese viewpoints. Still, it is undeniable that Japanese members represented both a boon and a liability. Takamine and Miyaoka were generally considered by both organizations as being among the former. The previously mentioned Ienaga Toyokichi was more checkered. A graduate of Johns Hopkins University, Ienaga had returned to the United States after a brief stint working in the Japanese Foreign Ministry eventually working as an advisor to the Japan Society in helping to edit its bulletin. However, as Auslin and Reischauer argue, “the real role” of Ienaga in the Society “was

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433 Japan, *China’s Foremost Need*, 5-6.
434 Japan, *China’s Foremost Need*, 6-7.
not clear” for “he also apparently served the Japanese government by attempting to improve the image of Japan in the United States.” As they conclude, “it appears that no one in the Japan Society knew of Ienaga’s official ties.” While the first statement is correct, the second is more questionable. As a debater Ienaga was undoubtedly effective. Speaking at a lecture following the excellent writer but poor orator Bernhard Dernburg—the main German representative in the U.S. during the First World War—Ienaga appeared even more impressive by comparison, at least to future Society member Francis V. Greene, who described him, “speaking in a clear and resonant voice, without manuscript or notes of any kind, never lacking or hesitating for the exact word, held his audience for more than forty-five minutes literally spellbound in wonder and astonishment at, and admiration for, so unusual a performance.” This is corroborated by the publisher George Haven Putnam—someone on good terms with both Ienaga and the Japan Society—who also compared the man to Dernburg. “The German was a man of force and a good scholar,” Putnam wrote in his memoirs of a debate he had seen, “but he had no sense of humour and no lightness of touch, and his Japanese antagonist, so to speak, walked all around him in the debate.” However, while Ienaga likely never told Putnam of his government contacts, the publisher could still guess the roots of his pro-Japanese opinions: “He had been charged, or he had charged himself, with the work of making clear to the American public the relation of Japan to the European War and the grounds on which Japan had felt called upon to enter the contest.” It was in “controversial discussion,” Putnam clearly saw, that Ienaga excelled, even when making points which “while not quite fair as a matter of historical relation, was perhaps legitimate in

436 Auslin, Japan Society, 23.
437 Francis V. Greene, ed. Why Europe is at War (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915), vi. This statement was dated March 29, 1915. Interestingly, when Greene applied for membership to the Japan Society the following month the sitting Society member who proposed him was Ienaga himself. See BJSNY 20, “New Members Elected Apr. 15, 1915,” Apr. 22, 1915.
Other sources tell a similar story. As a reporter for the *Evening World* noted in 1917, Ienaga was also director of the Japanese East and West New Bureau where he was “regarded by many as the semi-official spokesman of his country in ours.” Contrary to Auslin and Reischauer’s assertion, many Americans had no illusions as to the likely origins of Iegana’s undeniably pro-Japanese positions. The belief that the Society was thus overly credulous of its Japanese members must be tempered in the face of this apparently open secret as they appear to have accepted Ienaga despite his known flaws.

Overall, critics of the Japan Society and Carnegie Endowment mixed conspiratorial accusations with legitimate criticisms. For Flowers, his works were essentially little more than racist and populist polemics against affluent and esteemed Americans for purportedly selling out their own nation’s interests in the name of internationalism and Japanese-American cooperation. For a foreign critic like Chung, however, his work was based on these organizations genuine recognition and approval of Japanese imperialism in Asia. Indeed, in this case at least, it is clear the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment were the realists, acknowledging that imperialism was still a powerful force in East Asia, while Chung was an idealist with his belief in Wilsonian self-determination. Quoting the works of Korean independence advocates, including the young activist and future Korean leader Rhee Syngman, Chung argued passionately that the Japan Society merely accepted Japanese claims at face value and were thus abetting an unjust regime. In all of this, Japanese members of both organizations were both a help and a hinderance. On the one hand they provided their organizations with legitimacy and proved that they were meetings of equals for promoting better international understanding. On the other hand, they provided many Japanese with a privileged platform from which they could expose their views.

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and these were not always to every Americans’ tastes, provoking controversy. But again, the simple dichotomy of idealistic internationalism facing off against realistic nationalists does not explain the full complexity of how critics of Japanese-American internationalism attacked the Japan Society or the Carnegie Endowment.

In 1911, when the papers of the Hearst press concocted the false story that the Japan was looking at constructing a naval base at Magdalena Bay in Lower California, the newly appointed special correspondent Miyaoka reported to the Carnegie Endowment that he could disavow such “erroneous reports calculated to embitter.” But, as he lamented, “when the evil news manufacturers are active, no sooner is a false rumor disposed of than another of equally infelicitous and harassing nature is started, so that the process is just like arguing in a circle.”

Perhaps Tokutomi Sohō, the nationalist journalist, was right in his scepticism towards his fellow Japanese who attempted to convince Americans of their nation’s good intention when he argued that, “the anti-Japanese sentiments of the anti-Japanese Americans not only will not be mitigated by the tender or flattering words of our pro-Americans, but they will, instead, be rather intensified and enhanced.” After all, he claimed:

The anti-Japanese Americans are of the opinion that the Japanese are a people never to be trusted. They claim the Japanese do not express naturally and frankly any feeling of joy or anger, pleasure or pain, happiness or sorrow; that they often assume an appearance which conceals their real sentiments. … Thus such Americans will interpret the words of our pro-Americans as having the opposite meaning; detesting and being apprehensive of the Japanese, they constantly aggravate the anti-Japanese sentiments. … [T]his foments trouble which may ultimately plunge the two friendly countries into a conflict and bring immeasurable disaster.

As the controversies continued during the 1920s, the help or harm being done by the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment and their constituent members would remain a point of contention between the cultural internationalist movement and the rest of the American public.

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CONCLUSION: CUTTING DOWN THE CHERRY TREES, 1931-1945

“The development of real internationalism in Japan at this critical period in the history of her international relations augurs well for the prosperity of the Empire and the peace of the Pacific.”
– Miyaoka Tsunejirō, February 5, 1915

“The policy of Japan which seeks to establish a new order in Eastern Asia and which will create for us a self-sustaining economic unit in this part of the world will remain unchanged.”
– Miyaoka Tsunejirō, July 25, 1941

Since meeting with Mabie in 1912 after his pyrrhic victory in the Taisho Political Crisis, Ozaki Yukio had weaved in and out of the cultural internationalist activities of the Japan Society and Carnegie Endowment. He had contributed an article for Japan’s Message to America and had helped Takamine Jokichi bring cherry trees to America as the Mayor of Tokyo. Yet he had not personally involved himself in the internationalist cause. In 1931, however, Ozaki himself would take centre stage in promoting Japanese-American relations when he was invited to U.S. by the Carnegie Endowment to give lectures to American audiences, much as Nitobe had first done twenty years before. “I was thinking in those days,” Ozaki recalled in his postwar memoirs as he accepted the invitation, “that while the progress of civilization had made the world smaller, at the same time it had made the individual larger in some senses and more broad-minded.”

Looking back at the interwar era, Ozaki noted that as the world had become more interconnected the issues of individuals countries could not remain merely of national importance, but had now become of international importance. “In this frame of mind, therefore, I wished to meet with other thinking people and contribute what I could to leading the world out of its existing state of national wrangling and into one of international cooperation. … I wanted to do what I could to

442 Miyaoka, Growth of Liberalism, 6.
443 YCE, 1942, 75.
444 YCE, 1932, 57.
improve relations between Japan and America.” Accepting the Endowment’s invitation would hopefully allow him to do exactly this. Departing Japan in August 1931 and accompanied by his two daughters, Shinaye and Yukika, Ozaki arrived in California where he first visited his wife in San Diego (who was undergoing medical treatment at an American hospital) and gave lectures to local Japanese groups before finally heading eastward to New York and Washington.

Unfortunately for Ozaki, his exchange would soon be overtaken by the pace of events as the unstable political situation in Manchuria since the assassination of Zhang Zuolin reached a reckoning and the discontents to Japan’s internationalism of the 1910s and 1920s made themselves felt.

As Frederick Dickinson has noted, the Japanese armed forces had had their status reduced due to the public consensus of Taisho democracy and internationalist Shidehara Diplomacy during the 1920s. In the spring of 1922, for example, the Tokyo Peace Exhibition had opened in Ueno Park. Capturing the spirit of the event, the noted political cartoonist Ogawa Jihei penned an image of a fully kitted and confused Japanese soldier with fixed bayonet walking away from the Expo amid the branches of cherry trees. As the caption snarked, “what is this, the long sword of a man viewing blossoms?” To ideologues like Ishiwara Kanji this situation was intolerable. In the lectures he planned for the Army Staff College, Ishiwara railed against those Japanese who uncritically accepted the foreign ideals of democracy, Marxism, and pacifism with their internationalist pretentions. Given the disparity in strength between Japan and “the West,” Ishiwara fumed, it was suicidal for Japan to forsake its armed forces and the whole profession needed to be restored to its rightful place in Japanese society. “Truly,” he argued, “the Japanese armed forces are the guardian deity of that righteousness—the Japanese kokutai—which shall

446 Ozaki, Autobiography, 376.
448 Dickinson, Triumph, 144-145; 154-155.
save the world.” By the summer of 1931, Ishiwara, along with Itagaki Seishirō and other fellow plotters in the Kantōgun, had had enough with what they saw as the weak-willed attitude of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō towards the intransigent, pro-Chinese policies of Zhang Xueliang, and during the night of September 18 the Mantetsu owned tracks north of Mukden were bombed in a false-flag attack to justify Japanese retaliation. By the morning of September 19, the Manchurian Incident gained steam as the Japanese had captured Mukden and by September 21 were fast approaching Jilin. Requests from Tokyo to stop were ignored by Ishiwara and his co-conspirators and reinforcements from Korea were funnelled in to complete the occupation of Manchuria.

Back in the United States, Ozaki was almost immediately placed on the defensive as reporters and confused hosts asked him to explain Japan’s actions. At the Eighth Conference of Major Industries held in New York that October, Ozaki got his opportunity to respond. Packed with over a thousand noted American and foreign dignitaries, Ozaki offered his support for the internationalist political order which was collapsing around him. “At a time when we are troubling our friends all over the world with the unfortunate incidents in Manchuria,” he began, “I feel rather awkward to talk about peace and friendship between nations.” Still, Ozaki took the long view that this was “a temporary question, while what I want to say has much longer duration.” While not acting as an apologist for the Kantōgun, Ozaki’s speech contained an almost frustrated lament on Japan’s relations with Europe and America, arguing that prior to the Meiji Restoration, “while we were peacefully composing poems, practicing flower arrangement,

451 Somewhat amusingly, this included American secretary of State Frank Kellogg, signer of the eponymous Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris whose statutes the Kantōgun were presently transgressing.
and burning incense—in a word, while we were addicted to things artistic and beautiful—you did not give us a place even among third-rate powers.” It was only after the military victories of the Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese Wars that such respect was finally given. “If you blame Japan for being militaristic,” Ozaki said grimly, “I do not hesitate that it was the Occidental nations that made Japan militaristic.” Yet despite this sniping, Ozaki still held out hope that events could yet change. “Let us try to make all the nations of the world stand on a moral basis by accepting the authority of the International Criminal Court of Justice and ceasing to teach narrow nationalism to their citizens.” This sort of jingoistic nationalism, Ozaki conceded, “was very useful in a time now past, as feudalism was useful in a still earlier age before it. But now that the world has become so small, that narrow kind of nationalism is out of date.”453 Both the differences and similarities in worldview between Ishiwara and Ozaki were made clear. While both men spoke of the threat of “the West” to Japan, Ozaki was arguing for transcending such fears through the continuance of internationalism, while Ishiwara argued for their indulgence by a return to a more exclusionary and (as he saw it) necessarily punitive form of nationalism.

In the weeks which followed, Ozaki attempted to press on with his objectives, offering a flurry of eleventh hour ideas on how to stop the slow slide towards rearmament and resurgent nationalism which appeared to be growing by the day. On November 6, Ozaki suggested that the United States could promote disarmament by leveraging its European war debt to help enforce continental demobilisation. “She can bring economic pressure by her use of war debt revision and the moratorium.”454 On November 11, he suggested stern international action, preferably led by the League of Nations, was needed to stem Japanese aggression in Manchuria. “National sentiment has been stirred up in Japan,” Ozaki noted, and was quickly becoming unmanageable.

“How far the nations will forget themselves and their plans for peace many be only too well indicated by events which may follow along continuation of the present trouble between Japan and China.” ⁴⁵⁵ Action in both Europe and Asia was necessary, Ozaki pressed, because of the totality of modern warfare. “Since the last war no one knows how much more destructive the war machines have become,” he argued. “This is certain, however—millions and millions of city dwellers, men and women, young and old, will be subject to the danger of death in the next conflict.” ⁴⁵⁶ Yet, despite the worsening international situation, Ozaki’s brand of internationalism remained a mixture of idealist aspirations and pragmatic expectations. In an interview with Marjorie Luckey for the Los Angeles Times, Ozaki began by explaining the economic internationalist arguments against war; that the globalization of trade had made the effects of war on one side of the planet certain on the other. “Aren’t you omitting the moral issue [of war]?” he was soon asked. “Progress towards peace must come through aggressive education,” Ozaki smiled knowingly. “To some the moral issue makes the appeal, to other the materialistic. For the present I am stressing the materialistic.” Indeed, the elder Ozaki was not the only person to take such a pragmatic view. “Tourist trips are not of use in promoting understanding between countries,” his daughter Ozaki Shinaye asserted in the same interview. “Long visits on the other hand, especially when made by young people, who are more open to new impressions and new ideas than older ones, will help towards international understanding and friendliness.” ⁴⁵⁷ As Ozaki departed for Europe on December 10, the Wakatsuki cabinet had exactly one day of life left to it as the Kantōgun continued to mass its troops for the final march on the city of Jinzhou, ⁴⁵⁵ “Holds Speedy Action needed to Avert War,” New York Times, Nov. 12, 1931. For a look at the reaction of the Japanese public to the evolving crisis in Manchuria see Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society 1931-33 (London: Routledge, 2002). ⁴⁵⁶ “Japanese Urges Us to Lead Peace Move,” New York Times, Nov. 7, 1931. ⁴⁵⁷ Marjorie Luckey, “War—The Supreme Stupidity: An Interview with Yukio Ozaki,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 15, 1931.

In retrospect, the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis marked the beginning of a schism among Japanese and American internationalists. Yet, while the Kantōgun went about solidifying its occupation in Manchuria, there was little abrupt change in either Japanese-American relations or the prevailing beliefs of internationalism. “Americans were somewhat surprised at the sudden development but did not foresee any far reaching consequences,” as Ozaki himself recalled.\footnote{Ozaki, \textit{Autobiography}, 379.}

As Sandra Wilson has noted, the Japanese government maintained a major publicity offensive throughout the crisis which garnered the support of many Americans, from the writer K.K. Kawakami to journalist George Bronson Rhea.\footnote{See K.K. Kawakami, \textit{Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis} (New York: Macmillan, 1932); \textit{Manchoukuo: Child of Conflict} (New York: Macmillan, 1933); George Bronson Rea, \textit{The Case for Manchoukuo} (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1935).}

“The sympathy for or at least understanding of Japan's situation which remained in influential circles in the USA and Europe,” she notes, “suggests that the Japanese diplomats working so hard on behalf of their government were not completely out of touch.”\footnote{Sandra Wilson, “Containing the Crisis: Japan's Diplomatic Offensive in the West, 1931-33,” \textit{Modern Asian Studies} 29, no. 2 (May 1995): 371.}

Even Japan Society President Henry Taft averred, “I am inclined, even in the midst of the present disturbances, to accept as true the repeated assurances of the statesmen of Japan that a formal state of war with China is highly improbable.”\footnote{Henry W. Taft, \textit{Japan and America: A Journey and a Political Survey} (New York: Macmillan, 1932), vi.}

This was unsurprising given that Japan retained the rhetoric of internationalism even as officials resigned themselves to backing the Kantōgun. While Matsuoka’s dramatic walkout of the League of Nations, as Jessamyn Abel has argued, was often taken at the time as “a reversal of the Japanese government’s polices of international cooperation,” this is not how the Japanese saw it. “Neither withdrawal from the League nor the expansion of empire and escalation of war,” she asserts,
“completely expunged internationalist principles from either the practice or the rhetoric of Japan’s foreign policy.”

Indeed, even Matsuoka himself was uncertain about leaving the League and in his speech prior to his walkout he assured the assembly that, “it has always been our sincere wish and pleasure to co-operate with the fellow-members of the League in attaining the great aim held in common and long cherished by humanity.”

Nevertheless, the occupation of Manchuria had badly shaken the American cultural international movement. The Japan Society, which was in the middle of preparing for its annual dinner when the incident at Mukden was first reported, had been thrown into turmoil. Deciding to reschedule the event for the coming February when the fallout over the occupation would have hopefully dissipated, this idea collapsed when Ambassador Debuchi telegraphed the Society to inform them that because of the still troubled international situation, he would not be able to attend, and the dinner was cancelled entirely. By March, the flood of resignations from the Society had grown so high that a special committee on resignations need to be convened in order to handle the paperwork.

Nicholas Murray Butler, meanwhile, summarized the internationalist viewpoint in his annual report to the Carnegie Endowment:

No matter how disorganized the Chinese people may be and no matter what the incidental and local provocations which may have been given to Japan, that country which has for a generation past taken so large and so helpful a part in the efforts to build a new world of international cooperation has now so acted as to forfeit public confidence and public esteem. It may be, as alleged, that the militaristic elements in Japan have been too strong for the civil government and have insisted on going their way regardless of consequences. Be that as it may, what has taken place in Manchuria and in China has been carried forward with so little regard for the public opinion of the world and with so little respect


464 Lu, Agony of Choice, 93-95; Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations, Japan’s Case in the Sino-Japanese Dispute (Geneva, n.p., 1933), 62. These claims were not apparently made solely for the benefit of an American audience. According to Hitler’s translator, Paul Schmidt, Matsuoka later confessed to him that, “I was not entirely successful at Geneva because Japan had to leave the League.” See Leon Goldensohn, The Nuremberg Interviews: Conversations with the Defendants and Witnesses (New York: Knopf, 2004), 447.

465 Auslin, Japan Society, 28.
for existing treaties, particularly the Pact of Paris, that a grave blow has been struck at the integrity and effectiveness of those institutions upon which alone the world can depend for constant prosperity and peace. It must be repeated over and over again that these institutions rest, and can only rest, on a moral foundation and not on one of force. If the moral foundations fail, the institutions themselves break down. There is no substitute for moral obligation and national good faith.  

Nevertheless, Butler still hoped the Endowment would continue to persevere. “So far from being discouraged, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace must find in these happenings a new challenge and a new stimulus to multiply and strengthen every possible effort for the enlightenment of public opinion.” After all, he fatalistically quipped, “If civilization is to commit suicide, let it at least have the courage to do so consciously.”

The changes that occurred in the internationalist movement after 1931 showed the limits to how far Butler’s “internationalist mind” could be stretched within the confines of a nationalist mind. Part of the reason for this was that the Japanese government—like those of the other Great Powers—interpreted the fruits of interwar internationalism in self-interested terms of what joining the League of Nations or signing the Pact of Paris would do for them. As Thomas Burkman has argued, Japanese policy in the interwar era can be meaningfully divided between a period of “international accommodationalism” followed by an opposing period of “regionalism,” with the Manchurian Incident as the tipping point between the two. The first policy asserted that Japan’s “security and prosperity [were] best achieved by relating harmoniously to the global power structure, which at the time was centred in the Anglo-American powers.” The second stressed that, “the nation’s security and prosperity [were] best achieved through a stable and hospitable political, economic, and cultural incorporating neighboring lands, in Japan’s case East Asia.” This shift occurred, Burkman suggests, because many Japanese army officers and

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466 YCE, 1932, 45-46.  
467 YCE, 1932, 46.  
intellectuals did not feel Japan was gaining enough in continuing to accommodate itself to the other powers. By the late 1920s, for example, there was the sense that the League of Nations was not universal enough to care about Japan’s views due to both its alleged Eurocentric nature as well as the absence of many key powers (not least of which was the United States).\textsuperscript{469} Other Japanese views of the internationalist system were more cynical. In signing the Pact of Paris, for instance, many Japanese observers did not take the text at face value. Like many Americans—who argued that the Pact was reconcilable with the Monroe Doctrine—and many British—who saw it as a way to solidify their empire—many Japanese opportunistically believed that in signing the Pact they could retain their freedom to intervene in China if the need ever arose. As many in the Japanese army believed, including Ishiwara, the threat of the Soviet Union to Manchuria would one day necessitate a full Japanese occupation in at least the south of the country (Ishiwara himself wanted the whole region occupied to provide the Kantōgun with strategic depth). The Pact, however, only provided for the protection of past conquests, not future ones. While the later Kantōgun commander, Mutō Nobuyoshi, offered the justification that, “our actions were unquestionably in conformity with what has always been approved by International Law,” this was not what Japan had agreed to when it had signed the Pact in 1928.\textsuperscript{470}

The results of this resurgent nationalism made itself obvious in the words of many Japanese internationalists during and after the Manchurian Incident. While Ozaki, for the most part, maintained a dispassionate attitude towards the affair during his exchange—expressing his frustration at Japanese and Americans alike—many other Japanese internationalists would not show such tact or compunction. Miyaoka Tsunejirō, for example, offered outright justifications for Manchukuo. In 1935, for instance, he wrote a pamphlet published by the Carnegie

\textsuperscript{469} Burkman, “From World Order to Regional Order,” 204-205.
\textsuperscript{470} Hathaway and Shapiro,\textit{ The Internationalists}, 159-160; Peattie,\textit{ Japan’s Confrontation}, 97-98.
Endowment in which he offered a complete defence of Japan’s actions in leaving the League of Nations and creating its new puppet state. Citing numerous sources and bringing all his legal talents to bear, Miyaoka argued that the Pact did not “outlaw war,” but rather, as all signatories agreed, “the ‘renunciation of war’ as an instrument of their respective national policies would not deprive the signatories of their respective right of legitimate self-defence.” Furthermore, “just as the Great Powers which have signed the treaties guaranteeing security in Europe must alone shoulder the entire burden of keeping peace in Europe, so similarly Japan, as the only organized strong power in Eastern Asia, has an obligation to discharge which she cannot escape.” As Miyaoka piously concluded, the Japanese were “a people-loving people” who had been forced into war in 1894 and 1904, were all for the “maintenance of friendly relations with the rest of the world,” including “the promotion of cultural relations,” and had never “committed an act detrimental to the integral maintenance of the independence of China or any of her legitimate interests.” For someone who was allegedly an internationalist, these claims were not too dissimilar from those offered by the noted “realist” international legal scholar Tachi Sakutarō who openly deprecated the Pact’s significance and searched for loopholes in the text for Japan to exploit. Even Nitobe, the epitome of Japan’s interwar internationalism, could be emphatically apologetic. In 1932 he claimed—channelling the spirit of Matsuoka—that, “Japan’s advance—not necessarily of military methods, I should say—in search of a life-line, is as irresistible an economic force as the westward march of the Anglo-Saxon empires.” In Nitobe’s view, Japan’s policy in Asia was no different than that of the United States in Latin America and

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472 Miyaoka, *Foreign Policy*, 35
474 Bix, *Hirohito*, 222-223.
admitted frustration when he failed to convince his intended audiences.\textsuperscript{476}

The result of this turn from accommodation to regionalism had a profound impact for the cultural internationalist cause. As Akira Iriye has argued, the 1930s not only saw the rise of exclusionary nationalism, racism, aggression, and mass murder—“forces that were the precise opposite of cultural internationalism”—but it also saw the detachment of cultural understanding from ideals of internationalist solidary and instead saw their use in promoting national self-interests.\textsuperscript{477} For Japan, the coming decade would see the rise of organizations like the Society for International Cultural Relations (\textit{Kokusai bunka shinkōkai} or KBS) and programs like the foreign tours of the Takarazuka Girls’ Revue, both of which attempted to promote Japanese culture to American audiences, and did so not for the purpose of encouraging internationalism or promoting cosmopolitan viewpoints, but rather as vehicles to justify or paper-over Japan’s new regionalist expansionism in East Asia.\textsuperscript{478} In this respect, Japanese culture was being used less as a tool of promoting knowledge or understanding and rather as a form of “soft power”\textsuperscript{479} (in Joseph Nye’s terminology); a form of peaceful political power seeking “to shape the preferences of others,” partially through cultural attraction. Yet throughout this, as Abel and other historians note, the rhetoric, ideals and methodology of the previously accepted cultural internationalism informed the activities of Japan’s new “cultural diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{480} This was, however, of little consolation for either the Japan Society or the Carnegie Endowment.

For both organizations, the 1930s were a decade of disaster. “The minutes of Japan Society after 1933 are a sad repetition of decreasing membership, declining activity, and

\textsuperscript{476} Nitobe, \textit{Works}, 4: 232. See also Davidann, \textit{Cultural Diplomacy}, 154-156.
\textsuperscript{477} Iriye, \textit{Cultural Internationalism}, 91-92.
\textsuperscript{480} Abel, “Cultural Internationalism and Japan’s Wartime Empire,” 17-43; Iriye, \textit{Cultural Internationalism}, 91-130.
increasing financial problems,” as Auslin and Reischauer summarized the situation. “The directors were well aware of what was happening and even more aware that there was nothing much they or the Society could do to reverse the trend.” As that year’s Society report acknowledged, “The need of a better understanding of Japan is only too apparent. But the facilities available for that understanding are [now] woefully lacking.” The Carnegie Endowment—with its solid finances bequeathed by Andrew Carnegie and with a focus beyond Japanese-American relations—weathered the storm somewhat better. Yet, as the year 1937 ended with Japan embroiled in war with China, aspirations for peace rang hollow. “Let us suppose that an intelligent inhabitant of the planet Mars should look across space to see what is happening on this Mother Earth,” Butler mused in that year’s annual report. “What would his impressions be?”

He would hear the heads of the governments of important peoples, long looked upon as leaders in civilization, protesting their desire for peace, their belief in and their devotion to peace, while not only vigorously preparing for early and appalling war but actually carrying on international wars, in a spirit of cynical contempt for the moral public opinion of the world, without having even the honesty or the frankness to declare that they are at war. He would see nations, once acclaimed as leaders of civilization, whose school children are daily instilled with the spirit of war, taught war and drilled for war.

Travelling Europe in the spring of 1932, Ozaki Yukio could only watch the descent of his country from afar as his friend, Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, was assassinated, followed in quick succession by Inoue Junnosuke and Dan Takuma. “It seemed that in our country we made it a practice to kill off great men,” Ozaki remembered later, recalling the reports from friends to stay abroad in case he too was killed. Returning to Japan, Ozaki put his affairs in order. “In the circumstances, I felt that it would not be too soon to think of what kind of tombstone I would like.” As the war with China continued into 1938 and Prime Minister Konoe proudly proclaimed a New Order in East Asia, in Burkman’s words, “Regionalism had degenerated into a

481 Auslin, Japan Society, 29.
482 YCE, 1938, 43.
one-sided imposition of the Japanese will upon China.”\textsuperscript{484} There was little coincidence that this announcement came less than twenty-four hours after Konoe had severed all ties with the World Court and all social agencies belonging to the League of Nations. Japan was now floating untethered from all international pledges.

By 1941 both the Japan Society and the Carnegie Endowment had so dwindled that the final break was almost an anticlimax. Despite his increasingly indefensible statements, Miyaoka Tsunejirō would remain a member of the Endowment until his automatic dismissal with the outbreak of war. “It is with a sense of deep regret that the Director records the severance of a relationship with this Japanese correspondent,” Butler noted soon afterwards. “The fact that at the age of seventy-six his patriotism now commits him to support of the aggressor cannot wholly nullify the long years of service which he has rendered to the cause of international understanding.”\textsuperscript{485} Most Americans, however, were in no mood for sympathy. A few months after Pearl Harbor, the local newspaper in the small town of Hutchinson, Kansas received a parcel in the mail containing a “tastefully printed” copy of the 1942 Carnegie Endowment Yearbook, a fact the paper cheerfully took “as a gag.” In the editor’s opinion, “The part we like best is this: ‘Communication with the Orient though the Japanese correspondent of the Division, Mr. Tsunejirō Miyaoka have grown less and less satisfactory during the period under review.’”\textsuperscript{486} The understatement spoke for itself. By the outbreak of war on December 7, the Japan Society no longer had a full complement of directors to resign from their posts, but on December 8, President Henry Taft issued a brief statement that, “I hereby resign as president of the Japan Society and as a member of its Board of Directors, my resignation to take place at once.”\textsuperscript{487}

\textsuperscript{484} Burkman, “From World Order to Regional Order,” 214.
\textsuperscript{485} YCE, 1942, 75.
\textsuperscript{486} “Probably as a Gag,” Hutchinson News, Apr. 18, 1942. For the original see YCE, 1942, 74.
\textsuperscript{487} Auslin, Japan Society, 30.
Most remaining members followed suit soon after. The Society’s living members were not the war’s only victims. On the night of December 10, four of the Japanese cherry trees along the Tidal Basin in Washington DC, two of them originals planted by Takamine Jokichi, were cut down by what the Park superintendent Irving C. Root dismissed as “misguided individuals.” Into the base of one of the trees was carved “to hell with the Japanese.” American cultural internationalists were now the punchline to jokes and the victims of vandalism.

The fate of the Carnegie Endowment and the Japan Society in December 1941 showed the limitations of what cultural internationalism could practically do to improve Japanese-American relations. Despite the difficulties, both organizations had achieved some notable successes. As responses to the Japan Society’s bulletin, the accounts of Hamilton Wright Mabie and the Carnegie journalists, or other reviews of the various books and pamphlets published by both organizations show, these two nongovernmental internationalist organizations did spur debate in the American press about the status of Japanese-American relations, bringing attention to Japanese concerns with American decisions on issues such as racial exclusion, military competition, and the potential for trade disputes. In this, both organizations also produced a strong counternarrative to that offered by U.S. racial exclusionists, inflexible nationalists, and military boosters who could never claim they spoke on behalf of all Americans. This also helped to undercut the arguments of anti-American Japanese with similar criticisms. Nevertheless, the views pervasive in both organizations were also highly flawed. Firstly, both organizations remained tolerant towards Japanese imperialism in East Asia despite the obvious imperial rivalries this could cause, as well as its incompatibility with China’s right to self-determination and the maintenance of its territorial integrity. As John Meehan has observed, while imperialism was “generally discredited in the West since 1919, [it] still had great appeal in some circles

dealing with the Far East.” After all, “imperialism represented order in a region marked by political instability and conferred practical advantages to diplomats, traders, and missionaries.” For political conservatives, Meehan notes, this was a much better system of government than the “paper promises” offered by the League of Nations. Yet, as shown, many within the internationalist movement also had an affinity to such arguments, if in a more idealistic vein. From Jabez Sunderland’s defence of a reformed imperialism that sought to legitimately help the native population rather than exploit it, to the Carnegie exchange journalists—who while noting the iniquities of Japanese rule in Korea, still agreed with the views of the Shanghai Municipal Council about the value of imperialism in a China that was not yet fully unified and run by a corrupt Nationalist administration—many in both organizations still saw imperialism as a force for good in Asia, despite the clear contradictions. This was because most of these internationally-minded imperialists made a clear distinction between an “honourable imperialism” which sought to better the lives of its subject peoples, and an aggressive expansionism which was inherently self-centred and cruel. Prior to 1931, most American internationalists firmly believed that Japan was a modern and civilized nation firmly ensconced in the first category, and given their own colonial possessions thought it hypocritical not to do otherwise. Racial categorizing, clearly, was not incompatible with their internationalism. In such beliefs, both organizations and their members seemed as much the promoters of a pragmatic realism as a hopeful idealism. Clearly, as Lucian Ashworth argued, the supposed dichotomy between idealists and realists created by postwar observers was a false one that greatly oversimplified the political debates of this era.

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490 This view, incidentally, was much like the position taken by the Lytton Report in 1932 which acknowledged Japan’s “rights and interests” in Manchuria, noted the lack of a unified Chinese government capable of exerting authority over the region, but also criticized the blatant imperialist fiction of Manchukuoan “autonomy” and noted the region’s increasing violence as Japanese soldiers attempted to pacify local Chinese opposition.

Secondly, there was the cultural internationalist creed that better knowledge more widely distributed was the best way to promote international understanding, and thus peacefully resolve disputes. While these underlying motivations no doubt had their merits—it is better to make policy decisions based on facts and logic than on vague hearsay and (in Japan’s case) with a foreign belief in the inherently “inscrutable” nature of the oriental mind—yet both organizations failed to take into consideration the limitations of such beliefs. On the one hand, there was the inherent inflexibility of many people’s opinions. As Kwame Appiah notes, even for those with cosmopolitan viewpoints knowledge does not always lead to respect. Taking the case of the Victorian traveller Sir Richard Francis Burton as emblematic, Appiah notes that while well-versed in Islamic poetry, Burton was still a typical Victorian racist and thus, “an odd mélange of cosmopolitanism and misanthrope.” “Burton,” he concludes, “is a standing refutation, then, to those who imagine that prejudice derives only from ignorance, that intimacy must breed amity.”492 In particular, for Americans like Montaville Flowers and other immigration exclusionists, more knowledge was simply not going to win them over to the internationalist point of view and, as Tokutomi Sohō had suggested, their distrust would likely only be heightened by such attempts. Even Nitobe, as noted, became increasingly frustrated after the Manchurian Incident when what he assumed were perfectly logical arguments on the merits of Japan’s case were brushed aside by his intended audiences. On the other hand, there was the fact that spreading knowledge about Japan was pointless if it did not induce a response on the part of the recipient. As the Japanese law professor Takayanagi Kenzō lamented at the 1929 Institute of Pacific Relations Conference in Kyoto, even within the internationalist community, few seemed to care enough to act on Asian affairs. Referencing the previously mentioned treaties edited by

492 Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism*, 7-8. This fact was also explored by Edward Said in his studies of European colonialism. Knowledge of the essentialized “Orient”, as he noted, merely helped facilitate and justify European imperialism, not improve cross-cultural understanding. See *Orientalism* (New York: Penguin, 1995), 31-48.
John MacMurray for the Carnegie Endowment, Takayanagi reproached the League of Nations for its narrow interests. “My main thesis tonight is that Geneva is too far away to appreciate the complex conditions obtaining in the Far East. Members of the League Council may fall into the error of judging things by superficial observation of events and the mere study of the provisions of the treaties contained in MacMurray.” Takayanagi suggested that a new organization affiliated with the League needed to be established with both the United States and the Soviet Union to deal, “not only with the Manchurian question, but with questions relating to the whole international situation in the Orient.” Such an organization was never established and would be rendered moot with the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident two years later. Even today, with a larger number of internationalist organizations active than ever before, it is impossible to ignore that military conflicts still persist around the globe.

And yet cultural internationalism did not die. As Akira Iriye notes, the Second World War was as much a cultural battle as it was a military or geopolitical struggle. The fact, for example, that the Japan government consciously patterned its 1943 Pan-Asian Conference’s East Asian Declaration after the Allies’ Atlantic Charter merely clinches this point. Both declarations, as Iriye notes, were a form of cultural propaganda to lay out what each side in the conflict was fighting for and how the post-war would look if their side was victorious. The idea that culture had power, whether in the pursuit of nationalism or in the future pursuit of internationalism, thus remained alive during the war and reasserted itself with the Allied victory. While the Hutchinson Press was having a good laugh at the Carnegie Endowment’s 1942 Yearbook, the New York Times read in it a determination to win the war and then to win the peace. “Its intelligent pacifism, which gave its utterances an interventionist tone before we got

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493 Burkman, “From World Order to Regional Order,” 205.
494 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 131-149.
495 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 136.
into the war, leads it now to support the war aims of the United Nations, and will make it a factor in post-war planning,” the paper argued. “Reading its pages, one doesn’t feel that the peace movement has utterly failed but that peace is a great goal that sometimes has to be fought for.”

Working throughout the war as best it could, the Carnegie Endowment continued to labour in paving the way for the post-war reconstruction that was to come. As Butler defiantly asserted in 1942, “The work of the Division has carefully avoided the merely sentimental or that sensational propaganda for peace which is all too common.” Instead, “it has based its work, and will continue to do so, upon the intellectual forces which alone can guide the world in the establishment of new and constructive policies of international cooperation to make another war such as now rages practically impossible.”

Nor had the Japan Society met the fate of Takamine’s cherry trees. When Henry Taft stepped down in 1941, Louis V. Ledoux had assumed the mantle of command and worked to legally preserve the corporate framework of the Society until the end of the war, a task which was completed by April 1942. Lying idle for the duration of the conflict, the first meeting of the Society’s revived board of directors would be held on April 10, 1947 and the organization would slowly recover in the years which followed.

Both organizations continue to exist as of this writing.

For Ozaki Yukio, the end of the war came sooner than expected. “Mistakenly, I thought we might last for six months or so after the German surrender.” However, with the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the destruction of the Kantōgun at the hands of the Red Army, the war came to an end on August 15. “Yamato damashii was weaker than I thought.”

With the coming of peace, Ozaki moved to make the transition from war a smooth one. At the

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497 YCE, 1943, 29-30.
498 Auslin, Japan Society, 30; 33.
time of the surrender, he had already been planning for postwar reconstruction, having penned

two articles on the topic. The first simply called for a cease-fire to escape a complete collapse

with Japan’s honour intact, while the second was entitled “Requirements for Building a Peaceful

New World.” As the Diet was reconvened in September under Emperor Hirohito’s bother, Prince

Naruhiko, Ozaki submitted these ideas as a proposal for the upcoming surrender negotiations.

Many of the points were obvious conclusions; the fourth stated that Japan would liberate her

remaining empire; the fifth that the resulting peace treaty needed to be a magnanimous one to

prevent war in the future. The seventh and last point, however, offered an idea of how Japan

could integrate itself back into the international system it had definitively abandoned in 1938:

    We shall not only advocate building a new world but will cordially welcome experts to
    study ways of achieving it, to reform education and erase narrow-minded nationalism and
    statism, and to educate and train people to serve the new ideology of a universal
    brotherhood of the whole world under one roof.⁵⁰⁰

Even in Japan, cultural internationalism had awoken from its pre-war slumber.

APPENDIX A: IMAGES

Image 1: Charles William Elliot delivers a speech after his retirement as Harvard president, 1910
Library of Congress (LC-H261-7742 [P&P])
Image 2: Jabez T. Sunderland late in his career, mid-1900s
Andover-Harvard Theological Library (bMS 1446/220)
Image 3: Judge Elbert Gary keeps pace with Japanese special envoy and later ambassador to the United States Ishii Kikujirō, 1917-1919

Library of Congress (LC-B2- 4348-3 [P&P])
Image 4: Astor Hotel menu for the Honorary Commission of Raw Silk Industry of Japan, April 9, 1919
New York Public Library (b16981665)
Image 5: Carnegie exchange journalists pose with Zhang Xueliang (Second Row, Second from Left), and his attendants at his estate in Mukden, June 14, 1929
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